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In late 1989, the Washington and Lee Law Review published my article
on Virginia's equitable distribution law.' The article focused primarily
upon classification of marital and separate property under Virginia's
unique unitary theory of property, and paid special attention to the
definition of acquisition and the classification of appreciated property.
2
Even as that article was being published, however, the General Assem-
bly was considering significant changes to Virginia's equitable distribution
statute. Under the leadership of Lawrence D. Diehl, the legislative sub-
committee of the Family Law Section of the Virginia Bar Association
drafted legislation modifying the statute substantially.' The legislators were
given the text of the proposed bill and a detailed explanation of it, and
the initial reaction was favorable. After a period of discussion and several
relatively minor amendments, both the House of Delegates4 and the Senate'
passed identical versions of the final bill. On April 6, 1990, Governor
Wilder signed the Senate bill, and the proposed changes became law.
6
As finally enacted, the new amendment makes major changes in
Virginia's equitable distribution law. The unitary theory of property is
repealed, 7 and the doctrine of transmutation has been changed signifi-
1. Turner, Virginia's Equitable Distribution Law: An Owner's Manual, 46 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 807 (1989).
2. See id. at 827-44.
3. H.B. 606, 1990 Session, and S. 90, 1990 Session. See Diehl, Update on Transmutation
in Virginia, VutONaIA LAWYER, January 1990, at 30 (discussing two early drafts of Virginia's
new equitable distribution statute).
4. H.B. 606 (1990 Session).
5. S. 90 (1990 Session).
6. COMMONWEALTi OF VIRGINIA, GENERAL AssEMBLY, FINAL CUMULATIVE INDEX OF BMLs,
JOINT RFsoLUTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND DOCUNMNTS (1990) (hereinafter cited as GENERAL As-
SEMBLY INDEX). In addition, Govenor Wilder signed the identical House bill on April 9, 1990.
Id. Thus, the new amendments were fully enacted two separate times, and appear in two
different chapters of the Virginia session laws. See 1990 VA. ACTs 636, 764.
7. VA. CODE ANm. § 20-107.3(A) (Supp. 1990). Unless otherwise noted, all cites herein
to VA.CODE ANN. refer to the 1990 supplement.
VIRGINIA'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW
cantly.8 Most importantly, there is an entirely new set of statutory rules
for classifying appreciation in separate property.9 If the statute were an
automobile, the 1990 changes are much more than minor additions and
revisions. The General Assembly has issued a recall notice and compre-
hensively redesigned the vehicle.
This article will focus upon the new statute in two separate ways.
First, it will describe the new rules, discussing how the new rules will
operate in a number of common fact situations. Reference will be made
not only to the text of the amendments, but also to the legislative history,
which in several cases is as important as the text itself. Second, the article
will evaluate whether the new amendments are likely to accomplish their
purpose. The primary motivation behind the changes was a common
perception among attorneys and legislators that Virginia's equitable dis-
tribution law suffered from serious flaws.' 0 By comparing the new amend-
ments with similar law in other states, we can determine whether or not
the new amendment is likely to resolve these perceived shortcomings.
I. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
A. Policies Behind the Virginia Statute
The 1990 amendments were enacted to remedy several specific per-
ceived problems with the law before 1990. Before looking at these prob-
lems, however, we should review briefly three basic features of the way
Virginia divides property upon divorce.
1. Equitable Distribution
First, at the risk of stating a truism, Virginia has chosen to divide
property using an equitable distribution system. By choosing equitable
distribution, Virginia rejected the other two major alternative methods of
property division-legal title" and community property.' 2
Virginia's choice of equitable distribution over the other alternative
methods of propery division has important policy consequences. Any
property division system must balance two competing policy goals: indi-
8. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(3).
9. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
10. See, e.g., Diehl, supra note 3, at 30; Diehl, Transmutation in Virginia: Are We
Drowning in the Pool of Marital Assets?, J. VA. TRAL LAw. A., Sept. 1989, at 26; Legislative
Subcommittee, Family Law Section Board of Governors, Virginia State Bar Association,
"Report and Recommendations on the Issue of Transmutation and Classification of Property
in Equitable Distribution Proceedings" (1989) (hereinafter Legislative Subcommittee Report)
(attached as an appendix to this article).
11. See generally L. GOLDEN, EQUTrrABLE DisTmUTnoN oF PROPERTY § 1.03 (1983 &
Supp. 1990).
12. See generally id. § 1.04.
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vidualism and sharing. 3 Individualism is the traditional economic principle
stating that every person should receive the benefits or penalties of his
own actions. In the property division context, a completely individualistic
theory would award each spouse the property created by his or her efforts.
If creation is defined restrictively to mean inception of ownership rather
than origin of efforts, a completely individualistic theory would closely
resemble the legal title theory Virginia followed before 1983.14
In contrast to individualism, community property methods of property
division reflect the principle that husbands and wives should share all their
property equally. The principle of sharing is a longstanding principle of
Spanish and French law. Both Spanish and French law strongly influenced
the law of the eight original community property states.15 In common-law
states, legislators and courts originally chose individualism over sharing,
and expressed this preference in a legal title system. 16 Sharing principles
were not ignored, but common-law states assumed that sharing occurred
naturally during the marriage. It was necessary to enforce sharing when
the marriage ended, of course, but even then the common-law states did
not require actual sharing of property. Instead, common-law states imple-
mented sharing indirectly, by requiring the husband to support the wife
indefinitely at the marital standard of living.'
7
In the 1970s and 1980s, the rising divorce rate and the increasing
affluence of women caused alimony to become less a vehicle for sharing
and more a device for rehabilitation. This change prevented courts from
13. See generally Reynolds, Increases in Separate Property and the Evolving Marital
Partnership, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239, 242-44 (1989). Reynolds discusses the philosophies
of individualism and sharing at some length, but she does not view the two philosophies as
competing equals. Instead, she admits that her article "promotes a philosophy of sharing over
a more individualistic philosophy as appropriate to the marriage relationship." Id. at 244 n.12.
This article, by contrast, views the choice between the competing policy goals of individualism
and sharing as a choice best resolved in the political arena. Reynolds makes an excellent case
for her position, however, and she demonstrates well how courts can move toward a more
sharing-oriented, less individualistic scheme of property division.
14. See Emsberger v. Ernsberger, 224 Va. 1, 294 S.E.2d 794 (1982) (holding that Virginia
courts had no authority to transfer title to property during divorce proceedings); Watkins v.
Watkins, 220 Va. 1051, 265 S.E.2d 750 (1980) (same).
15. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 249-52.
16. See id. Indeed, the strong tendency toward individualism caused early American
community property decisions to reject some of the broad sharing principles of Spanish civil
law. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 252-58.
17. See L. WErrzmAN, THE DIVORCE REvOLUTION 145-47 (1985); Smith, The Partnership
Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEx. L. REv. 689, 694 (1990).
18. See L. WErrzi&AN, supra note 17, at 147-50; see also U.M.D.A. prefatory note, 9A
U.L.A. 147, 147 (1987); L. GOLDEN, supra note 6, § 1.02. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act (the Act) was completed in 1970 at the very start of the equitable distribution revolution.
The Act allows for spousal support only if the wife cannot support herself from her own
property or earnings. U.M.D.A. § 308, 9A U.L.A. at 347. To compensate for this limitation,
the drafters wrote the first modem equitable distribution statute. U.M.D.A. § 307, 9A U.L.A.
at 239. See H. CLAK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN TE UNITED STATES § 17.1 at
256-57 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing modern limitations upon concept of alimony); Smith, supra
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implementing sharing through alimony and caused eventual widespread
rejection of the title theory.' 9 Recent authors have continued to emphasize
sharing as the best way to protect women and children from the economic
consequences of divorce.20 A complete sharing-oriented theory of property
division would resemble traditional community property law, with its
strong emphasis upon joint ownership and its requirement that community
assets be divided equally upon divorce.
2'
By choosing equitable distribution, Virginia has opted for a middle
ground between individualism and sharing. When property is acquired
from nonmarital sources, the statute defines it as separate property, thus
preserving for the owner the benefit of his or her nonmarital efforts. 22
When property is acquired during the marriage, by contrast, the statute
implements sharing principles by classifying the property as marital, re-
gardless of whose efforts created it.23 The preference toward sharing is
tempered by the use of relative contributions to the marriage as a factor
in dividing marital property. Relative contributions, however, is only one
of a number of factors relevant to the overall division of marital property.
24
As we shall see, the new amendments continue the previous emphasis upon
balancing both individualism and sharing. 2 It is important, therefore, that
both policies be considered in construing the statute.
2. The Marital Partnership Theory
Second, the Virginia statute clearly follows the marital partnership
theory of marriage. 26 Under this theory, the parties' property should be
note 17, at 694 (noting that traditional concept of alimony depended upon widespread
assumption that marriage was permanent-an assumption that was questioned increasingly
during 1960, the last decade before equitable distribution).
19. See generally L, GOLDEN, supra note 6, §§ 1.01-1.02.
20. See, e.g., L. WEZ", supra note 17; Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future
of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1977); Reynolds, supra note 13,
21. Such a theory would not, of course, be identical to traditional community property
law. That law restricted sharing in many obvious and subtle ways, including notably the
longstanding refusal to treat active appreciation in separate property as community property.
See generally Reynolds, supra note 13. With its theory of joint ownership during the marriage
and its requirement that community property be divided equally, however, traditional com-
munity property law comes closer to an absolute sharing requirement than present equitable
distribution law.
This is not to say that community property states implement sharing better than equitable
distribution states. Indeed, I agree with Professor Reynolds that more progressive equitable
distribution states do a better job of implementing sharing principles specifically upon divorce.
See id. at 243. When we consider the marriage as a whole, however, including ownership
during the marriage and distribution upon death, community property is the more sharing-
oriented and less individualistic theory.
22. VA. CODE ANm. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
23. See id. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (except for gifts and inheritances, property acquired during
marriage is marital property, regardless of whose efforts acquired property).
24. See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
25. See infra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
26. Williams v. Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 24, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1987) (Virginia statute
"is intended to recognize a marriage as a partnership").
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divided in proportion to the contributions they have each made to the
marriage.2 7 Virginia law does not tell us how to define or measure con-
tributions, but clearly the process requires more than reference to an
economics textbook. Contributions with a low economic value may nev-
ertheless be given a higher value for purposes of property division. 28 The
proportional division requirement of the marital partnership theory is a
classic attempt to implement an individualistic philosophy within a marital
context. The flexible law on valuing contributions, however, reflects the
influence of the philosophy of sharing.
While most states follow the marital partnership theory in some form,
29
there are other theories regarding the proper treatment of marital prop-
erty.30 Virginia could have followed the lead of some community property
states and required an equal division of marital property,31 or it could
have reduced significantly the role of contributions to the marriage in the
ultimate division of property.32 Virginia's ultimate choice to adopt the
marital partnership theory shows a preference for individualism, tempered
by a broad sharing-based definition of contributions to the marriage.
3. Dual Classification
Third, Virginia has chosen the "dual classification" model of property
division. Under this model, the court's power to divide property extends
only to a limited class of "marital" or "community" property. 3 Property
27. See Williams v. Williams, 4 Va. App. at 24, 354 S.E.2d at 66 (1987) (property
should be divided equitably "based on the monetary and non-monetary contributions of each
spouse"); L. GOLDEN, supra note I1, § 1.01
28. For instance, property awards to full-time homemaker spouses regularly exceed the
total economic value of their homemaker services. See, e.g., Bidwell v. Bidwell, 122 A.D.2d
364, 504 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1986) (trial court did not err by refusing to accept expert testimony
on economic value of wife's homemaker services; economic value of such services not relevant
to equitable distribution); Smith v. Smith, 294 S.C. 194, 363 S.E.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1987)
(expert testimony relevant, but trial court's property award not limited to uncontested economic
value of wife's homemaker services).
29. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 1.02 at 3 (stating that almost all states embrace
partnership theory of equitable distribution).
30. See, e.g., Glendon, Is There a Future for Separate Property?, 8 FAM. L.Q. 315, 318
(1974) (noting that in West Germany and Sweden, systems resembling equitable distribution
are increasingly limited in favor of return to title theory); Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital
Property Outdated?, 22 J. FAm. L. 263, 268 (1984) (arguing that no marital property should
be accumulated until marriage lasts five years or child is born); Smith, supra note 17, at 689
(arguing that marital partnership theory has failed entirely, and suggesting supplementing
marital partnership theory with automatic continuing award based upon the difference in
parties' incomes).
31. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1990) (requiring that community estate
be divided equally upon divorce).
32. For instance, Virginia now requires the award of premarital property to the owning
spouse. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(i). If Virginia had enacted an all property rather
than a dual classification system, however, acquisition before the marriage would be only one
relevant factor in the overall division. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
33. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 2.01.
VIRGINIA'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW
falling outside this class is known as "separate" or "nonmarital" property,
and the court must award such property to the owning spouse. The dual
classification model can be contrasted with the "all property" model,
under which the court can divide all property owned by either party,
regardless of how the property was acquired.
34
Virginia's rejection of the all property model demonstrates several
policy preferences. First, a dual classification system provides as a matter
of law that certain types of "nonmarital" property are not to be shared
between the parties. An all property system, by contrast, allows the court
to order sharing of any asset when equity so requires. Although trial
judges in all property states have discretion to award nonmarital property
to the owner or at least to divide nonmarital property unequally, trial
judges are generally reluctant to do so." In all property states, most assets
are divided roughly equally in most cases.16 Therefore Virginia's choice of
dual classification over all property again shows a moderate preference
for individualism over sharing.
Moreover, property division in an all property state is a discretionary
process. States using the all property model have few fixed rules for
property division, and trial judges have great flexibility to reach an
equitable result. Unfortunately, the lack of a system of fixed rules for
property division reduces the predictability of judicial decisions. Because
different trial judges divide property in very different ways, the identity
of the trial judge can become the most important variable in the case.37
Indeed, the same judge may reach different results on essentially the same
facts. This unpredictability encourages litigation, discourages settlement,
and increases court costs.38 Dual classification provides a more predictable
result because the court cannot divide nonmarital property, but the price
of predictability of result is the loss of flexibility in the process. By
choosing dual classification over all property, the Virginia General Assem-
bly showed a clear desire that the court's property division be reasonably
predictable.
Finally, the all property system is an easy system to administer. Because
there are few fixed rules of law, the appellate courts are not burdened
with the need to decide difficult legal issues.39 Similarly, the trial courts
34. See id. § 2.02. For a sample all property statute, see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
208, § 34 (West 1989) ("the court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part
of the estate of the other").
35. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 2.02.
36. Id. During my five years as a researcher in the field of equitable distribution, I have
confirmed this observation in discussions with many attorneys from all property states.
37. Id. Again, I have confirmed this in numerous discussions with attorneys from all
property states.
38. Id. § 2.02 and appendix A (South Dakota section) (Supp. 1990); see also Schumaker
v. Schumaker, 439 N.W.2d 815, 818 (S.D. 1989) (Henderson, J., concurring) (discussing role
of contributions to specific assets in all property system, and concluding that undervaluation
of such contributions discourages settlement and encourages litigation).
39. See Smith, supra note 17, at 729 (describing classification of property in equitable
distribution states as "complex and unpredictable").
1990]
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need not deal with the complexities of classifying property as marital or
nonmarital, and can proceed directly to the division stage. Dual classifi-
cation, on the other hand, is harder to administer because the court must
decide difficult legal issues and then apply the resulting rules to fact
situations that often are detailed and complex. By enacting a dual classi-
fication system, the General Assembly evidenced a willingness to accept
some difficulty in administration to reach a more predictable, less discre-
tionary result.
B. Perceived Failings of the Prior Law
The 1990 amendments arose out of a clear sense that the previous law
suffered from serious problems. To understand the new amendments fully,
we must first understand the problems the General Assembly intended the
new amendments to correct.
The salient feature of Virginia law before 1990 was the unitary theory
of property. 40 The theory was adopted in Smoot v. Smoot,41 where the
court held:
Code § 20-107.3 contemplates only two kinds of property-marital
property and separate property, each expressly defined. Our statute
does not recognize a hybrid species of property.
42
Thus, under Smoot, a single asset could not have both separate and
marital interests. The court was required to classify assets as either all
marital or all separate property. Therefore, when property was acquired
with both marital and separate funds, one interest had to be submerged
beneath the other. The Smoot court chose to submerge the separate
interest:
[W]hen, as here, a spouse fails to segregate and instead, commin-
gles separate property with marital property, the chancellor must
classify the commingled property as marital property subject to
equitable distribution.
43
Accordingly, whenever marital and separate funds were mixed in a single
asset, the separate interest transmuted into marital property, even if the
respective sizes of the marital and separate interests could be determined
easily.
Although Smoot defined marital property broadly, the court did not
anticipate the equal division of all marital property. Indeed, the court
40. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.06A; Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435,
357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
41. 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
42. Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 441, 357 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1987).
43. Id.
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ultimately affirmed an unequal division on the facts." The court in Smoot
stopped short of requiring an unequal division, leaving the ultimate division
of property to the trial court's discretion.
45
Decisions after Smoot developed unitary property in a logical and fair
manner. In a number of cases, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that
almost any marital contribution was sufficient to transmute separate
property into marital property. 46 In keeping with Smoot and the general
philosophy of the Virginia statute, the Virginia Court of Appeals defined
contributions broadly, including not only direct contributions of marital
funds,47 but also indirect contributions of marital efforts. 48 In almost all
of these cases, the Virginia Court of Appeals repeated Smoot's reminder
that transmuted property need not be divided equally.49 Nevertheless, the
ultimate division still depended upon the trial court's discretion. Regardless
of whether the trial court divided the property equally or unequally, the
trial court's division of property was rarely challenged successfully on
appeal.
5 0
44. In Smoot, the husband had made a $25,000 separate property downpayment on a
home, and the parties made mortgage payments with marital funds. The trial court found that
use of marital funds to pay the mortgage transmuted the entire home into marital property.
233 Va. at 439, 357 S.E.2d at 729. The trial court returned $25,000 to the husband before
dividing the rest of the home equally, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed its decision.
Id. at 440-41, 357 S.E.2d at 730-31.
45. Smoot, 233 Va. at 443, 357 S.E.2d at 732; see also Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va.
App. 48, 378 S.E.2d 626 (1989) (holding that Smoot does not require a specific source of
funds credit).
46. See infra notes 47-48.
47. See, e.g., Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987) (separate property
downpayment on home transmuted when mortgage payments made with marital funds); Taylor
v. Taylor, 9 Va. App. 341, 387 S.E.2d 797 (1990) (separate property transmuted when
commingled with marital property in joint bank account); Lassen v. Lassen, 8 Va. App. 502,
383 S.E.2d 471 (1989) (same); Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va. App. 472, 375 S.E.2d 387 (1988)
(same); Price v. Price, 4 Va. App. 224, 355 S.E.2d 905 (1987) (separate property gemstone
transmuted into marital property when combined with marital property gemstone into new
ring).
48. No Virginia case has held that indirect contributions actually caused transmutation.
Two decisions recognized the possibility, however, and remanded the case for further factual
findings. See Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184, 190 (1988) (separate
property can transmute where active efforts of either party that are "significant to the marital
relationship" cause property to appreciate); Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 378 S.E.2d
626 (1989) (same).
49. See, e.g., Ellington, 8 Va. App. at 54, 378 S.E.2d at 629; Lambert, 6 Va. App. at
104, 367 S.E.2d at 190.
50. See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987) (awarding husband amount
of separate property downpayment on transmuted home, and dividing rest of home equally);
Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 378 S.E.2d 626 (1989) (affirming unspecified source of
funds credit less than proportional size of separate contributions; expressly holding that there
is no specific credit requirement, and that trial court has discretion to award any equitable
amount); Pommerenke v. Pommerenke, 7 Va. App. 241, 372 S.E.2d 630 (1988) (giving wife
half amount of marital funds used to pay mortgage, and awarding rest of transmuted separate
property home to husband; husband received $102,500, while wife received only $7500).
1990]
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The ultimate effect of unitary property, therefore, was to weaken the
protection given to separate property. If the Smoot court had recognized
the separate interest in mixed property, the trial court on remand would
have been required as a matter of law to return the separate interest to
the owning spouse. Under unitary property, with the entire property
classified as marital, the trial court had the discretion either to return the
separate interest to the owning spouse or to award the separate interest
to both parties. Thus, protection of separate property depended not upon
law, but upon the trial court's discretion.-" This weakening of separate
property was the primary perceived flaw with Virginia's pre-1990 equitable
distribution law.
A number of related problems arose logically from the discretionary
protection standard. First, the discretionary standard made it very difficult
for attorneys to predict the court's ultimate property division.12 This
unpredictability discouraged settlement and increased costs of litigation.
Second, the discretionary standard inevitably led to inconsistent trial court
opinions.5 3 Commingled separate assets protected by one judge would be
divided by another. The disparate trial court decisions violated the basic
equitable principle that similar cases should receive similar treatment.
Finally, the degree of protection given to separate property often depended
upon a technical analysis of relatively minor amounts of commingling
rather than upon the policies behind the statute.5 4 This analysis was so
counterintuitive and confusing that it impeded rather than assisted the
ultimate search for equity. Before taking two steps forward at the division
stage, the court had to take one step backward at the classification stage.
Beneath all these problems, however, is a deeper truth. In arguing for
statutory revisions, most commentators chose to focus upon procedural
flaws, such as unpredictability and inconsistency.5 5 None of these problems
would have arisen, however, if trial judges had exercised their discretionary
authority to protect commingled separate property by making an unequal
division. The very existence of procedural complaints, therefore, suggests
an underlying substantive failure. Under the unitary property system,
51. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.06A (discussing discretionary protection given to
separate assets under unitary theory of property); Turner, supra note 1, at 859-60 (same).
52. See Legislative Subcommittee Report, supra note 10, at 2 (criticizing "[i]nability to
counsel clients on their reasonable property expectations, even in the most simple of equitable
distribution cases"); Diehl, supra note 10, at 27 ("The inability to provide sound legal guidance
to our clients as to their ultimate expectations in the division of marital property upon divorce
in Virginia repeatedly has been cited as a current problem in prior published articles").
53. See Legislative Subcommittee Report, supra note 10, at 2 (criticizing "inconsistent
court results with similar fact situations"); Diehl, supra note 10, at 27 ("inconsistent case law
has still left practitioners without guidance as to when a 'source of funds' type of credit will
be made to the contributing spouse").
54. See Diehl, supra note 3, at 32 ("the opinions reward the marital estate due to a
'technical' commingling rather than further the goals of the marital partnership theory").
55. See Diehl, supra note 10; Diehl, supra note 3; Legislative Subcommittee Report,
supra note 10.
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Virginia trial judges were simply not giving sufficient protection to com-
mingled separate property.
5 6
C. Purposes of the 1990 Amendments
To summarize, therefore, the General Assembly adopted the 1990
amendments to correct several perceived problems with classification of
property under previous law. The classification process was viewed as too
unpredictable, too inconsistent, too technical, and too far removed from
the general policies of equitable distribution. All of these complaints
stemmed from two sources: Smoot's decision to leave the protection of
separate property to the trial court's discretion, and the failure of trial
judges to exercise that discretion to consistently protect commingled sep-
arate property. During the process of debating and passing the proposed
changes, the General Assembly was assured that the modified statute
would address each of these points. 57 It is reasonable to assume, therefore,
that the General Assembly's overriding intent was to correct these specific
perceived failings.
II. THE MIXED THEORY OF PROPERTY
The primary effect of the new amendments is simple: unitary property
is overruled. Section 20-107.3(A) states that there are three kinds of
property: separate property, marital property, and property "which is part
separate and part marital. '" s The new Virginia statute expressly contem-
plates the "hybrid species of property" Smoot refused to recognize. 9 The
rule that property can have both marital and separate interests will be
called the mixed theory of property.60
By recognizing mixed property, the new amendments change the basic
nature of marital property interests. Under unitary property, the marital
interest was essentially an equitable shadow of legal title.6 ' The interest
might or might not be present in a given asset, but where it was present,
it had the exact same size and shape as the legal title. Under the new
56. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.06A ("By leaving the return of separate property
to the unpredictable discretion of the trial judge, unitary property may unduly threaten the
concept of separate property"); J. Feldman & C. Fleck, Taming Transmutation: A Guide to
Illinois' New Rules on Property Classification and Division upon Dissolution of Marriage, ILL.
B.J., March 1984, at 336-38 ("The statutory protection given to nonmarital property by dual
classification was seriously threatened by the doctrine of [strict] transmutation" required by
unitary property).
57. See generally Diehl, "Comments and Analysis of Proposed Amendments to § 20-
107.3 Relating to Definition of Marital and Separate Property in Equitable Distribution
Proceedings" (hereinafter cited as Legislative Subcommittee Analysis) (attached as an appendix
to this article).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A).
59. See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 441, 357 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1987).
60. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.06 (discussing mixed theory of property).
61. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.06A; Turner, supra note 1, at 828-29; .
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amendment, by contrast, the marital interest is more analagous to an
equitable lien.6 2 Similar to other liens, under the new amendment the
marital interest can extend to all, some, or none of a particular asset.
A. Measuring the Marital and Separate Interests: The Source of Funds
Rule
1. Deriving the Source of Funds Rule
Although the statute clearly allows an asset to have both marital and
separate portions, the statute does not definitively state how to measure
the amount of these portions. Only a few provisions address the questions,
and these provisions all relate to very specific fact situations.
63
Outside of these specific fact situations, the statute provides no guid-
ance on measuring the marital and separate portions of an asset. This
failure is somewhat surprising, because the drafters' purpose was to
recognize fairly both the marital and separate interests in commingled
property.64 As the drafters intended to recognize and protect both of these
interests, one would expect to find some rule on how the sizes of these
interests should be computed. The statute, however, is entirely silent on
the question.
Nevertheless, the history of the amendments and the proceedings of
the General Assembly provide relatively clear guidance as to how to
measure the marital and separate portions of an asset. In most equitable
distribution states, the marital interest is computed under the "source of
funds rule." 65 The'source of funds rule provides that when property is
acquired with marital and separate funds, the ratio between the marital
and separate interests is the ratio between the marital and separate con-
tributions.66 While the new amendments are not clear on the subject, there
62. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.06; Turner, supra note 1, at 828.
63. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (dealing with appreciation in and income from
separate property); id. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d-e) (dealing with inseparably commingled marital and
separate property); id. § 20-107.3(G) (dealing with pensions); id. § 20-107.3(H) (dealing with
personal injury and worker's compensation awards).
64. See Legislative Subcommittee Report, supra note 10, at 4.
65. L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, §§ 1.07, 5.07, and 5.07A.
66. This was the original statement of the rule in the community property case of Moore
v. Moore. See Moore v. Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 368, 618 P.2d 208, 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662,
664 (1980) (community interest is "in the ratio that the payments on the purchase price with
community funds bear to the payments made with separate funds").
Despite its California origin, the source of funds rule has been rejected in most community
property states. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, §§ 1.06, 1.07 and 5.07A. Instead, most
community property states follow the inception of title rule, under which property is acquired
when legal title is first received. L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, §§ 1.06, 5.07. The source of funds
rule has been widely accepted in equitable distribution states, however, see infra note 92, and
it can now be called the majority rule. See L. GoLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A; cf. Tibbetts
v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 76 & n.9 (Me. 1979) (treating source of funds rule as isolated
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is evidence that the General Assembly meant to adopt the source of funds
rule.
a. Statutory Language
First, the language of the statute is consistent with the source of funds
rule. The statute defines separate property as all property "acquired by
either party before the marriage," and all property "acquired during the
marriage" by gift, inheritance, or exchange. 67 Marital property, by con-
trast, is all property "acquired by each party during the marriage" which
is not separate property.
6
Under these provisions, the key elements in determining the classifi-
cation of property are the manner and time of the property's acquisition.
The analysis is essentially two-tiered. First, we must determine the manner
of acquisition. If the property was acquired by gift, inheritance, or
exchange, then the property is separate property, regardless of the time
acquisition occurred. 69 Second, if the property was acquired by some other
means, we must determine the time of acquisition. If the property was
acquired before or after the marriage, it is separate property, and if the
property was acquired during the marriage, it is marital property.
70
These same rules can be applied to measure the marital and separate
interests in mixed property. Mixed property should be separate property
to the extent it was acquired (1) by gift, inheritance, or exchange at any
time, or (2) by other means before or after the marriage. 7' Mixed property
should be marital property to the extent it was acquired by other means
during the marriage. 72
From these rules, we can deduce two points about the nature of
acquisition. First, the new statute anticipates the existence of mixed prop-
erty.73 Since marital and separate property are acquired at different times
equitable exception to majority inception of title rule).
Equitable distribution states have generally defined the rule as providing that the marital
interest is a portion of the total equity in the property equal to the marital contribution
divided by the total marital and nonmarital contribution. See, e.g., Harper v. Harper, 294
Md. 54, 80, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (1982) (nonmarital interest is "in the ratio of the nonmarital
investment to the total nonmarital and marital investment in the property"); In re Herr, 705
S.W.2d 619, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (ratio betweeni marital and nonmarital interests is "the
ratio of marital investment to the total of marital and nonmarital investment in the property");
Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 382, 325 S.E.2d 260, 269 (1985) ("each estate is entitled
to an interest in the property in the ratio its contribution bears to the total investment in the
property"), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985). The language in the above
cases restates the Moore rule. See supra (discussing Moore rule).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
68. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(2).
69. Id.§ 20-107.3(A)(1)(ii-iii).
70. Id.§ 20-107.3(A)(1)(i), (A)(2)(iii).
71. See id.§ 20-107.3(A)(1)(i-iii) (defining separate property).
72. See id. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(i) & (A)(2)(iii) (defining marital property).
73. See id. § 20-107.3(A) (recognizing "separate property," "marital property," and
property "which is part separate and part marital property").
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and in different manners, it must be possible for the same asset to be
acquired in more than one way. Otherwise, mixed property would never
exist. Second, acquisition cannot mean mere inception of legal title. 74 If
this were so, every asset would be acquired in only one manner and at
only one time. As noted above, however, the statute clearly anticipates
multiple methods of acquisition. 75 If multiple methods are to exist, then
acquisition must be more than creation of legal title.
Neither of these points requires use of the source of funds rule, but
they are both fully consistent with it. Under the source of funds rule, the
ratio of marital and separate contributions is used to measure the marital
and separate interests. 76 Because contributions can be made by different
means at different times, acquisition is obviously a process rather than an
event. This meets the first requirement. In addition, under the source of
funds rule, acquisition depends not upon inception of title, but upon the
marital and separate contributions of real economic value.77 The fact that
title vested at a particular time does not matter because legal title by itself
is not a contribution to value. Thus, the source of funds rule meets both
of the statutory requirements outlined above.
Further guidance on measuring the marital and separate interests comes
from the provisions of the statute addressing appreciation. It is reasonable
to assume that the legislature intended to adopt a single comprehensive
theory of marital property. Thus, if we can find a single theory that unites
all of the disparate provisions of the Virginia statute, that theory should
probably control questions which the statute does not answer directly.
As we shall see, the new amendments adopt the same rule for classi-
fying income and appreciation in separate property. If marital funds or
efforts caused the appreciation or income, it is marital property, but if
forces outside the marriage caused the appreciation or income, that ap-
preciation or income is separate property. 7 Under this rule, classification
of property depends upon its source: the appreciation or income is given
the same classification as the funds or efforts which produced it. Moreover,
for several years now, pensions have been marital property to the extent
pensions were earned during the marriage. 79 Again, the statute looks to
74. Indeed, the court of appeals rejected an inception of title approach even under
unitary property. Booth v. Booth, No. 0981-86-3, slip op. at 5 (Va. Ct. App., Feb. 2, 1988).
Subsequently the Booth opinion was withdrawn for rehearing. When the opinion was reissued,
the court deleted the portion dealing with the definition of acquisition on grounds that the
issue had not been presented by the appellant. See Booth v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 371 S.E.2d
569 (1988). The deleted portion of the opinion, however, is consistent with prior and subsequent
cases and provides a valuable insight into the court's thinking.
75. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
76. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A.
77. See id.
78. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (appreciation in separate property); id. § 20-
107.3(A)(3)(a) (income from separate property).
79. See id. § 20-107.3(G).
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the source of an asset: pensions that were obtained as compensation for
marital efforts are defined as marital property.
The source of funds rule classifies unappreciated property in exactly
the same way. Like the statutory provisions on appreciation, income, and
pensions, the source of funds rule gives property the same classifications
as the underlying contributions that created it. 80 Virginia already applies
source of funds principles, therefore, when classifying pensions and ap-
preciation in separate property.
The new statutory rules on appreciation also support the source of
funds rule in a second way. The commingling provisions of the new statute
provide that when marital and separate funds are mixed, and the contri-
butions are identifiable, neither interest loses its character.8' Thus, the size
of the marital and separate interests must be at least the size of the
contributions. If the property then appreciates due to forces outside the
marriage, each estate is entitled to the appreciation in its proportional
interest. s2 The ultimate result is that the interests are proportional to the
contributions of the parties-the exact same result that would be reached
under the source of funds rule.
b. Legislative History
The General Assembly did not prepare any legislative history materials
addressing the new amendment. In presenting its proposed bills to the
General Assembly, however, the Family Law Section prepared a detailed
analysis that described the major effects of the bill.83 The analysis was
based upon a detailed report submitted by the Section's Legislative Sub-
committee,84 which prepared the first draft of the new amendment. Both
documents are attached as appendices to this article. Interested legislators
read both documents and relied upon them during discussion and passage
of the bills.8" Thus, at the time of passage, the legislators considered the
Family Law Section's submissions to be an authoritative statement of how
the bills would affect Virginia law. Because the General Assembly relied
upon these documents, the Subcommittee Report and the Family Law
80. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A.
81. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d-e) (establishing rules for classifying mixed
property if commingling causes "loss of identity"). By implication, if identity is not lost, the
marital and separate portions should remain unchanged.
82. When separate property appreciates due to forces outside the marriage, the appre-
ciation remains separate. See VA. CODE Am. § 20-107.3(A)(1). Because appreciation in marital
property does not fall within any express definition of separate property, appreciation must
be marital property. See id. § 20-107.3(A)(2)(iii).
83. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing Legislative Subcommittee
Analysis).
84. Legislative Subcommittee Report, supra note 10.
85. See Diehl, "An Introduction to Virginia's New Statute on Transmutation and
Property Classification in Divorce Suits, at 1-4, in Post-Divorce Modification and Enforcement
(Va. Committee on Continuing Legal Education ed. 1990).
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Section analysis are crucial resources for determining what the legislature
intended. s6
86. There is ample precedent for considering nonlegislative reports to be evidence of
legislative intent. Addressing such reports, the leading treatise on statutory construction notes:
In the interpretation of such legislation the reports of these committees or commis-
sions are considered valuable aids. Such reports are acceptable interpretive aids under
the same rule which justifies the use of legislative committee reports. The legislature
is assumed to have adopted the legislation with the same intent evidenced by the
commission's report, unless the language of the statute unambiguously indicates to
the contrary.
N. SINGER, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48.11 (4th ed. 1984); see, e.g., Greenhalge v.
Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982) ("the reports of commissions
established to prepare or recommend statutory revisions can prove valuable aids in construing
a statute").
The above quotation is made in the context of outside committees appointed by the
government. The Family Law Section's Legislative Subcommittee was not specifically so
appointed, but it is a duly authorized subcommittee of a government agency, the Virginia
State Bar Association. See VA. CODE ANN. 54.1-3910 (1988) (establishing Virginia State Bar
Association). The final report of a similar private committee established by the General
Assembly to study equitable distribution before its enactment has been given some weight by
at least one Virginia decision. See Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 341 S.E.2d 829
(1986) (relying on Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Section 20-107 of the Code of
Virginia, H. Doc. No. 21 (1982 Session)). Shortly after the new amendment was passed, the
General Assembly provided further evidence that the Family Law Section's views merit serious
consideration. See H.J. Res. 57 (1990 Session) (requesting Family Law Section form a committee
to study equitable distribution and report back to legislature). The views of the Family Law
Section would therefore seem to merit respect similar to that given to the views of private
commissions requested by the government to study specific issues.
If an interpreting court gives the views of the Family Law Section any special deference,
there could be problems with the general rule that the views of the statutory drafter are not
evidence of legislative intent. N. SINGER, supra, § 48.12. There is an exception to that rule,
however, when the drafter's views were presented to the legislature:
[I]f the draftsman's views were clearly and prominently communicated to the
legislature when the bill was being considered for enactment, so as to give reason
to believe that legislators' understanding of the bill would have been influenced by
the draftsman's communicated views and so as to be visible to others who are
concerned to understand the meaning of the act, there is reason to invoke an
exception to the general rule and attach weight to the draftsman's views.
Id. § 48.12; see, e.g., American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. United States, 386 F. Supp.
799, 803-04 (D.D.C. 1974) (construction of act by administrators "who participated in its
drafting and directly made known their views to Congress" are of "higher significance" than
construction of act by implementing agency, even though construction of act by implementing
agency ordinarily receives "great weight"). When the new amendment was being considered,
the Family Law Section's views were presented to the General Assembly through the Legislative
Subcommittee Report, supra note 10, and the Legislative Subcommittee Analysis, supra note
57. Thus, even if the Family Law Section is regarded as a private drafter, its views are
nonetheless some evidence of legislative intent.
Where the General Assembly changed the language in the initial draft bill submitted by
the Family Law Section, of course, the Report and Analysis are not good indicators of the
intent of the General Assembly. The mere fact that the legislature changed some sections of
the bill, however, see infra note 310, indicates that the legislature acted deliberately when it
left the remaining portions of the bill unchanged. Where the language was not changed,
therefore, the Report and Analysis are some evidence of the legislative intent.
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The Legislative Subcommittee Report states clearly that the new
amendments adopt the source of funds rule.8 7 The official report included
the following in its list of legislative goals:
A modification of the "unitary theory" of property classification,
by a "source of funds" classification statute which uses a marital
partnership theory as its basis.
An articulation of property classification to permit the trial
court to classify property based upon the "source of funds"
concept which is used in virtually all other common law classifi-
cation states.88
The Family Law Section's analysis likewise anticipates that the source
of funds rule will control. After discussing the new rules for classifying
untraceable mixtures of marital and separate property, the analysis states:
However, consistent with the "source of funds" theory, if such
contributions are "retraceable" by a "preponderance of the evi-
dence," and was [sic] not a gift, then such contributed property
shall retain their [sic] original classification, such property shall
be classified by the trial court as "part separate" and "part
marital" based upon the "source of funds" rules well-established
by non-Virginia case law.8 9
The explanation also discusses in some detail a hypothetical fact situation
involving the purchase of a home.90 In the hypothetical, the home is
purchased with a separate property down payment, and the mortgage is
paid off with marital funds. The explanation classified the home as part
marital and part separate property, in the same ratio as the marital and
separate contributions. This is the exact same result reached by numerous
cases applying the source of funds rule. 9'
In sum, the materials presented to the General Assembly make repeated
references to source of funds principles. Moreover, the hypothetical fact
situations used as examples all reach results consistent with the source of
funds rule. The source of funds rule was therefore presented to the
legislature as an integral part of the proposed bill. When the General
Assembly passed the bill, the General Assembly showed clear intent to
adopt the source of funds rule.
c. Other States
Although decisions from other states cannot control the interpretation
of the Virginia statute, those decisions are instructive as to the proper
87. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
88. Legislative Subcommittee Report, supra note 10, at 3-4.
89. Legislative Subcommittee Analysis, supra note 57, at 19.
90. See id. at 11.
91. See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 377 S.E.2d 666 (1989); Harper v. Harper,
294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982); In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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interpretation of the Virginia statute. Most other states follow the source
of funds rule. 92 There is reason to believe that the General Assembly knew
of this fact because the Legislative Subcommittee's official explanation of
the proposed amendments mentioned that the source of funds rule was
well-established in other states.93 Arguably, if the legislators had meant to
reject the clear consensus in other states, the General Assembly would
have issued an express statement to that effect. Because nothing in the
new amendments is inconsistent with the source of funds rule, there is no
reason why that rule should not apply.
d. Policy Concerns
Finally, the source of funds rule is consistent with the policies behind
the Virginia statute. As noted above, Virginia's equitable distribution
statute emphasizes individualism over sharing when classifying property as
marital or separate. 94 By giving each estate not only its base contribution
but also a fair return on its investment,9" the source of funds rule shows
a similar preference for individualism. At the same time, by drawing
92. For decisions adopting the source of funds rule by name, see Jackson v. Jackson,
765 S.W.2d 561 (Ark. 1989); Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 377 S.E.2d 666 (1989); Tibbetts
v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979); Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982);
Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325
S.E.2d 260 (1985); Shank v. Shank, 387 S.E.2d 325 (W. Va. 1989). For decisions adopting
general source of funds principles without identifying the principles by that name, see Gregg
v. Gregg, 474 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 297 (Fla.
1983); Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981).
Only two decisions have expressly rejected the source of funds rule. Smoot v. Smoot,
233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987); Anthony v. Anthony, 355 Pa. Super. 589, 514 A.2d 91
(1986). Smoot, of course, has been overruled by the new amendment. See supra notes 58-60
and accompanying text. Anthony was based on an unusual Pennsylvania statute providing that
all appreciation in separate property is marital property, regardless of cause. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 401(e) (Supp. 1990). Because most other states have no such statute, Anthony has
little value outside Pennsylvania. Moreover, although Pennsylvania has expressly rejected the
source of funds rule, the source of funds rule is probably the only theory which can unify all
of the Pennsylvania decisions on the definition of marital property. See generally L. GOLDEN,
supra note 11, appendix A (Pennsylvania section). Thus, while Pennsylvania has rejected the
source of funds rule in theory, Pennsylvania has not actually rejected the rule.
93. See Legislative Subcommittee Analysis, supra note 57, at 19 (source of funds rule is
"well-established by non-Virginia case law").
94. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
95. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 77 (Me. 1979) ("The marital and non-marital
estates have each made investments from which they are entitled to the full benefit and
return"); Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 57, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (1982) ("the spouse who
contributed nonmarital funds, and the marital unit that contributed marital funds each receive
a fair and proportional return on their investment"). Indeed, if the marital estate received
only the amount of its contribution and not a return on its investment, "incentive for a
sophisticated spouse to divert marital funds into improving his or her separate property thereby
depriving the other spouse of any possible return of the marital investment upon the dissolution
of the marriage" would exist. Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 380, 325 S.E.2d 260, 268,
cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
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distinctions along marital/separate lines rather than husband/wife lines,
the rule also implements principles of sharing. Like the Virginia statute,
the source of funds rule balances individualism and sharing, with a slight
preference for individualism.
The source of funds rule is also relatively easy to administer. The rule
is derived largely from the principle that marital and separate contributions
are investments which should receive a proportional share of any appre-
ciation or depreciation in the property involved. 96 This rule is easy to state
as a mathematical formula which can be easily applied by judges and
lawyers.97 Moreover, because the rule is grounded in a consistent theory,
it can be applied to a wide variety of fact situations. For instance, the
Virginia statute already applies versions of the source of funds rule when
classifying appreciation in separate property, income from separate prop-
erty, and retirement benefits. 9 By adopting the source of funds rule,
Virginia would adopt a general theory of classification that would help
solve many different classification problems.
Finally, the source of funds rule yields a predictable result. Because
the rule can be reduced to a simple formula, attorneys can predict with
some reliability the size of the marital and separate interests in mixed
property. 99 Increased predictability of results will ensure reliable protection
for separate property and encourage parties to settle rather than litigate
equitable distribution cases. Also, because a majority of state courts follow
the source of funds rule, there will be a large body of authority from
other states to which attorneys can look for guidance.1l° The presence of
this body of authority will ultimately make it much easier to predict how
Virginia courts may answer questions of first impression involving equi-
table distribution. The source of funds rule will thus greatly reduce the
unpredictability which plagued Virginia law before the new amendments.
2. Applying the Source of Funds Rule
a. The Basic Source of Funds Formula
The basic premise of the source of funds rule is that the ratio between
the marital and separate interests should be the same as the ratio between
the marital and separate contributions. 0' This relationship can be expressed
as a mathematical formula:
mi mc
si sc
where mi is the marital interest;
96. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A.
97. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (discussing basic source of funds
formula); L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A (discussing source of funds formulas generally).
98. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
100. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A.
101. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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si is the separate interest;
mc is the marital contribution; and
sc is the separate contribution.
In addition, the sum of the marital and separate interests must by definition
be equal to the total value of the property. Thus:
V = mi + si
where V is the net value (equity) of the property. Solving these two
equations simultaneously for the marital interest, we find the basic source




Therefore, the marital interest is obtained by multiplying two separate
numbers. The first number is the total marital contributions to the prop-
erty, divided by the total of all marital and separate contributions. The
second number is the total value of the property. The formula makes
intuitive sense, for the marital interest is the same portion of the total
value as the marital contributions are of the total contributions. Thus, if
40% of the contributions are marital, 40% of the total value will be
marital.
As the basic source of funds formula shows, the marital and separate
interests under the source of funds rule are not at all static. 103 Since the
marital interest is a factor of the total value, the marital interest will
increase and decrease in size as the property fluctuates in value. The
marital and separate interests should therefore be thought of as percentages
of total value rather than as absolute amounts.
b. Defining Acquisition
So far, we have treated the source of funds rule as simply a method
for measuring the marital and separate interests in mixed property. In its
full form, however, the rule is much more than a measurement tool.
Properly interpreted, the source of funds rule provides the most workable
of all basic policy frameworks for implementing the partnership theory of
marriage.
This framework arises from the interaction between the source of
funds rule and the statutory language. The source of funds rule provides
that the marital interest in mixed funds is proportional to the marital and
separate contributions. 104 Because the final value of the property will
almost always be either more or less than the total contributions, the value
of the marital interest will almost always be different from the amount
of marital contributions. How can we reconcile this variance with the
102. See In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing basic source of
funds formula); Mishler v. Mishler, 90 N.C. App. 72, 367 S.E.2d 385 (1988) (same).
103. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A.
104. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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statutory requirement that marital property be "acquired by each party
during the marriage?"10
5
The source of funds rule answers this question by focusing upon the
verb in the statutory sentence: "acquired." Because the marital interest
under the source of funds rule fluctuates in size, "acquisition" cannot be
a single set event occurring at a specific time. Instead, "acquisition" of
marital property is a continuing process: the marital interest increases
when new funds are added or when previously contributed funds appre-
ciate, and decreases when previously contributed funds depreciate. In each
of these situations, the marital interest increases only proportionally with
the value of the asset itself. The conclusion is elegantly simple: property
is "acquired" under the source of funds rule whenever real economic
value is created.' 6
We can find additional guidance in the statutory definition of separate
property. Under the statute, separate property includes three specific types
of property: gifts, inheritances, and exchanges.10 7 These three types of
property share one common characteristic: they were not created by the
marital partnership. Combining this common characteristic with the source
of funds rule's dynamic definition of acquisition, we can further refine
the definition of marital property. Property is acquired during the marriage
under the source of funds rule when (1) real economic value is created
during the marriage; and (2) the real economic value was a product of
the marital partnership.
This dynamic definition of acquisition is the heart of the source of
funds rule. 08 By defining acquisition during the marriage as the creation
of real economic value by the marital partnership, the source of funds
rule reflects financial reality accurately. Classification of property depends
not upon arbitrary rules of law, but upon actual objective facts about
when and how each individual asset was created. Because of this emphasis
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2).
106. See Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 57, 448 A.2d at 916, 929 (1982); Wade v. Wade,
72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 860, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
The reported cases generally define acquisition as the process of paying for newly acquired
property. See, e.g., Harper, 294 Md. at 80, 448 A.2d at 929 ("acquired" means "on-going
process of making payment for property"); Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 380-83, 325 S.E.2d at
268-69. Acquisition does not mean payment, however, where property is acquired by means
other than purchase. See Probstein v. Probstein, 767 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (husband
received stock during the marriage as additional compensation over and above his salary; stock
was acquired during the marriage, and thus marital property, even though stock was never
paid for). Thus, the rule that acquisition means payment applies only when property is acquired
by purchase.
A more accurate definition of acquisition would be the creation of real economic value.
Under this definition, property acquired by purchase is acquired when the price is paid, and
property acquired by gift or inheritance is acquired at the time of the transfer. Because this
definition applies to all possible means of acquisition, it is a more accurate statement of the
general rule.
107. VA. CODE ANm. § 20-107.3(a)(1).
108. See Harper, 294 Md. at 70-73, 448 A.2d at 922-25.
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upon economics, the source of funds rule implements the partnership
theory of marriage more accurately than any other theory of equitable
distribution.
c. Property Acquired on Credit
The source of funds rule operates especially well in classifying property
acquired on credit. This feature of the rule was presented to the General
Assembly directly'0 9 and was implicitly approved when the General Assem-
bly enacted the proposed bill.
In exploring the rule's treatment of credit, we will use a hypothetical
fact situation presented to the legislature." 0 Assume that the husband
purchases a $50,000 home with a $10,000 separate property down payment.
The parties make $20,000 in mortgage payments during the marriage, and
the home is worth $80,000 on the date of classification.
As with any source of funds question, we must begin by looking at
the creation of real value. When existing marital or separate funds are
used to purchase property, real value is created immediately. When prop-
erty is purchased with borrowed funds, however, the exact opposite is
true: no real value is created."' The purchaser merely has assumed a debt
equal to the purchase price of the property, and the purchaser's net worth
remains unchanged. At the time of purchase, therefore, property purchased
with borrowed funds has no real value, and it has not been acquired for
source of funds purposes.
' 2
Of course, property purchased with borrowed funds may obtain real
value at some point after purchase of the property. When real value exists,
one of two things has happened. First, the parties may have used funds
to reduce the amount of the lien. In this event, the increased value was
acquired in exchange for existing money. The real value should therefore
be given the same classification as the assets used to reduce the lien." 3 In
our example, $10,000 of the home was acquired in exchange for the
husband's separate property down payment, and $20,000 was acquired in
exchange for the marital funds used to reduce the mortgage. The separate
interest is thus at least $10,000, and the marital interest is at least $20,000.
This result does not depend in any way upon whether the contributions
were payments to the seller or payments to the lender. When the husband
used funds borrowed from the bank to pay part of the purchase price,
109. See Legislative Subcommittee Analysis, supra note 57, at 11 (example 10).
110. See id.
111. See Schweizer v. Schweizer, 301 Md. 626, 484 A.2d 267 (1984); In re Herr, 705
S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (both holding that property purchased on unpaid debt is
not "acquired" for source of funds rule purposes).
112. See Schweizer, 301 Md. at 627, 484 A.2d at 267.
113. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1)(iii) (property acquired in exchange for separate
property is itself separate property).
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no real economic value was created. 1 14 The bank had a lien equal to the
amount of the borrowed funds, and the loan did not increase the net
value of the property. Real value was created during the marriage only
when the parties reduced the lien with marital funds. " ' Under the source
of funds rule, therefore, there is no difference between payments of the
purchase price and repayments of secured debt." 6 Both are equally valid
contributions to the acquisition of property.
So far, the analysis has been relatively simple. The analysis becomes
complex, however, when real value is created for the second reason-an
increase in the value of the property involved. This increase must be
allocated to the marital and separate interests.
The logical way to allocate the appreciation would be to distribute it
proportionally to the marital and separate interests at the time of appre-
ciation." 17 Unfortunately, this is impractical. Under the source of funds
114. See Schweizer v. Schweizer, 301 Md. 626, 484 A.2d 267 (1984); In re Herr, 705
S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (both holding that property purchased on unpaid debt has
not been "acquired" for source of funds purposes).
115. See Schweizer, 301 Md. at 627, 484 A.2d at 267.
116. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A.
117. See Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 78, 377 S.E.2d 666, 670 (1989) ("Concerning
appreciation, if the house is thought of not as a single unit but as two monetary units, one
separate and one marital, the analysis is simplified").
This analysis may be a bit oversimplified, for there is actually a third unit involved. The
home appreciated in value from $50,000 on the date of marriage to $80,000 on the date of
valuation. Thus, of the $80,000 value, $30,000 represents appreciation, $10,000 represents
separate contributions, and $20,000 represents marital contributions. Added together, however,
these amounts total only $60,000.
The remaining $20,000 is the value of the outstanding mortgage on the date of separation.
Since the parties have not yet paid off this portion of the mortgage, no real economic value
exists, and for source of funds purposes this $20,000 portion has not been acquired by the
parties. In a roughly equitable sense, it is still owned by the bank, to which it would revert
if the parties stopped paying the mortgage.
Even though the $20,000 has not yet been acquired, however, it can still appreciate in
value. Thus, there are really three interests here: the marital interest, the separate interest, and
the bank's interest. Allocating the appreciation in proportion to the base amounts, we find
$12,000 marital appreciation, $6000 separate appreciation, and $12,000 appreciation in the
bank's interest. The marital appreciation should obviously remain marital, while the separate
appreciation should remain separate (unless it was caused by marital funds or efforts, as
discussed infra at notes 122-26 and accompanying text).
How should we classify appreciation in the bank's interest? That interest does not truly
belong to the bank, for the amount of the mortgage lien never changes. If the parties stopped
paying the mortgage, the bank would receive only its base $20,000 interest. The real economic
value of the appreciation in the bank's interest, therefore, belongs to the parties. A few source
of funds states have adopted with no discussion variants of the source of funds formula which
allocate the appreciation in the bank's interest entirely to one estate or the other. See L.
GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A.
Because the appreciation does not come entirely from either the marital or the separate
estate, however, most source of funds states would divide it proportionally between them. The
marital interest in the overall appreciation therefore equals the marital interest in the marital
appreciation, plus the marital portion of the appreciation in the bank's interest. This expression
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rule, the marital and separate interests are fluctuating constantly as the
parties make contributions to the real value of the property."' If appre-
ciation is to be apportioned logically, we would have to measure the
marital and separate interests at the exact moment when the property
appreciates. At the very least, this raises difficult questions of mathematics
that would pose an immense burden on the classification process." 9 At
the worst, measuring marital and separate interests at the exact moment
of property appreciation would be impossible, because rarely is it possible
to determine the exact moment when property appreciates. There is also
an element of the absurd to the entire process, for marital and separate
property are meaningless terms during the marriage when most property
appreciates.' 20 Marital and separate interests come into existence only upon
divorce, an event usually occuring long after the property has appreciated.
For practical reasons, therefore, no source of funds state applies a
purely logical apportionment method. Instead, courts assume that all of
mathematically reduces to the marital interest in the marital appreciation, computed without
reference to the bank's contribution-which is the same source of funds appreciation formula
used in the text. Express consideration of the bank's interest therefore does not change the
final result.
118. The marital interest actually fluctuates in two different ways. First, since the marital
interest is a factor of the total value, the marital interest rises and falls proportionately with
the value of the property. This is merely a corollary of the general rule that the marital and
separate contributions are investments that should participate in any gain enjoyed or loss
suffered by the property as a whole. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
In addition, the marital interest depends upon the total marital and separate contributions,
not all of which need be made at the same time. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying
text. The percentage marital interest therefore rises as more marital contributions are made,
and falls as more separate contributions are made. Only at the time of final classification will
the marital and separate interests finally become fixed.
119. For instance, in our hypothetical fact situation, the home appreciated in value by
$30,000 during the marriage. Assume that the marriage lasted for 30 months, and that the
home appreciated in value $1,000 in each month. After the first month of the marriage, the
marital contribution would be one $667 mortgage payment ($20,000 divided among 30 months),
and the separate contribution would be the $10,000 downpayment. The marital portion would
be the marital contributions divided by the total contributions, which would be (667/10,667)
or 6.2 percent. Ideally, therefore, 6.2 percent ($62) of the first month's appreciation would be
marital.
In the second month, the marital contribution would be $1334 in mortgage payments,
plus $62 in appreciation from the first month, for a total of $1396. The marital portion would
therefore be (1396/11,396) or 12.2 percent, and $122 of the second month's appreciation would
be marital. An ideal allocation of appreciation would require that this chain of calculations
be continued forward for the remaining 28 months of the marriage-a very burdensome task.
Note also that for all the complexity of this example, it is based upon two unrealistically
simple assumptions. We assumed that the home appreciated in value evenly through the
marriage, even though it probably would have appreciated more in some months than others.
We also assumed that the $20,000 mortgage reduction during the marriage was divided evenly
among the 50 months, even though the amount of principal reduction may have been greater
in some months than others. In a real case, therefore, the computation would be even more
complicated than it was in the above example.
120. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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the appreciation occurred after all of the direct contributions.' 2' This
technically incorrect assumption simplifies the entire process dramatically.
Because the direct financial contributions came first, the court can allocate
the appreciation in the same proportions as the marital and separate
interests acquired by direct contributions. Thus:
mcmA- ×A
mc + sc
where A is the total appreciation;
mA is the marital interest in the appreciation;
mc is the direct marital contribution; and
sc is the direct separate contribution.
This formula will be called the source of funds appreciation formula.
In addition, the total marital interest is by definition equal to the
direct marital contributions plus the marital interest in the appreciation.
In other words:
mi = mc + mA
where mi is the marital interest. Substituting the first formula into the
second, we find:
mi= mc +( mc x A)(mc + sc
Finally, we also know by definition that the direct financial contributions
plus the appreciation equal the total value of the property. Thus:
mc + sc + A = V
where V is the net value (equity) of the property. Solving the last two
equations simultaneously, we obtain:
mcmi = -- x V
mc + sc
This is the same basic source of funds formula derived above. By assuming
that all of the appreciation occurred before all of the direct contributions,
we find that the basic source of funds formula fairly allocates appreciation
between the marital and separate interests.
Applying these formulas to our specific fact situation, '2 we find
$10,000 in separate contributions, $20,000 in marital contributions, and
$30,000 in appreciation. The ratio of marital to separate contributions is
two to one, so that 67 percent of all the contributions are marital. Under
the source of funds appreciation formula, the $30,000 appreciation can
be allocated as $20,000 appreciation in the marital interest and $10,000
appreciation in the separate interest. The marital interest would be $20,000
in direct contributions plus $20,000 in appreciation, or $40,000. The
separate interest would be $10,000 direct contributions plus $10,000 ap-
preciation, or $20,000. Using the basic source of funds formula, the
121. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A.
122. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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marital interest would be 67 percent of the $60,000 total equity, or $40,000.
The separate interest would be 33 percent of the total equity, or $20,000.
Both formulas yield the same ultimate result.
23
Accordingly, in most cases, the basic source of funds formula fairly
allocates both the direct contributions and the appreciation. There is one
situation, however, in which the longer analysis must be used. The basic
source of funds formula assumes that none of the appreciation in the
property was caused by marital funds or efforts. Thus, appreciation in
the separate interest would remain separate, while appreciation in the
marital interest would remain marital. 124 In some cases, however, the
separate interest may appreciate because of marital funds or efforts. Such
appreciation is not caused by the making of mortgage payments with
marital funds because mortgage payments do not increase the value of an
existing interest.125 Instead, mortgage payments cause an entirely new
interest to be acquired, which is given the same classification as the funds
used to pay the mortgage.
26
In other situations marital funds or efforts may cause appreciation in
the existing separate interest. For example, if the parties buy an old home
with separate funds and then use marital efforts to rehabilitate it, the
marital contribution may cause appreciation in the separate interest. On
these facts, the basic source of funds formula will not work because that
formula assumes that all appreciation in separate property is separate.
Appreciation in separate property is marital property, however, when the
appreciation is caused by marital funds or efforts.127 The court should
therefore divide the appreciation into marital and separate components,
using the source of funds appreciation formula. 28 The marital interest
would then be equal to the direct marital contributions, plus the marital
share of the appreciation, plus any part of the separate share of the
appreciation which was caused by marital funds or efforts. In our hypo-
thetical fact situation, the marital interest would be $20,000 in direct
123. Under both formulas, only the $60,000 equity in the home is allocated, even though
the home is worth $80,000. This is not inequitable. The party who receives the home will
receive $20,000 of extra property, but that party will also be burdened with a $20,000 mortgage.
In terms of real economic value, therefore, the extra $20,000 does not exist. The source of
funds rule has fairly allocated all of the real economic value, leaving behind only equal
amounts of property and secured debt.
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
125. See Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 78, 377 S.E.2d 666, 670 (1989) (mortgage
payments created additional marital equity; "It]he only material cause for the remaining
appreciation ... was outside market forces"; thus, the mortgage payments were not a cause
of any appreciation occurring in the separate portion of the home); Willis v. Willis, 86 N.C.
App. 546, 549, 358 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1987).
126. See Thomas, 259 Ga. at 73, 377 S.E.2d at 666; Willis, 86 N.C. App. at 546, 358
S.E.2d at 571.
127. See VA. CODE Am. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
128. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.07A; Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: Development
of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C.L. REv. 195, 219 n.130 (1987).
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financial contributions, plus $20,000 appreciation in the marital portion,
plus that part of the $10,000 appreciation in the separate portion which
was caused by marital funds or efforts.
d. Defining Contributions
The definition of contribution under the source of funds rule is mostly
a matter of common sense. Any direct payment of consideration to the
seller clearly constitutes a contribution. Similarly, when borrowed funds
were used to pay the consideration, any payment of principal on the debt
constitutes a contribution. 29
If a payment is neither direct consideration nor repayment of principal
on a debt incurred to pay consideration, it is probably not a contribution. 130
For example, payments of interest on a debt are ordinarily not contribu-
tions, even when the debt was incurred to purchase the property involved.'
3 1
Tax payments 32 and attorney's fees 33 also are not contributions to the
acquisition of property.
In valuing premarital contributions, the court should not use the base
amount of the contribution. The contribution may have appreciated before
the marriage, and such appreciation is separate property. 34 The court
should instead value the separate contribution at its worth on the date of
marriage, 35 thus giving the owner the full benefit of his premarital
appreciation. For instance, if a home doubles in value after a premarital
down payment but before the marriage, the separate contribution should
be the equity in the home on the date of marriage, and not the amount
of the down payment.
129. See, e.g., Schweizer v. Schweizer, 301 Md. 626, 484 A.2d 267 (1984); In re Herr,
705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
130. See In re Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 372, 618 P.2d 208, 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665
(1980) ("The value of real property is generally represented by the owners' equity in it, and
the equity value does not include finance charges or other expenses incurred to maintain the
investment. Amounts paid for interest, taxes, and insurance do not contribute to the capital
investment and are not considered part of it").
131. See In re Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980); Blake v.
Blake, 81 Md. App. 712, 569 A.2d 724 (1990); In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986).
132. See In re Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980); Gravenstine
v. Gravenstine, 58 Md. App. 158, 472 A.2d 1001 (1984) (property taxes not contributions to
acquisition of property involved).
133. See In re Click, 169 IU. App. 3d 48, 523 N.E.2d 169 (1988), appeal denied, 122 Ill.
2d 571, 530 N.E.2d 241 (1988) (funds spent to defend spouse from criminal charges were not
contributions; decided under Illinois' unique reimbursement statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989), which follows some source of funds principles); Rickard
v. Rickard, 691 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (use of marital funds to pay attorney to
defend inheritance in contested will was not contribution to acquisition of inheritance).
134. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
135. See, e.g. Mishler v. Mishler, 90 N.C. App. 72, 367 S.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 323
N.C. 174, 373 S.E.2d 111 (1988).
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e. Partial Sales and Withdrawals
The source of funds rule provides a workable way of measuring the
marital and separate interests in assets acquired with both marital and
separate contributions. If the entire asset is sold or exchanged, the parties'
interests in the consideration are the same as their interest in the conveyed
property. Often, however, the parties will convey less than the entire asset.
This happens most frequently when the parties withdraw some but not all
of the funds in a joint bank account.
How does the court determine whether a partial sale or withdrawal
comes from the marital or separate interest? The first step is to look at
the intent of the parties. If there is evidence of intent that the withdrawal
come from a particular interest, the court should respect that intent.
13 6
Aside from contemporaneous statements, the best evidence of intent may
be the purpose for the withdrawal. Withdrawals for a family purpose are
probably from the marital interest, 37 while withdrawals to maintain sep-
arate property are generally from the separate interest.
38
Sometimes, however, there will be no clear evidence of intent. In such
cases, courts have come to different results. Some courts have held that
the marital funds are withdrawn first. 39 Other courts have held that the
withdrawals come proportionally from the marital and separate interests.
40
Because the best answer to this question might vary from case to case, it
would be a mistake to apply a single rule to all fact situations.'
4'
f. Date of Classification: The Status of Wagner
Under the source of funds formula, all marital and separate contri-
butions count in determining the marital interest, regardless of when the
136. See, e.g., Wadlow v. Wadlow, 200 N.J. Super. 372, 491 A.2d 757 (App. Div. 1985)
(funds were separate based on parties' intent); McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.
1973) (where interest on separate funds was marital, withdrawal exactly equal to annual interest
was intended to come from marital property).
137. See Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971);
See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966); see generally J. Oldham,
Tracing, Commingling and Transmutation, 23 F.. L.Q. 219, 224-26 (1989).
138. See Blaine v. Blaine, 63 Ariz. 100, 159 P.2d 786 (1945); Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.
App. 394, 499 P.2d 231 (1972).
139. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 584 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Brown v. Brown,
72 N.C. App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287 (1985). This is the traditional community property rule.
See, e.g., Harris v. Ventura, 582 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
140. See Lampton v. Lampton, 721 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that when
parties owned stock that was both marital and nonmarital property, gift to third party came
from marital and separate estate in proportions equal to parties' respective interests in stock).
141. For instance, while proportional allocation might in many cases be the fairest method,
it would also be the hardest method to apply. In order to use proportional allocation, the
court would have to determine the exact sizes of the marital and separate interests every time
a partial sale or withdrawal was made, a task which would be quite burdensome in the case
of an active bank account. Balancing the benefits and burdens of proportional allocation
would seem to require a case-by-case analysis. See Oldham, supra note 137, at 221-33 (discussing
problem of balancing benefits and burdens of proportional allocation, focusing primarily upon
community property states).
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contributions are made. For instance, if an asset is acquired partly before
and partly after the marriage, both the marital and separate contributions
count in determining the marital interest, even though the contributions
are made at different times.
142
This same principle also applies to different types of marital and
separate contributions. Assume, for example, that an asset is acquired
with three different monetary contributions: $10,000 in separate funds,
$5,000 in marital funds, and another $20,000 in marital funds. Each
contribution is made at a different time. To determine the marital interest,
the court should add up all of the different marital and separate contri-
butions and use them in the basic source of funds formula. The order in
which the contributions were made should have no effect upon the marital
interest. 14
3
Because all contributions count equally, regardless of which were made
first, the marital interest can vary over time. In the previous example, for
instance, the separate interest would have been 100 percent if the parties
had been divorced before the marital contributions were made. If the
parties had been divorced between the marital contributions, the marital
interest would have been ($5,000 / ($10,000 + $5,000)), or 33 percent.
Finally, if the parties were divorced after all the contributions had been
made, the marital interest would be (($20,000 + $5,000) / ($10,000 +
$5,000 + $20,000)), or 71 percent. Because marital contributions can be
made at any time, the percentage marital and separate interests will vary
during the marriage.
Before 1990, Virginia held that the marital interest could not decrease
in size during the marriage. In Wagner v. Wagner,'44 the parties purchased
property using funds borrowed from the wife's parents. The parents then
forgave the debt, intending to make a gift to the wife alone. The Virginia
Court of Appeals held that property had to be classified immediately upon
acquisition. 45 The property was marital property immediately upon its
acquisition because the debt had not yet been forgiven. The subsequent
forgiveness of the debt, the court held, could not convert marital property
into separate property.
46
Wagner is overruled by the new amendments. This conclusion can be
seen most clearly in one of the hypothetical fact situations presented to
the legislature. 47 Assume that the husband makes a $10,000 down payment
on a home before the marriage. During the marriage, the parties make 40
payments of $500 each toward the principal balance on the mortgage, for
142. See Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C.
App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
143. See Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C.
App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
144. 4 Va. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 407 (1987).
145. Wagner v. Wagner, 4 Va. App. 397, 404, 358 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1987).
146. Id.
147. See Legislative Subcommittee Analysis, supra note 56, at 11 (example 10).
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a total of $20,000 in marital contributions. The house is worth $80,000
on the date of valuation. If Wagner were still the law, the home would
have to be classified as marital or separate property immediately upon its
acquisition. Because the house was acquired before the marriage, the house
would be entirely separate property. Wagner could be interpreted to require
classification as of the first marital contribution, but that also yields an
unjust result, because the first marital contribution was the first $500
mortgage payment. Classification as of that time would give only a 1.67
percent marital interest ($500 / $30,000). The legislature was told, however,
that marital interest would be the total marital contributions over the total
of all contributions-($20,000 / $30,000), or 66.67 percent. 48 This result
can be reached only if Wagner is disregarded and the property is classified
as of the date of divorce.
There are other compelling reasons why Wagner should be abandoned.
The case never made much sense to begin with, because marital and
separate property cannot exist before a divorce decree is rendered. 49 The
property involved in Wagner could not have been either marital or separate
property immediately upon its acquisition, because there was no guarantee
that the parties would ever divorce. Obviously, if the marriage had lasted
until one party died, there would never have been any marital or separate
property. Wagner is in fact the only equitable distribution case ever to
adopt the inflexible rule that property must be classified immediately upon
acquisition. Such an unusual and arbitrary rule should not be adopted
absent the mandate of exp.ess statutory language.
In addition, Wagner placed significant weight upon the court's belief
that marital property cannot transmute into separate property. Under the
new statute, marital property can transmute into separate property. 50 The
new amendments therefore remove an important element of the court's
rationale.
Finally, the Wagner holding is poor public policy. By classifying
property immediately upon acquisition, Wagner made the first contribution
disproportionately important in relation to later contributions. '5' There is
148. Id.
149. See VA. CODE Am. § 20-107.3(A) (allowing equitable distribution only upon or after
decree of divorce); Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157 (1985) (court cannot make
equitable distribution before granting divorce decree). Because classification of property as
marital or separate has no effect unless the marriage ends in divorce, classifying property
while the marriage is still viable is meaningless. See, e.g. In re Olson, 96 Ill. 2d 432, 451
N.E.2d 825 (1983); In re Schwartz, 131 Ill. App. 3d 351, 475 N.E.2d 1077 (1985). For further
criticism of Wagner, see L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, appendix A (Virginia section) (criticizing
Wagner).
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(e) (contemplating in some cases that marital property
can transmute into separate property).
151. Under Wagner, because the process of acquisition begins with the first contribution,
the first contribution largely determines whether the asset will be marital or separate. 4 Va.
App. at 404, 358 S.E.2d at 410. Thus, if two equal contributions are made, one marital and
one separate, the order of the contributions is crucial. If the marital contribution is made
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no logical reason for such a rule. A $10,000 contribution made in the
first year of marriage is no more and no less valuable than a $10,000
contribution made in the last year of marriage. The clear overriding theme
of the new amendments is that all contributions should be treated equally,
and that contributions should retain their basic classification as long as
the contributions can be traced reasonably.1 52 Wagner prevents tracing of
some contributions by requiring the court to classify the property before
all the contributions are made. Because all contributions must now be
recognized and given equal weight, Wagner is clearly inconsistent with the
new amendments.
B. Changing the Marital and Separate Interests: The Doctrine of
Transmutation
The doctrine of transmutation provides that under certain circum-
stances, property can change from one classification to the other. 53 Before
the new amendments, the Virginia decisions identified two common fact
situations in which transmutation occurs. First, when a mixture of marital
and separate property cannot be separated into its component parts, the
entire mixture transmutes into marital property.5 4 This type of transmu-
tation will be called transmutation by commingling. Second, when the
parties intend that separate property become marital, they have in essence
made a gift of the separate property to the marital estate.1 55 This type of
transmutation will be called transmutation by implied gift.'
5 6
first, the asset is marital property; and if the separate contribution is made first, the asset is
separate property.
152. See generally Legislative Subcommittee Analysis, supra note 57.
153. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.33; Turner, supra note 1, at 837-45.
154. See, e.g., Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
155. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Westbrook, 5 Va. App. 446, 364 S.E.2d 523 (1988).
156. Accord L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.33. Other commentators refer to the concept
by different names. See Krauskopf, Classifying Marital and Separate Property-Combinations
and Increase in Value of Separate Property, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 997, 1003 (1987) (transmutation
by intent); Oldham, supra note 137, at 233 (1989) (transmutation by agreement).
Transmutation by agreement is a misleading label because it implies that both spouses
must consent to the change in character. As Oldham himself notes, however, "the consent of
the spouse losing the [separate] interest in the property is the focus." Oldham, supra note
137, at 235. Moreover, transmutation by agreement also implies that transmutation requires
an enforceable written agreement, a position which Virginia should reject. See infra note 171
and accompanying text.
It is much harder to choose between transmutation by intent and transmutation by implied
gift. Transmutation by intent focuses upon the key element of the doctrine, and is therefore
probably the most accurate label. In addition to being accurate, however, a label should
remind us of the statutory basis for the rule. Transmutation by intent does not meet this
requirement, since the classification provisions of the Virginia statute look almost exclusively
to the time and manner of acquisition. Nothing on the face of the statute suggests that the
parties' intent should be considered.
The statute does provide, however, that property loses its classification if it is given to
another estate. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d-e). This gift language provides a statutory
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The same two types of transmutation can be found in the language
of the new amendments. The new transmutation rules provide that property
retains its original classification "to the extent [it] is retraceable by a
preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift. ' 157 Inverting this
statement, property loses its classification if either (1) it is not retraceable,
or (2) it was a gift. The first alternative is essentially transmutation by
commingling, while the second alternative is essentially transmutation by
implied gift.
Although the two-pronged basic structure of transmutation still exists
under new amendments, the shape of the prongs is changed substantially.
The largest changes are in the definition of transmutation by commingling.
Because under unitary property principles a single asset could have only
one classification, all mixtures of marital and separate property were
inseparable as a matter of law. 8 Whenever marital and separate property
were mixed, therefore, the separate interest transmuted automatically into
marital property. 1" 9
Under the new amendments, a single asset can have both marital and
separate interests. 6' Accordingly, mixtures of marital and separate prop-
erty are no longer automatically inseparable. Instead, the court must
attempt to determine the amount of the marital and separate contributions.
If these amounts can be determined, the court must apply the source of
funds rule and classify the asset as part marital and part separate prop-
erty. 161
There will still be fact situations in which a mixture of marital and
separate property cannot be identified. Most married couples simply do
not keep their financial records with divorce in mind. When the court
cannot reasonably determine the amount of the marital and separate
contributions, there must be a default rule which instructs the court as to
how to classify the property. Thus, while the new amendments restrict
transmutation by commingling to cases in which the marital and separate
interests cannot be measured reliably, 62 the doctrine has not been abol-
ished.
In addition to restricting the circumstances under which property
transmutes by commingling, the new amendments also change the doc-
basis for classifying property according to the parties' intent. Thus, while transmutation by
intent focuses somewhat better upon the substantive content of the doctrine, transmutation by
implied gift focuses more upon the statutory basis. In order to emphasize that the doctrine
remains viable even under the new amendments, I have chosen to use transmutation by implied
gift in this article. Both labels, however, are consistent with the basic elements of the doctrine.
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d-e).
158. See Smoot, 233 Va. at 435, 357 S.E.2d at 728; Taylor v. Taylor, 9 Va. App. 341,
387 S.E.2d 797 (1990).
159. Smoot, 233 Va. at 435, 357 S.E.2d at 728.
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A).
161. See generally supra notes 101-35 and accompanying text (describing the source of
funds rule).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d-e).
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trine's substantive effect. Under unitary property law, all inseparable
mixtures of marital and separate property were classified as marital.
1 63
Under the new amendments, the result depends upon which contributions
were made first. If transmutation occurred when funds of one character
were mixed with an existing asset of the opposite character, the mixture
is given the same classification as the existing asset. 164 Thus, where marital
funds are inseparably mixed with existing separate property, the marital
funds transmute into separate property. When a court is unable to deter-
mine which asset existed first, the mixture is entirely marital property. 6
The new version of transmutation by commingling is not entirely
satisfactory. As noted above, all contributions to the marital partnership
receive equal weight, regardless of the time at which the contributions
were made. 66 Under the new amendments, however, when the marital and
separate interests cannot be measured, the entire asset is given the character
of the first contribution made.1 67 If marital funds are mixed with a
preexisting separate asset, for instance, the mixture is separate, because
the separate interest came first. Conversely, if separate funds are mixed
with a preexisting marital asset, the mixture is marital, even if the values
of the property involved are the same as in the previous example. These
rules violate Virginia's general presumption in favor of marital property. 68
The amendments would have done better to continue the previous rule
that property is entirely marital when marital and separate interests cannot
be identified.
This is not, however, a major problem. Because transmutation by
commingling applies only when the marital and separate interests cannot
be measured, 69 mixed property will be classified under the source of funds
rule in the large majority of cases. Mixed property transmutes into the
character of the first-in-time contribution only when there is insufficient
evidence to apply the source of funds rule. 70 If a court dislikes the result
under the somewhat arbitrary first-in-time rule, the court cna likely find
enough evidence to measure the marital and separate interests. The new
law on transmutation by commingling is therefore unlikely to cause sig-
nificant problems.
The new amendments do not change the doctrine of transmutation by
implied gift. The amendments state clearly that contributed property retains
163. See Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d).
165. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(e).
166. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d).
168. See id.§ 20-107.3(A)(2) ("All property [acquired by either spouse during the marriage]
is presumed to be marital property in the absence of satisfactory evidence that it is separate
property").
169. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) (property retains its original classification when contribution
to property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence).
170. Id.
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its original classification if it is not retraceable "and was not a gift.' 17'
If the contribution was a gift, therefore, it becomes part of the estate to
which it was given. Moreover, no particular formalities are required, and
a simple expression of donative intent would probably be sufficient to
change the character of an asset. 7 2 Therefore, transmutation by implied
gift is still a viable doctrine under the new amendments.
C. Appreciation of the Separate Interest: The Active Appreciation Rule
The heart of the new amendments is a fairly specific set of rules on
classifying appreciation in separate property.17 Often appreciation in sep-
arate property is caused by marital contributions, and the basic philosophy
of the new amendments is that all property traceable to a marital source
should constitute marital property. 4 Since Virginia now follows the mixed
theory of property, there must be a method for measuring the respective
marital and separate interests in appreciated separate property.
The method set forth in the new amendments is easily stated. The
statute provides:
The increase in value of separate property during the marriage is
separate property, unless marital property or the personal efforts
171. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d-e).
172. For instance, in Westbrook v. Westbrook, 5 Va. App. 446, 364 S.E.2d 523 (1988),
the parties used borrowed funds to build a home on the husband's separate property real
estate. The wife allowed use of her credit only after the husband signed a written statement
that they owned a separate property home "together." The agreement was not sufficient to
transfer legal title because of the Statute of Frauds. Nevertheless, the court found sufficient
evidence of an implied gift, and held that the home transmuted into marital property.
Because the court's rationale did not depend upon any commingling of marital and
separate funds, nothing in Westbrook is inconsistent with the new amendments. Indeed, strong
policy reasons support the Westbrook decision. Virginia has a strong public policy of enforcing
the agreements of the parties in divorce cases. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(I) (addressing
agreements between parties control over contrary language in equitable distribution statute).
By enforcing such agreements, courts follow the parties' own expectations, reduce litigation
costs, and encourage future settlements. These policy reasons apply to implied gifts as well as
enforceable contracts. Transmutation by implied gift "combines the advantages of administra-
tive efficiency with reaching results intended by the parties, thereby enhancing settlement
possibilities." Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 997, 1003.
Courts should make certain, of course, that the expression of donative intent was serious
and legitimate. In Westbrook, for example, the husband's statement of intent was made
deliberately after arm's-length negotiations in which he received a substantial benefit (the wife's
credit). 364 S.E.2d at 525-26. Where the expression of intent is not so deliberate, transmutation
might not occur. Where donative intent clearly exists, however, it should be enforced even if
there was no formal enforceable agreement. Requiring a formal agreement would work a
substantial injustice, for married couples often reach informal understandings on use and
ownership of their property. As long as the owning spouse's consent was genuine, these
arrangements should be enforced, even if there was no formal written agreement. The Statute
of Frauds has no place in the law of transmutation by implied gift.
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
174. See supra notes 63-100 and accompanying text.
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of either party have contributed to such increases and then only
to the extent of the increases in value attributable to such contri-
butions. The personal efforts of either party must be significant
and result in substantial appreciation of the separate property if
any increase in value attributable thereto is to be considered marital
property.
75
Thus, the general rule is that appreciation in separate property remains
separate. The appreciation is marital property, however, if several factors
are present. First, there must have been marital contributions to the
property. 76 A marital contribution for this purpose is either any amount
of marital funds, or any "significant" amount of marital efforts.
77
Second, the separate property involved must have appreciated, and to the
extent marital efforts are involved, the appreciation must be "substan-
tial. ''17 Finally, there must be a causal connection between the marital
contributions and the appreciation. 7 9 If all these requirements are met,
the appreciation is "active," and the appreciation constitutes marital
property.8 0 If the requirements are not met, the appreciation is "passive,"
and it remains separate property. 18'
1. Marital Contributions
Under the statute, there are two types of marital contributions: marital
property and personal efforts. 8 2 Contributions of marital property most
commonly consist of marital funds. Note that there is no minimum amount
of property that must be contributed, and no minimum amount of appre-
ciation that must result. Even small amounts of appreciation are marital
if they were caused by direct financial contributions.
The law on personal effort is not as clear. The statute defines "personal
effort" broadly:
"Personal effort" of a party shall be deemed to be labor, effort,
inventiveness, physical or intellectual skill, creativity or managerial
activity, promotional or marketing activity, applied directly to the
separate property of either party.8 3
This definition includes almost every conceivable effort which could be
used to increase the value of separate property. Moreover, the statute





180. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39; Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 1013-
37. Almost all dual classification equitable distribution states recognize the distinction between
active and passive appreciation.
181. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39.
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
183. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(e).
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states that the personal effort of "either" the owning or the nonowning
spouse can create active appreciation.
8 4
"Personal effort" is qualified, however, in two ways. The personal
effort must be "significant," and the amount of appreciation must be
"substantial."' 5 The statute does not in any way define these terms. As
both terms were enacted from a similar Illinois statute,8 6 however, a
workable definition can be derived from the case law under that statute.8 7
To begin with, we should understand the purpose of the "significant"
personal effort and "substantial" appreciation requirements. The limita-
tions were not intended to provide any arbitrary lower limit upon the
amount of personal effort which is judicially recognizable. If only a small
amount of personal effort is contributed, then there will be only a small
amount of active appreciation. 8  One of the important strengths of the
mixed theory of property is that the court can reward small contributions
with equally small marital interests.8 9 This benefit would be lost if the
statute were read to apply only to objectively "large" marital contribu-
184. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
185. Id.
186. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990). On its face, the
Illinois statute is very different from the Virginia statute, because the Illinois statute defines
active appreciation as separate property. Id. para. 503(a)(7). In addition, however, the statute
also gives the marital estate an equitable right of reimbursement equal to the amount of
appreciation caused by marital contributions. Id. para. 503(c)(2). As in Virginia, if the
contributions are of personal effort, the effort must be significant and the appreciation must
be substantial. Id. para. 503(c)(2). The end result, therefore, is that active appreciation is
essentially marital property. See L. GoLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.34 (Supp. 1990) (criticizing
complicated statutory scheme of Illinois).
187. Although the Illinois case law is certainly relevant, it is not by any means dispositive.
There are, in fact, a number of relevant differences between the Virginia and Illinois statutes.
First, the Virginia statute contains a very broad definition of personal effort. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-107.3(A)(3)(c). This provision has no counterpart in the Illinois statute, and the Illinois
cases may define personal effort more narrowly than the Virginia legislature intended. Second,
the burden of proof under the Illinois statute is clear and convincing evidence, while the
burden of proof under the Virginia statute is a preponderance of the evidence. Compare ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(c) with VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1). Finally, the Illinois
statute clearly requires reimbursement for all contributions of marital funds, regardless of
whether the property involved appreciated. See In re Adams, 183 Ill. App. 3d 296, 538 N.E.2d
1286 (1989). The Virginia statute, by contrast, recognizes a marital interest from contributions
of marital funds only if the property appreciated. VA. CODE ANN. 20-107.3(A)(3). A different
result might occur if contributions of marital funds constitute partial acquisitions of property
under the source of funds rule. See supra notes 102-35 and accompanying text. Any reference
to the Illinois case law must therefore be checked closely to see if the underlying statutory
provisions in both states are the same.
Also, of course, little attention should be paid to Illinois cases decided under the unitary
property scheme that prevailed before paragraph 503(c) was enacted. The pre-503(c) cases are
no longer consistent with Virginia law because Virginia has now rejected unitary property. VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A).
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (appreciation is marital property "only to the extent
of the increases in value attributable to such [marital] contributions").
189. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.06A.
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tions. The General Assembly intended that all marital contributions result
in a marital interest proportional to the amount of resulting appreciation.
At the same time, however, the General Assembly realized that active
appreciation questions are difficult to resolve. Answering questions in-
volving appreciation often requires extensive expert testimony, extensive
research by the parties, and extensive thought on the part of the trial
judge.190 This procedure is not cost-effective in every case, and it should
be applied only whenits benefits outweigh its burdens. Accordingly, the
Illinois courts have recognized that "the requirement that no reimburse-
ment is to be made unless a spouse's personal efforts are significant and
result in substantial appreciation is designed to avoid de minimus claims."''
For example, if the parties would have to pay $5,000 in system costs 9 2 to
classify only $1,000 worth of personal effort which caused only $2,000
worth of appreciation, the benefit is obviously not worth the cost.
The purpose of requiring significant efforts and substantial apprecia-
tion, therefore, is to ensure that the benefits of classifying appreciation
are greater than the inherent cost of the classification process. 93 Given
this purpose, the definition of "significant" and "substantial" should be
relative rather than absolute. The court should balance the amount of
personal effort and appreciation involved against the cost to the parties
190. See, e.g., Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 F m. L.Q. 147, 154
(1989) (noting that active appreciation cases pose "daunting administrative problems").
191. In re Morse, 143 Ill. App. 3d 849, 854, 493 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (1986).
192. Computing the system costs of classifying appreciation in separate property could
easily consume an article in itself. The tangible expenses are obvious, including attorney's fees,
expert's fees, and court costs. In addition, there are intangible costs. For instance, the trial
judge must spend extra time and effort hearing and deciding the appreciation question. The
appellate courts must likewise spend time and effort hearing the question, especially since
active appreciation questions frequently generate complicated appeals. These judicial resources
could arguably be better employed in other areas of the law.
193. The validity of this purpose lies largely outside the scope of this article. One could
argue that the parties themselves will suffer most when the costs of litigating active appreciation
outweigh the benefits, and that no statutory restriction is needed in order to prevent waste of
judicial resources. Other states have certainly not been plagued by litigation over small amounts
of active appreciation, and it seems unlikely that this will be a problem in Virginia under the
new amendments. In addition, if there is a minimum efforts requirement in the statute, there
is a risk that it would be incorrectly interpreted to establish an objective minimum unrelated
to the costs of litigation. Such a minimum would penalize spouses making small marital
contributions, who are probably disproportionately women.
Still, the decision to place a minimum effort requirement in the statute is not unreasonable.
One of the most troublesome features of unitary property was the creation of large marital
interests from small marital contributions. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text. The drafters
were understandably sensitive to this problem, and added a minimum effort requirement to
make certain it would not recur. Although the ability to award small marital interests made
the restriction technically unnecessary to accomplish the legislative purpose, the restriction
nevertheless provides extra certainty that the size of the marital interest will remain proportional
to the marital contributions. As long as the minimum effort requirement is not used as an
excuse to ignore small but still valuable marital contributions, it should not lead to unjust
results.
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and the public of litigating the question. If the expense of litigation
exceeds the amount of personal effort involved, resolving the question
may not be worthwhile.
This cost benefit approach is consistent with most of the Illinois case
law. In In re Tatham, 94 the husband spent most of the marriage managing
the wife's 1006-acre nonmarital farm. Among other things, he grew crops,
raised cattle, and built a riding stable and arena. Although he had once
received $800 per month salary for his efforts, that salary stopped shortly
after the parties were married. 195 The value of the husband's services
obviously far exceeded the judicial cost of deciding the case, and the court
had little trouble finding the husband's personal efforts to be significant.
196
A contrary result was reached in In re Morse, 97 in which the husband
owned a nonmarital insurance agency. The wife spent a few hours per
day working for the agency, doing clerical work and serving as office
manager. Except for selling two insurance policies, she did not make any
direct contributions to the business. 198 Although the wife's services certainly
had some value, the judicial cost of measuring the active appreciation
likely would have exceeded the amount of appreciation involved. Accord-
ingly, the court found that wife's effort was not significant, and that the
appreciation was not substantial.
Illinois has yet to consider whether or not homemaker services can
create active appreciation. The law in other states is split on this ques-
tion. 99 Some states hold that appreciation caused by homemaker services
is marital property, 20° while other states find such appreciation to be
separate property.
20'
194. 173 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 527 N.E.2d 1351 (1988).
195. In re Jatham, 173 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1081-83, 527 N.E.2d 1351, 1355-56 (1988).
196. Id. For further discussion of other issues raised in Tatham, see infra notes 210-216
and accompanying text.
197. 143 Ill. App. 3d 849, 493 N.E.2d 1088 (1986).
198. In re Morse, 143 Ill. App. 3d 849, 853, 493 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (1986).
199. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39; Turner, supra note 1, at 844.
200. See Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986); Goderwis
v. Goderwis, 780 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1989); Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383, 716 P.2d 1133
(1986); Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J. Super. 281, 543 A.2d 1062 (App. Div. 1988); Griffith v.
Griffith, 185 N.J. Super. 382, 448 A.2d 1035 (Ch. Div. 1982); Beightol v. Beightol, 90 N.C.
App. 58, 367 S.E.2d 347 (1988).
201. See In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Applegate v. Applegate, 219
Neb. 532, 365 N.W.2d 394 (1985); Haldemann v. Haldemann, 145 Wis. 2d 296, 426 N.W.2d
107 (Ct. App. 1988) (dicta).
These cases are particularly offensive because they refer to homemaker services as usual
spousal duties not worthy of being considered in equitable distribution. The courts have been
unclear as to the source of this spousal duty. No provision in the law of any state currently
requires either spouse to perform homemaker services. At the most, because both spouses live
in a joint home, each may have a duty to perform half of the homemaker services, but a full-
time homemaker still contributes far more to a marriage than her usual spousal duty. Indeed,
courts recognize the unique value of homemaker services at the division stage, by awarding
homemaker spouses 50% or more of the marital assets. See supra note 28. There is no reason
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The question is much less important in Virginia than in other states.
Homemaker services can cause appreciation in two ways: directly or
indirectly. Direct causation occurs when the appreciation is caused by
homemaker services performed on the appreciated property itself.20 2 Be-
cause homemaker services clearly fall within Virginia's broad definition
of "personal effort," 203 appreciation directly caused by homemaker serv-
ices should always be marital property.
Indirect causation occurs when one spouse performs more than her
share of homemaker services on assets other than appreciated separate
property. 204 By taking on these extra duties, the homemaker frees the
owning spouse to spend additional time and effort managing separate
property. Indirect causation is an important issue in states where only the
nonowning spouse's efforts can create active appreciation s.2 0  In Virginia,
however, the efforts of either spouse can create active appreciation.
20 6
Thus, wheni the efforts of the owning spouse cause separate property to
appreciate, the owning spouse's efforts alone are sufficient to make the
appreciation marital, regardless of whether any indirect homemaker serv-
ices are involved. Virginia's broad definition of "personal effort" allows
us to sidestep the indirect homemaker services controversy.
20 7
There is obviously substantial middle ground between the full-time
farm work in Tatham and the occasional clerical work in Morse. In
resolving questions within this gray area, the courts should lean toward
finding that the significant efforts and substantial appreciation require-
ments were met. There is no unfairness to the parties in defining these
terms liberally, because small marital contributions still yield only a small
marital interest. 20 8 Virginia's unitary property background may lead to a
why homemaker services should not be recognized equally when the services have created
active appreciation. After reading the above cases, one is left with the unfortunate impression
that the predominantly male appellate judiciary is discriminating against predominantly female
homemaker spouses. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39.
202. See, e.g., Beightol v. Beightol, 90 N.C. App. 58, 367 S.E.2d 347 (1988) (husband's
rental property increased in value because wife provided free housekeeping services).
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3).
204. See Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986).
205. In New York, for instance, appreciation in separate property is marital property only
if it is caused by the efforts of the nonowning spouse. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236B(l)(d)(3)
(1986); Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986). Appreciation
caused by the efforts of the owning spouse during the marriage is clearly a product of the
marital partnership, and it should be marital property. The only way for New York courts to
reach this desirable result is through reliance upon indirect homemaker services.
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(e).
207. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3) (appreciation due to owner's personal effort is
marital property).
208. Id. It could be argued that trial courts will be unwilling to find small amounts of
active appreciation, just as courts were apparently unwilling to award highly unequal divisions
in transmutation cases under unitary property. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
If this proves to be true, there might be some basis for an objective minimum of personal
effort needed to create a marital interest. It is doubtful that judges will be reluctant to award
1990]
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fear that the marital interest will be disproportionate, but this is unlikely
to happen under the new amendments. In fact, the only harm caused by
classifying as significant small marital contributions is the cost to the
judicial system of spending time and effort resolving de minimis claims.
Because Virginia has already expressed its willingness to accept some
difficulty in administration in order to reach a fair result, 209 the cost of
resolving active appreciation claims should not be an overwhelming con-
cern. Given any chance that the benefit to the parties might outweigh the
cost to the system, therefore, the court should hold that limitations upon
personal efforts are met.
2. Increase in Value
The statutory phrase "increase in value of separate property during
the marriage ' 21 0 seems clear enough upon its face. A court determines the
value of the property on the date of valuation and then subtracts the
value on the date of marriage. The difference is the increase in value,
which is marital property if it was caused by marital contributions.
Beneath this placid surface, however, lies a difficult question: the
distinction between improvement and maintenance. If $10,000 in marital
funds are used to make improvements on separate property, the increased
value is clearly marital. 21  But what if the same $10,000 is used for
small amounts of active appreciation. If anything, judges in other states have tended to
underestimate the amount of active appreciation. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sanders, 547 So. 2d
1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (remanding case for second time due to trial judge's refusal
to recognize wife's interest in active appreciation of husband's farm). Unitary property is not
a good analogy, for under that doctrine, protection of separate property depended upon the
trial judge taking an affirmitive act (an unequal division). Under active appreciation, by
contrast, the trial judge must take an affirmitive act (finding active appreciation) to protect
marital property. If judicial inertia has any effect at all, therefore, it will help protect the
separate interest. There is no reason to suspect that judges will reward small marital contri-
butions with disproportionately large marital interests.
209. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
211. This example assumes that the improvements are sufficiently general that they cannot
be valued independently. If a court can determine the value of the improvements by themselves,
it might treat the improvements as a new asset acquired by marital funds. See Diehl, supra
note 85, at 1-107 to 1-108 (stating if marital funds used to add new room to separate property
home, and new room is capable of being valued independently, room should be treated as
distinct asset acquired with 100% marital funds); cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 78, 377
S.E.2d 666, 670 (1989) (noting that under source of funds rule, marital portion and separate
portion of asset function much like distinct pieces of property). If improvements have no
independent value, however, courts would treat the improvements as an increase in value of
the improved property. Because the increase was caused by marital funds, the increase would
constitute marital property. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
There is no difference between these two methods if the property has not appreciated.
$10,000 in active appreciation is functionally the same as a new marital asset worth $10,000.
The difference is significant, however, if the property has appreciated. In that case, if the
improvements are separable, the court will measure the appreciation in the improvements
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maintenance? The statute could be read to require that increases in value
be measured from the value on the date of marriage. There is some logic
to this approach, because all property requires maintenance. If mainte-
nance creates a marital interest, therefore, all separate property will slowly
become marital. 2 2 On the other hand, the statute could be read to require
that increases in value be measured from what the value would have been
if no marital contributions had been made. This approach is also logical,
because ignoring maintenance can be unfair to the marital estate. In our
example, if there is no marital interest, the marital estate has lost $10,000
without receiving any corresponding benefit.
The question came before an Illinois court in In re Tatham . 2 13 The
husband in that case worked full time during the marriage on the wife's
nonmarital farm, and received no salary for his efforts. There was an
excellent argument that the increased value of the farm was marital
property. The wife claimed, however, that the property did not appreciate,
and that the marital estate should therefore receive no compensation at
all for the husband's full-time services. The court seemed to disagree:
separately from the appreciation in the rest of the property. It is possible, and probably even
likely, that the percentage appreciation in the improvements will be different from the
percentage appreciation in the rest of the property. On the other hand, if the improvements
are inseparable, the court will have to apply the source of funds rule to the entire asset. The
initial cost of the improvements would then be a marital contribution to the acquisition of
the home, just like any marital contributions to the downpayment or the mortgage payments.
For example, assume that the parties buy a home using $40,000 of the husband's separate
funds, $10,000 of the wife's separate funds, and $10,000 of marital funds. Then, they spend
$15,000 of the wife's separate funds on improvements. If the improvements are separable,
then the court will value the home and the improvements separately. Assuming the improve-
ments are worth $20,000 on the date of valuation, that amount will be the wife's separate
property. Applying the source of funds rule to the remaining equity (the full equity less the
$20,000 improvements), two-thirds (40,000/60,000) would be the husband's separate property,
and one-sixth (10,000/60,000) of the equity would be the wife's separate property and marital
property respectively. If the improvements were not separable, the wife's separate contribution
would be $25,000 ($10,000 original contribution plus $15,000 spent on improvements). The
husband's separate interest would then be 53.3% (40,000/75,000); the wife's separate interest
would be one-third (25,000/75,000); and the marital interest would be 13.3% (10,000/75,000).
The percentages would be multiplied by the entire equity.
Both of these results are consistent with the source of funds rule. The normal source of
funds formula presumes that all parts of an asset appreciate in the same amount. Thus, if an
asset as a whole increases in value by 30%, then the marital and separate interests individually
also appreciate by 30%. This is only a presumption, however, and should be rebuttable if
there is contrary evidence. Where separable improvements have appreciation in a different
percentage from the rest of the asset, there is evidence that the general presumption of uniform
appreciation is incorrect. The improvements should therefore not be classified under the normal
source of funds formula.
212. Several Illinois cases reached this result under unitary property. These cases treated
the matter as a question of causation, however, and not as a question of what constitutes an
increase in value. For this reason, these cases are discussed fully at note 269 infra and
accompanying text.
213. 173 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 527 N.E.2d 1351 (1988).
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[T]he fact that respondent continued the day-to-day operation of
the farm and did not permit the farm to deteriorate was another
factor that the circuit court may have considered. Whenever stren-
uous efforts are made to maintain property values against over-
whelming external factors such that it appears that the efforts
were for naught, and especially in this time of ever increasing
problems besieging the agriculture industry, it cannot be said that
the property was not substantially appreciated even though the
application of numerical values may appear to belie those efforts.
214
This language suggests that an "increase in value" may result when
"strenuous efforts" offset "overwhelming external factors" that otherwise
would have caused substantial depreciation.2 15 After making this sugges-
tion, however, the court ultimately decided that the value of the property
had increased. The above language, therefore, was not the basis for the
court's decision.
Even so, Tatham suggests that marital contributions for maintenance
might sometimes give the marital estate an interest in the underlying
property. Such an interest is unlikely when the amount spent for mainte-
nance is small. The balance of factors is different, however, when the
marital contributions are substantial. In Tatham, for instance, if the
property had not appreciated and the marital estate had been awarded no
interest, the marital estate would receive no consideration at all for the
husband's services during the marriage. In effect, he would have been
working for free. Such a substantial loss of marital property would have
been seriously unjust. Where a very substantial amount of marital property
or personal effort is used to maintain separate property, courts should
consider awarding a marital interest.
21 6
3. Causation
The heart of active appreciation law is the last part of the test. The
court will reach this prong of the test only if -the court has already found
that marital contributions were made and that the property increased in
value. When both of these requirements are met, the court must then
214. In re Jatham, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 1082-83, 527 N.E.2d at 1357 (1988).
215. Id.
216. See also Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, 212 Neb. 730, 325 N.W.2d 832 (1982)
(marital interest exists if nonowning spouse "has significantly cared for the [separate] property
during the riiarriage").
The entire question of contributions to maintenance also arises in the context of deter-
mining causation. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text. Indeed, since the question
involves weighing of various policy interests, it is probably better considered as a causation
problem. Still, the statute provides on its face that there must be an "increase in value"
before causation is relevant. VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1). Thus, if increases in value
must in all cases be measured from the value on the date of marriage, rather than the value
if no marital contributions had been made, the causation question never arises.
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determine the extent to which the marital contributions caused the increase
in value.
The extent to which marital contributions cause increase in the value
of property is perhaps one of the most discusssed issues in property
division law. Many different commentators have addressed the question, 217
usually in relation to a series of causation tests developed in community
property states in the early part of the twentieth century. 218 The drafters
of the Virginia statute were aware of those tests in at least a general
manner. 2 9 None of the community property tests is truly consistent with
modem notions of the marital partnership,2 ° however, and most equitable
distribution states have adopted a more flexible approach. 221 Some deci-
sions have taken this approach too far by treating all issues of causation
as pure questions of fact.222 Virginia should adopt the flexible equitable
distribution approach, but it should recognize the legal as well as factual
elements of causation.
a. Community Property
Community property states have generally refused to classify appre-
ciation in separate property as marital or community property.23 Never-
217. See, e.g., L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39; King, The Challenge of Apportionment,
37 WASH. L. REv. 483 (1962); Krauskopf, supra note 156; Reynolds, supra note 13.
218. See infra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Diehl, supra note 85, at 1-8 to 1-9 (briefly discussing reasonable compen-
sation method and reasonable rate of return method, and suggesting that choice of method
be made on case-by-case basis).
220. See infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
223. For a small selection of the early cases, see Lombardi v. Lombardi, 44 Nev. 314,
195 P. 93 (1921); In re Cudworth's Estate, 133 Cal. 462, 65 P. 1041 (1901); In re Higgins, 65
Cal. 407, 4 P. 389 (1884). The Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule as recently as 1984.
Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). For an exhaustive discussion of the evolution
of community property law on appreciation in separate property, see Reynolds, supra note
13, at 259-83.
In view of recent developments in equitable distribution states, classification of active
appreciation can fairly be called the historical blind spot of community property. The problem
has arisen largely because community property states view the community and separate interests
as absolutely legally protected estates in property. Once property has been assigned to one
estate, reassignment to another would constitute illegal seizure of private property. See e.g.,
Jensen, 665 S.W.2d at 109. This view is inconsistent with the marital partnership theory. If
the parties' property is truly to be divided in proportion to their contributions to the marriage,
the law must recognize that each party contributes at different times and in different ways.
Since the balance of contributions to the marriage is constantly changing, the parties' interests
in property do not remain constant. Equitable distribution states recognize this, and treat the
marital interest as a flexible equitable lien which rises and falls throughout the marriage in
both absolute and percentage terms.
The tradition of treating community and separate interests as absolute estates in property
is strong, and change will probably not occur overnight. Nevertheless, community property
law would reach better results if it began treating the parties' interest less like an estate in
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theless, community property states have recognized for some time that a
community interest should exist when community funds or efforts are used
to improve separate property. 22 Community property states reconciled
these competing policies by giving the community estate not an actual
interest in separate property, but an equitable right of reimbursement.
22
1
The causation question first arose when courts tried to determine how
much reimbursement should be granted.
A number of early reimbursement methods have little relevance to
equitable distribution. Initially, many courts limited the measure of re-
imbursement to the value of the community funds or labor involved.
226
This method denied the community estate any return on its investment,
and it is not presently followed in any state.22 7
Most community property courts today recognize that the amount of
reimbursement should be the increase in value caused by community funds
or efforts. 22 Thus, the causation question in community property states
is the same as in equitable distribution states, even though community
property law generally does not classify the appreciation as community
property. For a time, many courts awarded either complete reimbursement
or no reimbursement at all, depending upon whether the predominant
cause of the appreciation was community or separate contributions. This
method posed many of the same problems as a unitary property method,
and it gradually fell out of use.229
The first serious attempts to answer the causation problem were made
in the state of California. In the early twentieth century, the California
cases identified two different competing approaches. Under the "reason-
able rate of return method," all appreciation up to an objectively reason-
able rate of return on the separate interest was passive, while all remaining
appreciation was active. 2 0 Under the "reasonable compensation method,"
by contrast, the community estate was entitled to objectively reasonable
compensation for the community contributions to the property.2 11 In
property and more like a lien. For example, Wisconsin adopted a community property law in
1985, but it continues to apply its equitable distribution statute when the marriage ends in
divorce. See Kuhlman v. Kuhlman, 146 Wis. 2d 588, 432 N.W.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1988)
(community property law applies only during the marriage, and not upon divorce); Haack v.
Haack, 149 Wis. 2d 243, 440 N.W.2d 794 (1989) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Kuhlman).
The result is a workable mixture of legal protection during the marriage and flexible distribution
upon divorce. Other community property states would do well to consider Wisconsin's example.
224. See generally Reynolds, supra note 13, at 264-65, 276-77.
225. See id. at 276-77.
226. See Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 1015.
227. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 275-76.
228. See Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 1018.
229. See id. at 1015-18.
230. See generally Reynolds, supra note 13, at 277-78; see also Pereira v. Pereira, 156
Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909).
231. See generally Reynolds, supra note 13, at 278-82; see also Van Camp v. Van Camp,
53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921).
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computing reasonable compensation, however, the court had to include
the owning spouse's salary as a benefit already received by the marital
estate. The amount of active appreciation therefore equaled the reasonable
value of the community contributions, less the owning spouse's salary.
23 2
All further appreciation was active.
An example may help illustrate both methods. Assume that the hus-
band's separate property increased in value during a one-year marriage
from $100,000 to $200,000. Assume further that $10,000 worth of marital
effort was used to improve the property, that the owner received $5,000
in salary, and that the prevailing risk-free interest rate is 10 percent. Under
the reasonable rate of return method, the separate estate would receive its
base contribution ($100,000) plus 10 percent interest, for a total of
$110,000. The community estate would receive the remaining $90,000.
Under the reasonable compensation method, the community estate would
be entitled to the reasonable value of its contributions ($10,000) less the
salary already received ($5,000). The remaining appreciation would go to
the community estate. The community interest would therefore be $5,000,
and the separate interest $195,000. As the example demonstrates, the two
California methods can yield varying results.
Both California methods suffer from serious flaws. The reasonable
compensation method is based upon the implied assumption that services
with a reasonable value of $10,000 will cause $10,000 of appreciation.
233
If this assumption were true, then a business that paid fair salaries would
never grow in value. 23 4 For every $10,000 the business appreciated, the
business would pay out exactly the same amount in salary. Common
experience shows, however, that businesses pay average salaries often
increase in value. (Indeed, this is almost the definition of a successful
business.) The reasonable compensation method fails to recognize that
services often contribute more to a business than their fair economic value.
The reasonable compensation method can therefore seriously underestimate
the amount of appreciation actually caused by marital contributions. 235
232. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 280-81.
233. This assumption views the reasonable compensation method in its best light. Other
commentators have argued that the reasonable compensation method awards the community
only some arbitrary objective "reasonable" compensation for its contributions, rather than
allowing the community to share in the gain or loss suffered by the property as a whole.
Viewed in this way, the reasonable compensation method is clearly inconsistent with the basic
source of funds principle that marital contributions are investments and not loans. See Reynolds,
supra note 13, at 281.
234. Of course, the business could passively appreciate through external factors, such as
increases in the value of its real property. A more proper conclusion would therefore be that
if the assumption made by the reasonable compensation method is correct, then no business
will ever rise or fall in value for any reason other than blind luck. This conclusion contradicts
common experience just as much as the somewhat simplified conclusion made in the text.
235. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 281 (criticizing reasonable compensation method and
stating "When the courts 'compensate' the community instead of allowing it to share in the
increase in value, the courts ignore the community's right to share the fruits of marital labor");
Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 1033 (stating that reasonable compensation method is unwar-
ranted because it limits marital share to less than actual contribution).
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The reasonable rate of return method suffers from too much reliance
upon objective financial data. For instance, if an objective reasonable
interest rate is 10%, then 10% of the appreciation will always be passive.
This inflexible rule can sometimes be quite harsh. For instance, if 90%
of the contributions are marital but the business appreciated only 11%,
then the community's 90% contributions give it only 9.1% (1/11) of the
overall appreciation. The fundamental problem in this example is that the
objective reasonable interest rate is unreasonable for the specific separate
asset being classified.
23 6
The reasonable rate of return method works much better if the court
uses not an objective rate, but a subjective rate based upon the experience
of other similar types of separate property. For instance, a court classifying
a separate property widget company would look to the reasonable rate of
growth for the average company in the widget industry.2 7 Looking to
reasonable industry rates of growth does not completely eliminate the
problem with objective reasonable interest rates discussed in the last
paragraph, but such an approach does tailor the interest rate to the specific
asset involved. As long as a proper rate of return is chosen, therefore,




Most equitable distribution states have ignored the community property
experience. In fact, the author is unaware of a single recent equitable
distribution case that has employed either of the two California methods
by name. Instead, courts in equitable distribution states have taken a fresh
look at the problem of causation. The equitable distribution decisions
have not identified any single method of measuring causation. Instead,
generally courts have treated the matter of causation as a question of fact
that cannot be resolved by a simple formula. 2 9 The choice of method is




Judicial willingness to treat causation as a question of fact is in one
sense a major step forward. Both community property methods can reach
236. See Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 1029.
237. See id. at 1015-16, 1029 (discussing choosing rate of return under community property
law).
238. Significantly, the only recent writer to propose an allocation method for use in
equitable distribution states leaned toward the reasonable rate of return method. See id. at
1035. Krauskopf's marital effort method provides that a reasonable rate of return on the
specific separate asset involved should be separate property, if the separate property owner
proves that that economic conditions enhanced the value of the property. Id.
239. See Macaluso v. Macaluso, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); cf. McCann
v. McCann, 142 Misc. 2d 1083, 1085, 539 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (1989) (lamenting lack of expert
testimony on question of causation, and finding insufficient evidence to determine cause of
appreciation). See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39.
240. See Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 344 S.E.2d 100 (1986).
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absurd results through their insistence upon using objectively average
compensation and interest rates to judge specific fact situations. 2A1 In real
life, however, no asset will ever be exactly average. When the asset involved
fails to meet the court-determined averages, any formula-based method
breaks down. By treating causation as a question of fact, the equitable
distribution cases achieve greater flexibility and fairness.
In another sense, however, there are serious risks to treating causation
as a pure question of fact. All too often, appellate courts use the factual
standard as an excuse to avoid answering difficult questions of law. In
reviewing the active appreciation decisions, one is struck by the almost
complete lack of guidance the trial courts have received on the causation
question. 242 As Virginia learned under unitary property, a lack of concrete
standards increases litigation costs, discourages settlements, and frustrates
the bench and bar.241
There is, of course, a limit to how much guidance courts can give in
determining the cause of appreciation. The inquiry is fact-specific, and no
two cases will ever be the same. Causation is not so fact-specific, however,
that guidance is impossible. It is possible to strike a better balance between
the need for flexibility and the need for objective standards. This article
will suggest one way in which appellate courts might put more substance
into the law of causation.
c. Causes in Fact and Law
In looking for objective standards on the law of causation, one is
immediately drawn to the law of torts. Causation has been a crucial
question in tort law for generations, and courts have devined a workable
method for answering questions involving causation.2" In tort law, cau-
sation remains mostly a question of fact,25 but there are sufficient rules
of law to provide reasonable guidance on how the inquiry should be
structured.
241. See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
242. For instance, in Lawing v. Lawing, the court remanded the case with these instruc-
tions:
The court should make findings as to the value of the shares at time of inheritance
and as of the date of valuation. It then should determine what proportion of that
increase was due to funds, talent or labor that were contributed by the marital
community ... , as opposed to passive increases due to interest and rising land
values of land owned at inheritance, and the efforts of [third parties]. We recognize
that we cannot require mathematical precision in making this determination....
Nevertheless, the trial court must make a reasoned valuation, identifying to the
extent possible the factors it considered.
Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 176, 344 S.E.2d 100, 112 (1986). It is hard to see how
the above paragraph gave the trial judge any real guidance at all.
243. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
244. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEErON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS chap. 7
(5th ed. 1984).
245. Id. § 41, at 264-65.
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Causation in the law of torts is a two-pronged inquiry. First, the court
must determine whether the defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the
plaintiff's injuries. 46 Causation in fact is "but for" causation: if the
defendant had not been negligent, would the plaintiff have been injured?
247
The test requires the court to compare the actual state of affairs with the
hypothetical state of affairs that would have resulted if the defendant had
not been negligent. 248 If the plaintiff would not have been injured in this
hypothetical fact situation, the defendant's actions are not the cause in
fact of the plaintiff's injuries.2 9
Not every cause in fact, however, is a cause in law. Every law student
has his own favorite case in which an improbable series of events caused
an unlikely injury.250 In these cases, even though the cause in fact test is
met, the defendant is still not liable. In the language of the courts, his
conduct is not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
251
Volumes have been written on the definition of proximate causation
in the law of torts, and the rules are far too numerous to summarize
here. 252 The important point is that proximate cause is a question of public
policy rather than a question of observed fact. 253 The court is concerned
not with metaphysical notions of cause and effect, but with the question
of whether equity demands that the defendant should be responsible for
the plaintiff's injuries. 2 4 This is by no means an easy test to predict or
apply, but it is an honest and straightforward approach. The parties
involved know that policy is the test, and they direct their arguments
specifically in those terms. The resulting judicial opinions make clear
policy choices, which then provide guidance for future cases. Because the
law of proximate cause recognizes policy issues and addresses them directly,
the law of proximate cause has struck a very appropriate balance between
flexibility and certainty.
A similar approach could be imported into the law of equitable
distribution. As in the law of torts, causation in active appreciation cases
should consist of two parts: causes in fact and causes in law. To determine
246. Id. § 41, at 263-65. See Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 151 S.E.2d 422 (1966).
247. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 244, § 41, at 266-67. See Wells, 207 Va. at
622, 151 S.E.2d at 428.
248. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 244, § 41, at 265.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Pasgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (finding
defendant railroad company not liable when railroad's employee clumsily assisted passenger in
boarding train, causing her to drop package of fireworks; package exploded, causing several
scales located some distance away to fall upon the plaintiff).
251. Id. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 244, § 43, at 284-90.
252. See W. PROSSER & W. KEErON, supra note 244, § 41, at 263 n.1 (giving brief
selection of literature).
253. Id. § 42 at 272-75; see Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 622, 151 S.E.2d 422, 428
(1966) ("Proximate cause has been described as a shorthand descriptive phrase for the [policy]
limits the law has placed upon an actor's responsibility for his conduct").
254. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 244, § 41, at 272-75.
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causation in fact, the court should determine what the value of the property
would have been if there had been no marital contributions. The difference
between this hypothetical value and the actual value of the property is the
amount of appreciation caused in fact by the marital contributions.
2
11
Because "but for" causation is a question of fact, 2 6 the result will
depend greatly upon the circumstances of the case presented. Nevertheless,
a list of relevant factors in determining the causation of increased property
values can be distilled from the reported case law:
1. Type of Asset. Marital contributions affect the value of some
types of assets more than others. For instance, real estate often appreciates
passively, because no one person has any real control over fluctuating real
estate prices. 217 Conversely, close corporations often appreciate actively,
because their value depends greatly upon the owner's efforts. 25
2. Similar Assets. If the asset in question has appreciated more than
other assets in similar conditions, the extra appreciation may be due to
marital skill and effort. 259 If the asset has appreciated less than other
similar assets, there is likely to be little or no active appreciation.
255. The statutory phrase "increase in value during the marriage" could refer only to the
increase upwards from the value on the date of marriage. See supra notes 211-16 and
accompanying text. If so, then the amount of appreciation caused in fact could not exceed
the difference between the value on the date of marriage and the value on the date of valuation.
This limitation would not apply if "increase in value" can be measured from the value
if no marital contributions had been made. Of course, as discussed below, the difference
between value at the time of marriage and value if no marital contributions had been made-
essentially, the increase in value caused by maintenance-will not be caused at law by marital
contributions unless special circumstances are present. See infra notes 268-72 and accompanying
text.
256. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 244, § 41, at 264 (stating cause in fact
is question "upon which all the learning, literature and lore of the law are largely lost. It is
a matter upon which lay opinion is quite as competent as that of the most experienced court").
257. See Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 194 n.8 (Minn. 1987).
Some commentators have argued that the type of asset should not be a factor in
determining causation. Their rationale is essentially that courts use the type of asset factor as
a rationale for limiting the amount of active appreciation and thus reducing the nonowning
spouse's share of the marital estate. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 13, at 288 (classification
should not depend upon "the fortuity of the kind of separate property a spouse happens to
own").
Of course, we should not use generalizations about the type of asset as a substitute for
full analysis. Nevertheless, the law must recognize the differences between various types of
property. For instance, a skilled operator can cause immense appreciation in the value of a
close corporation, while real estate prices are generally beyond the control of any single
landowner. As a matter of economic reality, therefore, appreciation in close corporations is
frequently active, while appreciation in real estate is frequently passive. The law gains nothing
by ignoring these obvious differences. Appreciation should not be deemed passive merely
because real estate is involved, but the owner's lack of control over real estate prices should
be a factor in most real estate appreciation cases.
258. See Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 194 (noting that "a business, like a garden, must be
tended if it is to flourish").
259. See Haldemann v. Haldemann, 145 Wis. 2d 296, 426 N.W.2d 107 (1988) (wife's
farm increased in value while farm values were generally falling; appreciation held active).
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3. Third Parties. If appreciation can be traced to the acts of third
parties, it was obviously not caused by marital contributions. 260 Third
parties include not only co-owners of the property involved, but also
governments and other institutions with influence over the economy.
2 6'
4. Control and Expertise. If the owning spouse has complete control
over the asset, it is more likely that the efforts of the owning spouse
caused the appreciation. 262 A finding of causation is especially likely if the
owner also has special expertise in the field. 263 If the owner had little or
no control (as in, for instance, an owner of IBM stock), the owner's
efforts were probably irrelevant.
264
260. See Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 344 S.E.2d 100 (1986) (appreciation
caused by efforts of husband's partner held passive).
261. See Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (demand for corporation's
products increased greatly after enactment of federal environmental control laws; appreciation
held passive); Myers v. Myers, 70 Haw. 143, 764 P.2d 1237 (1988) (favorable change in dollar/
yen ratio; appreciation held passive).
262. See McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910 (majority shareholder
in close corporation; appreciation held mostly active), cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d
488 (1985).
263. See Lester v. Lester, 547 So. 2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (husband
"was a recognized genius in his field and was firmly engaged in running his business";
appreciation held active). Of course, to the extent the owner made unusually skilled contri-
butions, his or her contributions to the asset were greater than the nonowner's, and the
argument for an unequal division becomes stronger. See Teitler v. Teitler, 156 A.D.2d 314,
549 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1989) (appreciation in art studio caused almost entirely by wife's skill as
artist was active, but husband's interest in appreciation was only 25%).
264. See Shahidi v. Shahidi, 129 A.D.2d 627, 514 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1987) (appreciation in
husband's IBM stock held passive).
It is important, however, that control be defined in a flexible manner. Even when the
parties do not have control over the value of a particular asset, the parties still have control
over whether or not their funds will be invested in that asset. Therefore, where the owning
spouse used his own efforts and expertise to select unusually wise investments, the appreciation
has been held active even though neither spouse had control over the investments' values. See
Nolan v. Nolan, 107 A.D.2d 190, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1985) (unemployed husband spent all his
time and effort managing separate property securities portfolio; appreciation held active);
DeMarco v. DeMarco, 143 A.D.2d 328, 532 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1988) (parties jointly invested
husband's personal injuries award; appreciation held active); Miceli v. Miceli, 533 So. 2d 1171
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (same situation as Nolan; error to award wife none of the husband's
property); Fredel v. Fredel, 531 So. 2d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (appreciation in actively
traded stock portfolio held active); cf. McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d
910 (suggesting that business decision to redeem shares owned by another shareholder might
create active appreciation), cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985). One commentator
has suggested that the decision to retain an investment might be marital property. See Reynolds,
supra note 13, at 323. No reported case has yet reached this result.
This entire issue might best be considered under the tort law-based theory of causation
discussed below. See supra and infra notes 244-81 and accompanying text. As a factual matter,
any investment decision can cause appreciation, regardless of whether it is a decision to buy,
a decision to sell, or a decision to retain. This conclusion is particularly clear in Virginia, due
to the broad statutory definition of personal effort. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3). It is
less clear, however, whether investment decisions should be the cause in law of resulting
appreciation. Most states have been willing to recognize increases caused by buying or selling,
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5. Marital Funds. If marital funds are invested in the property, it is
highly unlikely that the amount of appreciation caused by the funds would
be less than the amount invested.
265
After determining how much appreciation was caused in fact by marital
contributions, a court should consider as a matter of policy whether the
factual causes of the appreciation constitute causes at law. Because policy
matters are questions of law, the trial judge's opinion on this point should
not be given special deference. 266 Instead, the court should determine
whether recognizing all of the appreciation is consistent with the marital
partnership theory and the purposes of the statute.
Since no state currently follows a tort-law-based theory of causation,
there is no case law expressly analyzing causation issues under a cause at
law method. Nevertheless, there are a number of cases in which the court's
decision on causation was based upon concerns of policy rather than
concerns of fact.267 In essence, these cases have implicitly applied cause at
law analysis.
There are several common issues which tend to be resolved by a policy
oriented type of analysis. The first of these is appreciation caused by
maintenance. When marital funds are used to maintain separate property,
the marital funds obviously cause the value of the property to increase.
Had the marital funds not been used, the value of the separate property
would be much less. 26 As a practical matter, however, almost all separate
property requires some maintenance. Separate property would therefore
gradually disappear if maintenance caused active appreciation. 269 Moreover,
but no state has yet recognized appreciation caused by the decision to retain an investment.
Such recognition would significantly reduce the amount of separate investment property, since
many spouses owning investments make a deliberate decision to retain the property during
marriage. Moreover, it would make make active appreciation an issue in every case involving
investments, reducing the cost-effectiveness of divorce litigation. Retention of investments is
therefore similar in many ways to maintenance, which is not the cause in law of appreciation
unless special circumstances are present. See infra note 268-71 and accompanying text. When
the issue arises, there is a good chance that retention of an investment will be held not to be
the cause in law of any resulting appreciation.
265. See, e.g., McCann v. McCann, 142 Misc. 2d 1083, 1086, 539 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283
(1989) (where parties introduced no evidence on causation, "it would be inappropriate for this
court to randomly select a percentage of appreciation attributable to the [nonowner's] direct
or indirect contributions"; but because $18,000 in marital funds had been used to improve
the home, $18,000 of appreciation was be deemed marital).
266. Cf. W. PROSSER & W. Y=ON, supra note 244, § 42, at 273 ("Unlike the fact of
causation, with which it is often hopelessly confused, this is primarily a problem of law").
267. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text; see also supra note 256.
268. Cf. supra note 248 (test for causation in fact is whether value would be less if
marital contributions had not been made). Where property is maintained with marital funds,
its value would obviously be less if it had not been maintained at all. Contributions to
maintenance are therefore the cause in fact of appreciation in the maintained property.
269. See In re Olson, 96 Ili. 2d 432, 451 N.E.2d 825 (1983) (holding that contributions
to maintenance do not produce marital interest); In re Frazier, 125 Ill. App. 3d 473, 466
N.E.2d 290 (1984) (same). These Illinois cases are distinguishable because they were decided
1990]
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almost every case would pose active appreciation questions, thus burdening
the courts with difficult legal issues. 270 As a matter of policy, therefore,
maintenance with marital funds usually does not cause active apprecia-
tion. 271 The maintenance is a cause in fact, but it is not a cause in law. 272
A second situation arises when the owning spouse received a fair and
reasonable salary. Some courts have applied reasoning similar to the
reasonable compensation method and limited the amount of active appre-
ciation to the fair value of the marital contributions. 273 Again, even where
the owning spouse's salary is reasonable, there is no doubt that marital
contributions can be the cause in fact of appreciation in the property. If
the marital estate is limited to a reasonable salary, therefore, it is because
the marital contributions were not a cause in law of any excess appreci-
ation.274
These two situations demonstrate how a tort law test of causation
could improve equitable distribution law. Courts considering the mainte-
under unitary property. If the court had found that maintenance with marital funds created
even a small marital interest, the entire value of the property would have been marital. Under
the new amendments to the Virginia statute, however, small marital contributions can be
rewarded with a small marital interest. The Illinois cases are therefore not entirely consistent
with current Virginia law. Still, the difference goes only to the degree of danger and not to
its existence. If contributions to maintenance were the cause in law of increased value, no
asset would ever be entirely separate property.
270. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (active appreciation questions require
large expenditure of attorney time, judicial time, and other system costs).
271. See In re Olson, 96 Ill. 2d 432, 451 N.E.2d 825 (1983); In re Frazier, 125 Ill. App.
3d 473, 466 N.E.2d 190 (1984); Haldemann v. Haldemann, 145 Wis. 2d 296, 426 N.W.2d 107
(1988) (dicta).
272. Of course, this balancing of policy factors might hold true in all cases. If the marital
contributions to maintenance are sufficiently large to overcome the objections discussed in the
text, a marital interest might exist. The court strongly hinted that it would follow this rationale
in In re Tatham, 173 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 527 N.E.2d 1351 (1988), but eventually decided that
the property had appreciated. There was therefore no need to consider the maintenance
question. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text (giving full discussion of Tatham).
273. Only one equitable distribution case has actually reached this holding. See In re
Morse, 143 Ill. App. 3d 849, 493 N.E.2d 1088 (1986) (instructing trial court that no marital
interest should be found upon remand if owner's salary was fair and reasonable).
Several other cases state the rule without formally adopting it as a holding. In Hoffmann
v. Hoffmann, the court stated that active appreciation could not exist unless the owner's salary
was not fair and reasonable. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984). Ultimately,
however, the Hoffman court held that the appreciation was caused by fortuitous enactment
of federal legislation, and therefore not caused by marital contributions. Accordingly, the
court's comments on the salary question were dicta. See also Krauskopf, supra note 156, at
1032 & n.176 (questioning whether Hoffman made use of reasonable compensation method
mandatory or merely permissive); Haldemann v. Haldemann, 145 Wis. 2d 296, 426 N.W.2d
107 (1988) (approving of rule in dicta, but ultimately finding appreciation active).
274. The reasonable compensation approach is discussed here as an example of how courts
are already implicitly using cause in law reasoning in active appreciation cases. This discussion
should not be interpreted as approving of the reasonable compensation approach. The reason-
able compensation approach is inconsistent with the marital partnership theory, and no equitable
distribution state has expressly accepted it. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text
(discussing flaws of reasonable compensation approach).
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nance and fair salary situations often have failed to distinguish causes in
fact from causes in law.2 7 - This treatment is confusing because, by any
fact-based standard of causation, contributions to maintenance and con-
tributions paid for with a fair salary obviously can cause property to
appreciate. From a pure cause in fact viewpoint, therefore, these cases
confuse the reader by reaching an obviously incorrect result. The real basis
for the decisions would have been much more apparent if the courts had
expressly recognized that for policy reasons, they were limiting the number
of causes in fact which the law will recognize. Cause in law analysis would
therefore make causation decisions significantly easier to understand.
Focusing upon the policy interests also allows us to reach better
decisions. For instance, under a cause in law approach, there is no absolute
rule that contributions to maintenance can never cause an increase in
value. Instead, we have merely observed that in most cases, the policy
goals of protecting separate property and avoiding litigation would be
unduly hindered if maintenance were sufficient to create active apprecia-
tion.276 That hindrance may not be present, however, in all cases. If the
marital contributions are sufficiently large, the balance of policy factors
may be different. This possibility was at least mentioned in In re Tatham,
277
in which the husband worked full time for no salary maintaining the
wife's nonmarital farm. By implicitly using a cause in law approach, the
Tatham court was better able to recognize a fact situation meriting
departure from the general rule.
Similarly, when we focus upon policy concerns, we can better deter-
mine whether decisions in other states are consistent with Virginia law.
For instance, the policy factors supporting the reasonable compensation
approach are largely unique to community property states. The method
arose in California, where the courts must divide the community assets
equally between the parties s.2 7 Thus, if the court feels that the wife should
not receive half of the property, it can achieve this goal only by limiting
the amount of community property. In the leading reasonable compensa-
tion case, the court was motivated primarily by a desire not to give the
wife much property because the marriage had been a marriage of conven-
ience.27 9 Virginia law differs from California law on a crucial issue,




275. Most of the decisions state simply that the marital contributions involved did not
create active appreciation, without explaining their reasoning in any great detail. See, e.g., In
re Morse, 143 Ill. App. 3d 849, 493 N.E.2d 1088 (1986) (adopting fair salary approach without
discussing matter in detail or giving supporting reasons). The problem therefore goes deeper
than mere failure to distinguish causes in fact from causes in law. Many courts have decided
the question of causation without any express analysis at all.
276. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
277. In re Tatham, 173 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 527 N.E.2d 1351 (1988). See supra notes 199-
202 and accompanying text (discussing Tatham).
278. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 4800 (Supp. 1990).
279. See Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 1016.
280. See Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 341 S.E.2d 829 (1986).
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There is therefore no need to reduce the marital interest merely because
the wife should receive less than half of the marital property. When we
look at the policy factors, we find that reasons behind a reasonable
compensation approach are much weaker in Virginia than in community
property states.
Finally, a public policy analysis helps us identify additional policies
not considered in some of the reported cases. One such policy involves
the economic choices presented to the parties during the marriage. Equi-
table distribution law should encourage the parties to make these choices
fairly, and should not reward a spouse who makes them self-interestedly.
The owner of a close corporation, for example, has the power to choose
how much salary he will pay himself. If the marital interest is limited to
reasonable compensation for the owner's efforts, the owner will be en-
couraged to take only a reasonable salary, and accumulate the remainder
of the corporation's earnings. In order to discourage owning spouses from
making this unfair choice, several recent decisions have rejected the rea-
sonable compensation approach. 28' By implicitly applying a policy-based
cause in law approach, these courts have realized that traditional policies
such as the reasonable compensation approach often encourage choices
which are unfair to the dependent spouse. This important point has been
missed by courts applying more formula-based approaches.
A tort-law-based theory of causation therefore offers important ad-
vantages to courts considering active appreciation issues. By focusing
attention more upon the policy concerns and less upon philosophies of
cause and effect, a tort-based approach encourages courts to identify
clearly the real factors behind their decisions. Honest analysis does not
guarantee easy decisions, but it does guarantee that the real questions will
be confronted directly.
4. Burden of Proof
The statute does not expressly state who bears the burden of proof
when classifying appreciation in separate property. This question has arisen
nationwide in only a few equitable distribution states, and there is no
clear consensus. In the only decision to consider the question directly, a
Florida court held that the burden is on the owner to prove that the
appreciation was passive. 282 A larger number of other decisions, however,
have classified appreciation as passive when there was no proof as to the
cause of the appreciation.283 Implicitly, therefore, these cases have placed
281. See McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, cert. denied, 314 N.C.
331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied,
313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985); see also Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184 (Minn.
1987).
282. Massis v. Massis, 551 So. 2d 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
283. See, e.g., McNaughton v. McNaughton, 74 Md. App. 490, 538 A.2d 1193 (1988);
Smith v. Smith, 154 A.D.2d 365, 545 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1989); McCann v. McCann, 142 Misc.
2d 1083, 539 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Popp v. Popp, 146 Wis. 2d 778, 794, 432 N.W.2d
600, 605 n.3 (Ct. App. 1988).
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the burden upon the nonowner to prove that the appreciation was active.
The Florida case seems more consistent with Virginia law. In Virginia,
as a general rule, property is presumed to be marital unless proven to be
separate. 284 The statute does not state expressly whether the presumption
applies to appreciated separate property, so a presumption of active
appreciation is certainly not required. 285 Still, the presumption on its face
applies to all fact situations. Unless there are clear reasons for a different
rule, appreciation in separate property should be presumed to be marital.
An examination of the relevant policy concerns does not yield a clear
basis for placing upon the nonowner the burden of proving the causation
of appreciation. Instead, the policy factors support placing the burden
upon the owner in at least some situations. First, the experience of other
states shows that appreciation is more often active than passive. 2 6 When
courts have found appreciation to be passive, the rationale has almost
always been that no marital contributions were made. 2 7 In other words,
when parties have made marital contributions and the property has ap-
preciated, the appreciation has generally been held to be active. Classifi-
cation as active is therefore the most common result, at least when marital
contributions were made.
Second, the owning spouse is more likely to have in his possession
the necessary documents to determine the cause of appreciation. In states
in which the burden is placed at least implicitly upon the nonowner,
owning spouses have been very reluctant to release the necessary financial
information. 28 Often, owning spouses have complied with discovery re-
quests only after repeated court orders and threatened sanctions. 2 9 Equi-
284. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2). Technically, the marital property presumption
applies only to property acquired during the marriage. Id. Under a strict construction of this
limitation, appreciation in inherited or gifted property could be presumed active, while
appreciation in premarital property could be presumed passive. These differing presumptions
would be absurd, however, because there is no relevant difference between the various types
of separate property. Inheritances, gifts and property brought into the marriage are all equally
outside the marital partnership unless improved with marital contributions. The same burden
of proof should therefore apply in all active appreciation cases, regardless of the type of
separate property involved.
285. At the very least, there is a substantial difference between presuming that property
acquired during the marriage is marital property and presuming that appreciation in separate
property is marital property. In the former instance, the court must classify the entire asset.
In the latter instance, by contrast, the court is classifying only part of the asset (the
appreciation), and the rest of the asset (the underlying value) is unquestionably marital.
Arguably, because part of the asset has already been classified as separate, it is more likely
that the rest of the asset will be separate. The case for presuming that unappreciated property
is marital is therefore stronger than the case for presuming that appreciation in separate
property is marital.
286. See Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 1034-35.
287. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39 (Supp. 1990).
288. See id.
289. The seriousness of the problem is most evident from a review of the cases imposing
sanctions upon owning spouses for failure to disclose information. See L. GOLDEN, supra note
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table distribution is burdensome enough upon the courts without unnecessary
discovery litigation. Placing the burden upon the owning spouse would
put the burden on the party best equipped to meet it.
At the very least, therefore, the owning spouse should have the burden
of proving causation. The relevant financial information will be in the
owner's hands, and where marital contributions have been made, causation
is by far the most common result.290 Conversely, many cases have found
that no marital contributions were made or that property did not appre-
ciate. The burden of proving marital contributions and appreciation should
remain upon the nonowning spouse.
29'
11, § 4.04 (Supp. 1990). The most common objection raised by the owning spouse has been
that the interest of his business in the privacy of its own financial records outweighs the
nonowning spouse's equitable distribution rights. Although this argument has been uniformly
rejected, see id. § 4.06, owning spouses still persist in making the argument to increase the
difficulty and expense of proving active appreciation. See id. §§ 4.04-4.06 (discussion of
discovery in equitable distribution cases).
290. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
291. A presumption that separate property has appreciated would be unworkable, because
appreciation is ordinarily only a portion of the total asset. In order to presume appreciation,
we would have to presume that every asset appreciated by some specific percentage during the
marriage. There is no statutory basis for arbitrarily choosing such a figure. Also, previous
attempts to allocate appreciation using objective average rates of return have created more
problems than they have solved. The burden of proving appreciation should be on the
nonowning spouse.
In a previous publication, I suggested that the burden of proving no marital contributions
should be upon the owning spouse. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39 (Supp. 1990). The
issue of which party should bear the burden of proving no marital contributions is a close
one, but at least in the specific context of the Virginia statute, I am inclined to place the
burden upon the nonowner. Very few reported cases find no causal connection between marital
contributions and appreciation, but a much larger number of cases find that there were no
marital contributions to begin with. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39. Existence
of marital contributions is therefore not the most common result. Placing the burden upon
the nonowner would probably not result in significant injustice, because it would be fairly
easy to prove that some marital contribution was made. Finally, as noted at supra note 192
and accompanying text, active appreciation issues are difficult and expensive to resolve. The
presence of the "substantial" appreciation and "significant" personal effort requirements in
the Virginia statute shows the legislature's awareness of this fact. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.3(A)(1). See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. Requiring affirmitive proof of
appreciation and marital contributions will help ensure that expensive active appreciation
questions will not be litigated needlessly.
This result is not entirely inconsistent with Krauskopf who advocates an apparently
unconditional presumption of active appreciation. See Krauskopf, supra note 156. Krauskopf's
rationale is that "[t]he practical context of the apportionment issue is a marriage in which
marital effort has been expended for the benefit of the family.... Assuming the goal of
equitable distribution is to recognize the full marriage partnership concept, the marital estate
should be favored." Krauskopf, supra note 156, at 1034-35. I agree that the marital estate
should be favored when marital effort has been expended for the benefit of the family, but
there are a substantial number of cases in which no such marital effort was expended on
separate property. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39. Certainly this is not the
"practical context" of all of the reported cases. By refusing to presume marital contribution,
we are essentially adopting Krauskopf's presumption, but requiring affirmitive proof that its
underlying condition is met.
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III. JOINTLY TITLED PROPERTY
The status of jointly titled property under the new amendments is
unclear. Before 1990, the statute defined all jointly titled assets as marital
property. 292 The new amendments, however, provide that all marital and
separate contributions to property acquired during the marriage shall retain
their identity if such contributions can be traced by a preponderance of
the evidence. 293 Unfortunately, the new amendments did not expressly state
whether or not the tracing provisions control the provision that all jointly
titled assets are marital. The statute therefore contains two contradicting
provisions, and the courts will have to reconcile the conflict.
The most likely answer is that jointly titled assets are still marital
property. The joint title provision is a specific statute applying only to
jointly titled property, while the tracing provision is a general statute
applying to a broader range of property. Ordinarily, if two statutes
conflict, the more specific one will control. 294 Also, if jointly titled assets
can be separate property, then the joint title provision of the statute would
have no effect. 295 Such a construction would violate the general rule that
all provisions of a statute must have some effect. 296 The drafters did tell
the legislature that the tracing provisions would control, 29 7 but legislative
history is relevant only when the statute is ambiguous. 29 The question is
close, but the statute may not be sufficiently ambiguous to permit evidence
of legislative intent. Jointly titled assets will probably continue to be
marital property under the new amendments.
The general rule in other equitable distribution states is that jointly
titled property is presumed to be a gift to the marital estate. 299 The
292. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2)(i).
293. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d-e).
294. See Commonwealth v. United Airlines, Inc., 219 Va. 374, 248 S.E.2d 124 (1978).
The Virginia cases tend to speak in terms of general and specific words rather than general
and specific statutory provisions, but the basic principle should apply equally in both contexts.
295. In other words, if the tracing provision controls, jointly titled property will be
classified under the source of funds rule. This is exactly the same result which would occur if
the joint title provision had been repealed. Because the legislature did not repeal the joint title
provision, it must have intended that the provision have some effect upon the law of equitable
distribution.
296. See, e.g., Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 314 S.E.2d 61 (1984).
297. See Legislative Subcommittee Analysis, supra note 57, at 2 (example 2) (new amend-
ments will allow court to trace funds in joint savings account); id. at 5 (example 6) (tracing
funding in joint checking account). It may be significant that all of the joint title situations
presented to the legislature involved joint bank accounts, and not jointly titled real property.
This is further evidence that the legislature did not comprehensively consider the joint title
problem. It would probably be a mistake, however, to apply different rules to jointly titled
bank accounts and jointly titled real property. This distinction is present drawn only in North
Carolina. See Manes v. Harrison-Manes, 79 N.C. App. 170, 338 S.E.2d 815 (1986). Manes
has encountered substantial criticism. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 128, at 227-28. Virginia
should apply a single rule for classifying all jointly titled property.
298. See, e.g., Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 330 S.E.2d 84 (1985).
299. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.27. Only Maryland holds to the contrary. See
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presumption is based upon a belief that married couples ordinarily expect
that jointly titled property will be "ours" rather than "his" or "hers." 3°°
The correctness of this presumption is purely a policy issue, but the joint
title provision suggests that the General Assembly agreed with the pre-
sumption when the statute was first enacted. 01 When the new amendments
were debated, the legislature focused primarily upon the problems of
unitary property, and did not consider or discuss common expectations
arising from joint title.10 2 The policy question simply was not presented.
Until the legislature fully considers the joint title question and deliberately
recedes from prior law, the courts should continue to hold that jointly
titled assets are completely marital property.
IV. PERSONAL IN.uRY AWARDS
The new amendments also provide new rules for classifying personal
injury awards. Cases from other states are split on this topic. Under the
mechanistic approach, personal injury awards are always marital prop-
erty.30 3 Under the analytical approach, by contrast, the court divides the
award into its component parts. Those parts meant to compensate the
marital estate for lost wages and medical expenses are marital property,
while those parts meant to compensate the injured spouse for pain and
suffering are separate property.3 °4 Most recent cases have followed the
mechanistic approach, reasoning that it is a workable compromise between
protecting the marital estate and recognizing the uniquely personal nature
of personal injury awards.
30 5
The Virginia statute adopts the analytical approach, but modifies the
approach in a significant way. Under the new amendments, compensation
for lost wages received during the marriage is marital property.3 °6 The
remainder of the award is separate property.307 The court can order that
part of the award be paid to the nonowner, but payments to the nonowner
Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 477 A.2d 1163 (1984). Most states only presume a gift, however.
See, e.g., McLean v. McLean, 323 N.C. 543, 374 S.E.2d 376 (1988); Trattles v. Trattles, 126
Wis. 2d 219, 376 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1985). Virginia is the only state which makes all
jointly titled assets marital property as a matter of law.
300. See Sharp, supra note 128, at 227.
301. VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107.3(A)(2)(i).
302. For instance, the Legislative Subcommittee Analysis, supra note 56, does not discuss
the policies behind the joint title provision. The Legislative Subcommittee Report, supra note
10, also fails to mention the topic.
303. See, e.g., McNerney v. McNerney, 417 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1987); Orszula v. Orszula,
292 S.C. 264, 356 S.E.2d 114 (1987). See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 6.25.
304. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 255 Ga. 461, 339 S.E.2d 591 (1986); Johnson v.
Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430 (1986); Landwehr v. Landwehr, Ill N.J. 491, 545
A.2d 738 (1988). See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 6.26.
305. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 6.26.
306. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(H).
307. Id.
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can be made only from benefits payable to the owner. 308 Thus, the
nonowner's share of a structured award cannot be paid out in an immediate
lump sum.
The key difference between the new amendments and the analytical
approach is treatment of compensation for medical expenses incurred
during the marriage. Under the analytical approach, ordinarily such com-
pensation is marital property, because the expenses were paid with marital
funds.c 9 In Virginia, however, such compensation is always separate
property, regardless of whether marital funds were used to pay the ex-
penses. 10 This rule can easily lead to absurd results. For instance, assume
that the parties spend their entire marital estate paying the husband's
medical bills. The husband then receives an award compensating him for
his injuries, and immediately divorces the wife. Under the new amend-
ments, all of the compensation for medical expenses would be separate
property. There would be no marital estate to divide, and the wife would
not receive any of the parties' property. This result would shock the
conscience of any reasonable observer. The statute should be amended to
provide that compensation for medical expenses is marital property if the
expenses were paid with marital funds.
31'
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430 (1986). See generally
L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 6.26.
310. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(H). As originally recommended by the Family Law
Section, the bill adopted the overwhelming consensus rule that marital property includes
compensation for tangible expenses paid with marital funds. Diehl, supra note 85, at 1-49.
This provision was stricken from the bill before passage by the legislature. Compare Diehl,
supra note 85, at 1-49 with VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(H).
311. The statute will not lead to an absurd result in every case, since medical expenses
are ordinarily paid by health insurance. Cases will certainly arise, however, in which a
substantial amount of medical expenses are not covered by insurance and must be paid from
the marital estate. When marital funds have actually been spent to pay the expenses, compen-
sation intended to reimburse the marital estate for those expenses must be marital property.
Any other result would penalize the noninjured spouse for complying with his or her legal
and moral duty of support.
When the new amendments were under consideration, some legislators apparently ex-
pressed concern about cases in which one spouse substantially reduces his work responsibilities
and earns significantly less income in order to take care of his injured mate. In such a
situation, a substantial part of the personal injury proceeds should be marital property. This
fact situation, however, will not arise often. For every case in which one spouse spends his
own time caring for the other, there will be many more cases in which marital funds are
spent. It is essential, therefore, that marital property include all compensation for medical
expenses actually paid with marital funds.
Moreover, the caretaker spouse situation can be resolved reasonably well under existing
Virginia law. Under the doctrine of transmutation by implied gift, separate property becomes
marital if it is given implicitly to the marital estate. See supra note 171-72 and accompanying
text. When one spouse spends substantial time caring for the other's injuries, it is unlikely
that the parties intended to award the caretaker no compensation whatsoever. Instead, the
parties probably intended to create a form of joint enterprise, in which both spouses would
share both the burdens and the benefits of caring for the injury. Unless there was clear
contrary evidence, therefore, I would resolve the caretaker spouse situation by holding that
the separate property portion of the award transmuted by implied gift.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. Interpreting the Statute: The Lesson of Smoot
Before leaving Smoot to the realm of the legal historian, we should
pause briefly to consider the larger picture. The Virginia Supreme Court
decided Smoot in 1987,312 five years after the Virginia statute was en-
acted.3 13 Only three years later, in 1990, the General Assembly overruled
Smoot by general consensus.114 The new amendments received almost no
organized opposition, and passed both houses by substantial margins.
315
The overwhelming rejection of Smoot sheds considerable light upon
the legislative intent behind the original Virginia statute. Many members
of the 1982 General Assembly were also in the 1990 General Assembly,
and nothing between 1982 and 1990 caused sudden recognition that unitary
property was wrong. 1 6 Logically, therefore, the legislature did not change
its mind suddenly as to the wisdom of unitary property. Had the question
directly arisen in 1982, unitary property would have been rejected as
decisively as it was rejected in 1990.
We can learn much about statutory construction by asking why the
court in Smoot decided that the Virginia General Assembly intended to
adopt unitary property. The Smoot court's mistaken view of the legisla-
ture's intent was not a mere incidental error, but the product of an
improper method of interpretation. As initially enacted, the Virginia statute
did not expressly adopt either unitary or mixed property. 317 In looking for
evidence of the legislature's implicit intent, the Smoot court did not ask
whether unitary property was wise public policy. Instead, the court mi-
croanalyzed the legislature's word choices, and concluded that unitary
property was more consistent with the language chosen by the legislature.,'
Smoot's emphasis upon the legislature's word choices stands in contrast
to two more recent cases. In Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corpo-
ration, 19 and again in Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia
312. Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987).
313. 1982 VA. ACTS ch. 309.
314. See 1990 VA. AcTs chs. 636, 764. These chapters are identical versions of the new
amendments. See supra note 6.
315. The Senate version of the new amendements, S. 90, passed the Senate 37-1 and the
House 57-34. GENERAL ASSEmLY INDEx, supra note 6. The identical House of Delegates bill,
H.B. 606, passed the House 87-10 and the Senate 32-8. Id.
316. In other words, a reasonable legislator intending to adopt unitary property would
have foreseen most of the problems which actually developed. If property must be all marital
or all separate, the marital estate must by definition be either too broad or too narrow.
Because he foresaw these problems when he voted for unitary property, a reasonable legislator
would not have been distressed when the problems actually occurred, and he would not have
voted to amend the statute. A large majority of legislators, however, were distressed by the
recent problems and did vote for the new statute. Since the problems of unitary property were
all foreseeable, it is unlikely that the legislature originally intended to adopt unitary property.
317. See 1982 VA. AcTs ch. 309.
318. Smoot v. Smoot, 233 Va. 435, 441, 357 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1987).
319. 238 Va. 97, 380 S.E.2d 895 (1989).
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v. Harris,320 the Virginia Supreme Court stressed that the statutes must be
construed in light of the legislative purpose. Defining what it called the
"mischief rule,''321 the King Land court held:
Every statute is to be read so as to "promote the ability of the
enactment to remedy the mischief at which it is directed." ...
Further, it is a universal rule that statutes such as those under
consideration here, which are remedial in nature, are to be "con-
strued liberally, so as to suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy," as the legislature intended.
322
Equitable distribution statutes are at least as remedial in nature as the
environmental statute construed in King Land. Smoot was therefore an
ideal case for analyzing the alternative constructions in light of the statute's
overall equitable purpose.
Failure to conduct such an analysis was Smoot's crucial mistake. If
the court had applied the "mischief rule" of King Land and Harris, the
result would have been entirely different. Unitary property has been
rejected in every other state except Illinois,3 23 and it fared so badly there
that it was rejected as decisively as it was in Virginia. 24 Even in 1987, the
Illinois experience clearly showed that the unitary theory of property did
not sufficiently protect commingled nonmarital assets. Unitary property
therefore does not advance the statutory purpose, and it could not have
withstood analysis under the "mischief rule." By looking to the legisla-
ture's word choices rather to the overall equitable purpose behind the
statute, the Smoot court seriously misread the legislature's intent.
Smoot's error should have a noticeable effect upon the way Virginia
courts construe the Virginia statute. Until recently, there was a strong
tradition in Virginia that courts should apply statutes according to the
plain meaning of the statutory words.3 25 This guide to interpretation,
hoever, is only helpful when statutory meaning is clear. When the statute
is ambiguous, as statutes often are, courts must look to the broad statutory
purpose and to any available legislative history.
326
320. 239 Va. 119, 387 S.E.2d 772 (1990).
321. Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. 97, 99, 380 S.E.2d 895, 897
(1989).
322. 238 Va. at 101-04, 380 S.E.2d at 897-98, quoting Natrella v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 231 Va. 451, 461, 345 S.E.2d 295, 301 (1986) (in turn quoting Jones v. Conwell, 227
Va. 176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984)) and Shumate's Case, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 653, 661
(1860) (emphasis by King Land court).
323. L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.06A.
324. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990). See generally L.
GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.34; Turner, supra note 1, at 861.
325. See, e.g., Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 362 S.E.2d 688 (1987); Ambrogi
v. Koontz, 224 Va. 381, 297 S.E.2d 660 (1982); School Board of Chesterfield County v.
School Board of City of Richmond, 219 Va. 244, 247 S.E.2d 380 (1978); Lovosi v. Common-
wealth, 212 Va. 848, 188 S.E.2d 206, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 922 (1972).
326. This emphasis upon the legislative purpose when construing ambiguous statutes is
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If the plain-meaning rule is used to construe ambiguous statutes,
courts will find themselves microanalyzing the legislature's word choices,
just as the court did in Smoot. This microanalysis leads to inaccurate
statutory constructions. The goal of statutory construction, of course, is
to determine the intent of the legislature.3 27 In order to do this, judges
must think like legislators. Legislators, however, place far more weight
upon broad policy concerns than they do upon precise language. The
courts will therefore construe ambiguous statutes much more accurately if
they look to the purpose and history of the statute. This requires the
"mischief rule" of King Land, not the microanalysis of Smoot.
Fortunately, the interpretation of the Virginia statute has been essen-
tially successful. For a good example of statutory construction, we need
look no farther than Lambert v. Lambert.128 In that case, the court
considered whether separate property transmuted into marital property if
it was improved with significant personal effort. Since the Lambert court
could not overrule Smoot, it faced two unappetizing choices. If no trans-
mutation occurred, the marital estate would receive nothing for its con-
tributions; if transmutation did occur, there was a substantial risk that
the marital estate would be overcompensated. The Lambert court openly
more common outside Virginia. See, e.g., N. SINGER, supra note 86, § 45.09; Milwaukee
County v. Department of Industry, 80 Wis. 2d 445, 259 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1977) ("the purpose
of the whole act is to be sought and is favored over a construction which will defeat the
manifest object of the act"). Indeed, no less an authority than the United States Supreme
Court has suggested that in some cases, the statutory purpose may even prevail over the
statute's literal wording:
Where the words are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative history
to reach a conclusion. And that method of determining congressional purpose is
likewise applicable when the literal words would bring about an end completely at
variance with the purpose of the statute.
United States v. Public Util. Comm. of Ca., 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953) (emphasis added).
Compare with this statement the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Carrico in Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va. v. Harris, 239 Va. 119, 387 S.E.2d 772 (1990):
[Tihis court is confined to the language the General Assembly used in attempting
to deal with the mischief, and, if that language is insufficient for the purpose, so
be it.
239 Va. at 126, 387 S.E.2d at 776 (Carrico, C.J., dissenting). With all respect, Chief Justice
Carrico would have made the same mistake in Harris which the court had already made in
Smoot. It is unquestionable that the primary rule of statutory construction is to determine the
intent of the legislature. See infra note 327. If the legislature clearly intends to reach a certain
result, the court should implement that result, regardless of whether the legislature's drafts-
manship meets some objective minimum standard of clarity. Ignoring the legislative intent
thwarts the will of the majority in a manner wholly inconsistent with Virginia's tradition of
judicial restraint. Virginia courts need to stop placing so much emphasis upon the legislature's
precise word choices, and start placing more emphasis upon the legislative purpose. Both
Harris and Lambert are excellent steps in the right direction.
327. See, e.g., Virginia Dept. of Labor and Industry v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 Va.
97, 353 S.E.2d 758 (1987); Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 330 S.E.2d 89 (1985);
Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 736, 324 S.E.2d 698 (1985); Vollin v. Arlington County
Electoral Bd, 216 Va. 674, 222 S.E.2d 793 (1976).
328. 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988).
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looked to the purpose of the statute, and concluded that enhancing the
marital estate would yield a more equitable distribution of the parties'
property. 329 The court reached this result even though the statute could
reasonably be read as providing that all appreciation in separate property
remained separate. 3 0 Lambert is therefore an excellent example of a court
emphasizing the statute's broad remedial purpose over microanalysis of
the legislature's word choices.
When we look at the new amendments, we see that Lambert has
generally fared quite well. Active appreciation no longer causes complete
transmutation, 331 of course, but that is not a defeat for Lambert. The
Lambert court would probably have jumped at the opportunity to classify
only the amount of active appreciation as marital property, if that option
had been consistent with Smoot. The core of Lambert is its recognition
that the marital estate has some interest in actively appreciated separate
property, and that part of its holding has now been codified. 332 The new
amendments change the amount of the remedy, but they do not alter the
basic concept.
The contrast between Smoot and Lambert is overwhelming. Smoot
used a plain-meaning approach to construe an ambiguous statute, and it
was overwhelmingly rejected only three years after it was decided. Lambert
looked to the broad statutory purpose, and the fundamental part of its
holding was written into the new statute. There is a clear lesson here for
the Virginia courts to consider. If courts refuse to look at the broad
statutory purpose when interpreting ambiguous statutes, their decisions
will be inconsistent with the legislative intent. Future Virginia decisions
should construe § 20-107.3 under the broad purpose-based analysis of
Lambert and King Land.
B. Defining Marital Property: The Unitary Property Experience
Most recent commentators on equitable distribution have argued for
a broad definition of marital property.33 This argument is unquestionably
correct, because a large marital estate gives the trial judge maximum
flexibility to reach an equitable result. Nevertheless, if followed to its
logical extreme, the broad marital estate argument would swallow the
329. Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 106, 367 S.E.2d 184, 190 (1988).
330. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (1980) (repealed 1990) (stating without apparent
qualification that appreciation in separate property is itself separate property).
331. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (when property actively appreciates, only the
appreciation itself is marital property).
332. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1).
333. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 13; Sharp, supra note 128, at 248; Sharp, Equitable
Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C.L. REv. 247, 249
(1983) ("Neither the statutory distributional factors nor judicial wisdom can effectuate a fair
division of marital property unless that property is defined fairly in the first instance").
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entire dual classification system of equitable distribution.334 Marital prop-
erty must be defined broadly, but there must be limits on the size of the
marital estate.
Virginia's experience under unitary property shows well the dangers
of an overbroad definition of marital property. At the classification stage,
unitary property was unquestionably generous to the marital estate, and
trial judges had more than enough marital property to divide. The system
broke down, however, at the division stage. Because the pool of marital
property was so large, the ultimate property division depended mostly
upon the trial judge's discretion. The discretionary standard caused un-
predictability, inconsistency, and increased litigation. 35 The resulting in-
equity offset substantially the benefits of a broad definition of marital
property.
A broad marital estate, therefore, is not the ultimate goal of equitable
distribution. Every property division case poses hard questions of public
policy. When the court broadens the definition of marital property, it
does not really answer those questions. Instead, it merely shifts the
responsibility for answering them from the classification stage to the
division stage.3 36 This shift has substantial policy effects, because it shifts
the review standard from independent judgment to abuse of discretion.
337
As the Virginia experience shows, the discretionary standard yields uncer-
tain, unpredictable, and ultimately inequitable answers to equitable distri-
bution questions.
There are certainly some property division issues that are best suited
for discretionary review. 3 s Many policy issues, however, must receive a
334. Under a dual-classification system, the court can divide only marital property. If the
definition of marital property is expanded as far as possible, all of the parties' property would
be divisible, and there would not be a dual-classification system at all. Legislative adoption
of a dual-classification rather than an all-property system necessarily implies some role for
separate property.
335. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
336. For example, assume that the husband's separate property business increases in value
during the marriage. The increase was due to two factors: the husband's expertise, and the
long hours he spent improving the business. The husband was able to spend those long hours
on the business only because the wife was a full-time homemaker.
This situation poses a very difficult policy question: the extent to which the wife should
share in an increase directly caused by the husband's efforts. Regardless of how the court
handles the case, it must eventually address this question. If the court classifies the appreciation
as part marital and part separate property, it will be answering the policy question mostly at
the classification stage. If the court classifies the entire increase as marital property, the
difficult question has been avoided at the classification stage. The husband will undoubtedly
argue, however, that he should get more than 50% of the appreciation because most of it
came from his efforts. Thus, classification of the increase as marital property has not answered
the policy question. It has only postponed resolution of that question from the classification
stage to the division stage.
337. Classification of property as marital or separate is an issue of law, upon which the
appellate court independently reviews the trial court's judgment. Division of marital property
is an issue of fact, and the trial court's decision is reversed only for an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 78, 377 S.E.2d 666, 670 (1989).
338. Questions of which spouse contributed how much to the marriage are particularly
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uniform and consistent answer.339 Such an answer cannot be given under
a discretionary review standard. On issues where consistency and unifor-
mity are needed, therefore, the appellate courts should not limitlessly
broaden the definition of marital property. Instead, appellate courts should
strive to create workable rules of law for measuring the marital and
separate interests. Virginia's experience shows the best way to maintain
consistency is to recognize partial marital and separate interests. If the
court classifies the entire asset as marital and relies upon the trial judge
to reach an unequal division, the result will be uncertainty and chaos.
We must, therefore, strike a balance between an overly broad and an
overly narrow definition of marital property. This balancing test makes
intuitive sense. At its heart, the dual classification model is an attempt to
protect the property rights of both parties in a consistent and predictable
manner. 3 4 This goal is not achieved if the appellate courts defer all the
difficult questions to the trial court by defining marital property too
broadly. The appellate courts should instead confront the difficult ques-
tions directly, by adopting appropriate definitions of marital and separate
property. Any property in which both spouses have valid interests should
be marital property. By enacting a dual classification statute, however,
the legislature has declared that some types of property should be awarded
to the owning spouse. Where these types of property are involved, the
courts should not hesitate to find that asset to be separate property.
There is a fine line, of course, between defining the marital estate
broadly and defining it too broadly. The line can be seen most clearly by
looking at how we expect marital property to be divided. If there is a
well resolved as questions of fact. See, e.g., Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. App. 1, 371 S.E.2d 833
(1988) (trial courts have particular discretion when considering and balancing statutory equitable
distribution factors). Conversely, one of the main purposes of a dual classification system is
to ensure that certain types of property are immune from division. Thus, where the question
is whether or not an asset is immune from division, a question of law is presented. Thomas
v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 377 S.E.2d 666 (1989); Campion v. Campion, 385 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); Schwegler v. Schwegler, 142 Wis. 2d 362, 417 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1987).
339. For example, the role of contributions to maintenance in active appreciation is a
recurring equitable distribution question. Although the amount of contributions to maintenance
in any particular case is a question of fact, the degree to which such contributions can cause
active appreciation is an issue of law. If it is not given a single consistent answer, the courts
will reach disparate results in similar fact situations.
Accordingly, courts should not simply define all contributions to maintenance as marital
contributions for purposes of active appreciation. Such a definition would simply move the
difficult policy question from the classification stage to the division stage. At the division
stage, the trial court's decision would be reviewed on an abuse of discretion basis, and the
decisions would quickly become inconsistent. Instead of overbroadening the marital estate, the
court should determine as a matter of law the role of contributions to maintenance in creating
active appreciation, and classify the appreciation as part marital and part separate property.
Because the trial court's classification of appreciation is a question of law subject to independent
review on appeal, this method of making the decision ensures a consistent and uniform rule
on the role of contributions to maintenance.
340. See supra notes 35-39.
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general policy consensus that an asset should be divided roughly equally
in most cases, it should be classified as marital. If we expect an asset to
be divided substantially unequally, however, we are asking for trouble if
we classify that asset as marital.34' Because of the discretionary review
standard, there is no guarantee that trial judges will make the desired
341. Surprisingly, few recent commentators recognize this fact. Instead, most commen-
tators argue for a broad definition of marital property at the classification stage, while
assuming that the division stage will take care of itself. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 13
(arguing for broad definition of marital property, without discussing what happens at division
stage).
Virginia's experience under unitary property reminds us how closely the classification and
division stages are linked. We cannot simply classify all disputed assets as entirely marital
property, and congratulate ourselves for a job well done. If there is a legitimate reason to
award the asset disproportionately to the owning spouse, trial judges will divide the asset
unequally in at least some cases. By defining marital property overbroadly, therefore, we have
only deferred the ultimate question until the division stage-the stage least suited to resolving
it fairly and consistently.
An excellent example of an overbroad definition of marital property is the principle that
all appreciation in separate property should be classified as marital. While most states have
rejected this position, a leading commentator recently embraced the position that all appreci-
ation in separate property should be classified as marital. See Wenig, The Increase in Value
of Separate Property During Marriage, 23 Fum. L.Q. 301 (1989). Wenig concludes that
distinguishing active from passive appreciation is too difficult, and that all appreciation should
therefore be marital property. Wenig, supra, at 330-337. Wenig's position would be workable
at the classification stage, but it would cause serious problems at the division stage. Even if
passive appreciation cannot efficiently be identified, there are still solid common-sense reasons
why appreciation caused by inflation should be separate property. Wenig herself may recognize
this, for she reassures us that trial judges still have the flexibility to make unequal divisions.
Wenig, supra, at 337. Following this suggestion, judges applying Wenig's system would probably
divide the appreciation in many separate assets unequally, reasoning that the nonowner is not
entitled to 50% of the appreciation caused by inflation. Because of the discretionary review
standard, trial judges would likely reach inconsistent results on the same facts, and it would
be largely impossible to predict how any court would treat appreciated separate property.
Unfortunately, therefore, Wenig's attempt to avoid the difficult question of distinguishing
active from passive appreciation would merely defer it to the division stage. Ironically, the
ultimate result could well be less uniformity and predictability than in the present system-the
exact opposite of Wenig's stated goals.
Of course, inconsistency would not be a problem if trial judges were content to divide
all appreciation equally. The concept of passive appreciation, however, is rooted deeply in
basic principles of equity. If we are going to have separate property to begin with, it should
not be lost merely because of inflation. The basic equity of distinguishing active from passive
appreciation is clear from the fact that almost every dual-classification jurisdiction makes the
distinction. See generally L. GOLDEN, supra note 11, § 5.39. Any expectation that trial judges
will be content to divide appreciation equally in all cases is therefore wishful thinking.
The above example demonstrates well one additional facet of defining marital property.
In determining whether we expect marital property to be divided equally or unequally, we
must be reasonable in our expectations. If dividing a certain asset unequally makes sense, then
trial judges will divide it unequally at the division stage in at least some cases. These unequal
divisions will not be uniform, and the law will be inconsistent and inequitable. Therefore,
when there is substantial reason to divide an asset unequally in most cases, we should define
part of the asset as separate property. Defining it as entirely marital property will cause more
problems at the division stage than it would solve at the classification stage.
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unequal division. Even if most judges do divide the asset unequally, there
will still be no consistency or uniformity to the amount of inequality.
a42
Any legislature enacting a dual classification system has expressed its desire
that the property division system be to some extent predictable.3 43 If this
goal is to be attained, courts should not regularly ask trial judges to make
unequal divisions. Marital property should therefore not include any asset
we expect to divide unequally in a large number of cases.
344
C. The New Amendments
The new amendments are an attempt to limit Smoot's overbroad
definition of marital property. By defining all commingled assets as marital
property, Smoot included many traditionally separate assets in the marital
estate. This refusal to protect separate property deferred the hard questions
of property division from the classification stage to the division stage.
Not surprisingly, the resulting trial court decisions were inconsistent and
arbitrary.
Under the new amendments, the hard questions will return to the
classification stage. The task of the appellate courts will be harder, for
appellate judges must now face difficult questions of law involving appre-
ciated property and the source of funds rule. Until the courts have outlined
the basic parameters of the new law, there will be confusion and uncer-
tainty.
In the long run, however, Virginia's equitable distribution law could
improve significantly. Courts will focus more upon the real policy issues,
and less upon arcane questions of commingling and transmutation. The
law will be more predictable, making settlements easier to reach. Most
important, division of assets will become much more uniform and much
342. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
In addition, an overbroad definition of marital property may actually hurt the interests
of nonowning spouses. One of the basic unstated assumptions of equitable distribution is that
in most cases, most of the assets should be divided approximately equally. When we start
encouraging unequal divisions, this notion starts to decay. By approving an unequal division
in one case, we are unavoidably approving of unequal divisions in general, and increasing the
risk that trial courts will divide marital property unequally in cases where the division should
be equal. This does not mean that all unequal divisions are wrong, but it does mean that all
unequal divisions have a potential for harm. If our definition of marital property includes
assets we expect to be divided unequally in most cases, this harm is maximized. In order to
minimize the number of improperly unequal divisions, we should minimize our reliance upon
unequal divisions across the board.
343. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
344. This is not an argument against recognizing small marital interests. The marital
interest should not be ignored merely because it is less than half of the value of the asset.
We must, however, be careful about the method we choose for recognizing small marital
interests. If we classify the entire asset as marital and ask the trial judge to make an unequal
division, the decisions will be inconsistent and unpredictable. Instead of classfying the whole
asset as marital, we should classify the asset as part marital and part separate property. This
recognizes both interests in a consistent and predictable manner, while preserving the general
principle that most marital property should be divided approximately equally in most cases.
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less inconsistent. These changes can potentially increase the overall equity
of most property divisions.
It is important, of course, that the courts interpret the new amendments
in light of their purpose. That purpose was not to limit the rights of the
nonowner, but to remove traceable commingled separate property from
the marital estate. 45 The drafters clearly intended that the spouses share
all legitimate products of the marital partnership, as shown by the express
adoption of the active appreciation rule and the broad definition of
personal effort.3 46 Thus, while the new amendments are individualistic, the
amendments restrict broad principles of sharing only in the context of
traceable commingled property. As long as the courts recognize the im-
portance of sharing and continue to define marital property broadly, the
new amendments will result in better decisions for both spouses.
In my earlier article, I concluded that the success of Virginia's pre-
1990 equitable distribution law depended upon the wisdom of the state's
trial judges. 347 By contrast, the success of the new amendments depends
upon the wisdom of the state's appellate judges. Future appellate courts
interpreting the new amendments must walk a narrow path between an
overly narrow and an overly broad definition of marital property. If the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals respond to the challenge, Virginia
can be a leading state in the law of equitable distribution.
345. The list of legislative goals in Legislative Subcommittee Report, supra note 10, makes
no mention of limiting the marital estate. A listing of goals after the fact in an article by the
chairman of the legislative subcommittee similarly does not mention any intent to restrict
marital property. See Diehl, supra note 85, at 1-5 to 1-6. The new legislation "is only intended
to 'tame' the harsh and extreme rulings of Virginia's transmutation case law." Diehl, supra
note 85, at 1-6.
346. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) & (3).
347. Turner, supra note 1, at 862.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
ISSUE OF TRANSMUTATION/CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
IN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION PROCEEDINGS
BY
Family Law Section,
Board of Governors, Virginia State Bar
Lawrence D. Diehl, Marks & Harrison, Hopewell, Va.
Chairman of Legislative Subcommittee
1. STA TEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:
The status of the law of property classification and transmutation
pursuant to § 20-107.3 is in chaos due to the ruling of the Virginia
Supreme Court in Smoot v. Smoot, and subsequent cases. There
is virtually no guidance to trial courts and practitioners. Our
transmutation law is more overbroad than that of any other
equitable distribution state, and there is virtually an unfettered
discretion resulting from such cases in the division of marital
property by the trial court which has caused confusion and incon-
sistent results in court cases.
In the case of Smoot v. Smoot, 213 Va. 435, 357 S.E.2d 728 (1987),
the Virginia Supreme Court adopted the "unitary theory" of property
classification pursuant to § 20-107.3 of the Code. Despite court rulings
or legislation in most other common law states adopting the "source
of funds" rule, to similar statutory language allowing "dual classifi-
cation," and thus, more definite credits and rules as to the division
of marital property, the Court held that property in Virginia divorce
proceedings was either all marital, or all separate, and that even
"insignificant" actions could transmute property from separate to
marital property.
Subsequent case law in Virginia has also held that, despite the clear
language of the statute, that "active appreciation" of the value of
separate property due to the efforts of the spouses during marriage
transmutes the entire separate property to marital, thus giving the
court the discretion to divide the property as it sees fit in accordance
with the statutory factors of § 20-107.3(E). See, e.g., Lambert v.
Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988); Ellington v. Ellington,
8 Va. App. 48, 378 S.E.2d 626 (1989). Other cases dealing with the
issue of credits for contributions to the acquisition of marital property
by payment of money from separate property sources have left incon-
sistent results, some providing a full credit to the contributing spouse,
Pommerenke v. Pommerenke, 7 Va. App. 241, 372 S.E.2d 630 (1988),
some providing some credits or a division considering monetary con-
tributions in part, Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. App. 1, 371 S.E.2d 833
(1988), and some rejecting a full credit where the contribution is clearly
traceable to the contributing spouse, Ellington, supra. More recent
cases such as Lassen v. Lassen, 6 VLR 125 (8/8/89) and Taylor v.
Taylor, 6 VLR 171 (8"89, opinion withdrawn 9/8/89), further show
the inequitable results of the mere commingling of separate property
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with marital bank accounts where a clear retracing of the separate
property with marital bank accounts where a clear retracing of the
separate property was presented by the evidence.
The results of all of these have been criticized by family law practi-
tioners due to the following reasons:
(1) Inconsistent court results with similar fact situations.
(2) A theory of transmutation that is as broad as any in the country
due to the Smoot ruling, which theory is arguably inconsistent
with the marital partnership theory.
(3) Lack of standards as to what activities are sufficient to permit
transmutation of separate property.
(4) Lack of guidance on when a "source of funds" credit will be
given to a contributing spouse in the ultimate monetary award
or division of property even if transmutation of separate property
to marital property has occurred.
(5) Inability to counsel clients on their reasonable property expecta-
tions, even in the most simple of equitable distribution cases due
to the complete and broad discretion now vested in the trial court
as to their ultimate ruling in such matters.
In summary, the state of § 20-107.3, the equitable distribution statute
as it relates to property classification, transmutation, and definite
ground rules for even the most simple of divorce cases is in chaos due
to the ruling in Smoot, and the post-Smoot cases.
For further articles and publications setting forth the problem, see the
following items attached hereto as "Background Materials":
1. "Transmutation in Virginia: Legislative Approaches In Response
to Smoot," Diehl, 9 Family Law News, No. 3 (Winter 1988-89).
2. "Analysis of the Ellington Case," Diehl, Family Law News Alert,
No. 1 (April, 1989).
3. "Appeals Court Fine-Tunes Equitable Distribution," Virginia
Lawyers Weekly, 017 (689).
4. Upcoming publication, Diehl, "Transmutation in Virginia: Are
We Drowning in the Pool of Marital Assets," VTLA Journal (Fall
1989 Edition).
5. Family Law Notes #7, 11 and 13, National Legal Research Group.
6. Chart analysis of Transmutation Cases and % of Distribution
Cases prepared by Lawrence D. Diehl. (There were included in
Seminar materials presented in Fall, 1988 Virginia State Bar CLE
Program and July, 1989 VTLA Annual Family Law Seminar).
7. "Taming Transmutation"-llinois Bar Journal, Article analyzing
Illinois statutory language upon which part of Virginia Statute is
based.
8. Upcoming Publication; Diehi, "Update On Transmutation: Anal-
ysis of Lassen and Taylor Cases," Virginia Bar Journal (Fall 1989
Edition).
II. STATEMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE GOALS OR NEEDS TO
RESPOND TO SMOOT:
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In order to respond to the numerous effects and implications of
the Smoot case, a comprehensive revision to the statutory language
of § 20-107.3 will be needed.
Any statutory revisions, responding to the problems specified above,
should, at a minimum, include the following:
1. A modification of the "unitary theory" of property classification,
by a "source of funds" classification statute which uses a marital
partnership theory as its basis.
2. An articulation of property classification to permit the trial court
to classify property based upon the "source of funds" concept
which is used in virtually all other common law classification
states.
3. A more definite articulation of those circumstances when credits
or reimbursements for contributions by a spouse from their sep-
arate property will be made to provide more guidance to practi-
tioners and the trial courts on such issues.
4. A statutory classification concept that recognizes the "marital
partnership theory," including the personal efforts of either or
both of the parties during the marriage that have resulted in the
economic benefit to the marriage.
5. A statutory classification concept that preserves the integrity of
the separate property of a spouse where only passive appreciation
has increased its value, and a further specific response to the
Lambert and Ellington cases by preventing transmutation unless
the efforts of the spouses are substantial and result in significant
appreciation of the separate property.
6. To the extent possible, a statutory revision that is readable,
provides definite guidelines on reimbursement and classification
issues consistent with the "marital partnership" theory, and con-
tains such revision in a consolidated area of the Code.
III. SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND BACKGROUND RESEARCH:
The subcommittee began its research into the area in the Fall of 1988
by reviewing all Virginia case law on the subject, and the extensive
legislative revisions that responded to a similar classification problem
in the state of Illinois. Recent requests by Del. William Axelle, Del.
Sam Glascock, Del. "Chip" Dicks and Del. Glen Crowshaw have also
requested this subcommittee to study this issue. Background materials
included the outline on Transmutation that was presented in the Fall
CLE lecture, 1988, by the Virginia State Bar, prepared by Lawrence
Diehl of Hopewell and Frank Morrison of Lynchburg. Richard Crouch
of the subcommittee provided numerous articles on the Illinois response
to their transmutation/classification problems for the committee's
review. Lawrence Diehl researched the statutes of numerous other
common law equitable distribution states, as well as a review of the
Uniform Marital Property Act and articles interpreting the provisions
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of these statutes contained in treatises, Law Review Articles and the
Equitable Distribution Law Journal.
Due to the fact that the only other state that had a similar problem
in its property classification due to court rulings was Illinois, and the
fact that they had responded to the same issue through use of a
"reimbursement" theory type of statutory response, a careful review
of their statute and articles relating to its implementation and effects
in Illinois was made. Case law examined by the sub-committee in
Illinois appeared to properly respond to the statute and more fairly
recognized the marital contributions of the parties, credits for traceable
reimbursements and responded to the harsh results of previous trans-
mutation cases. However, the committee has further studied a possible
classification level approach to the problem in order to resolve the
problem at a classification level, using the Illinois approach as a basic
starting point.
On July 27, 1989, after approximately one year of study and meetings,
the subcommittee made certain preliminary recommendation on the
issue. After further study, on September 29, 1989, at the Board of
Governors meeting, the full board adopted a recommendation to
pursue the enactment of a "source of funds" statutory amendment to
§ 20.107.3, which amendment was identified as "Option B" in the
subcommittee's preliminary report of July 27, 1989.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS:
There is absolutely no question that legislation is needed to make sense
out of an area of the law that has gotten out of hand through the
broad rulings of court cases of transmutation and property division
resulting from Smoot. Unless legislation is enacted, continued lack of
definite rules, overbroad discretions with the trial courts and unfair
cases of transmutation will continue to provide virtually no guidance
to practitioners and the courts in fairly advising clients as to their
reasonable expectations in such cases. Litigation will continue on issues
that should and could be resolved by providing definite ground rules
in such areas as credits for contributions from separate property,
commingling of assets and issues of transmutation of separate property
due to the personal efforts of the parties, where no standard for such
efforts has been articulated by courts.
Further, such legislation would not be inconsistent with the original
goals of the concept of equitable distribution as enacted in 1982, but
would provide the guidance needed by the courts and practitioners
resulting from the unexpected ruling in Smoot, which is arguably
inconsistent with the legislative goals set forth in the initial legislative
history on the subject.
In order to fully and comprehensively respond to the issue, the Board
of Governors of the Family Law Section recommends the enactment
of an amendment to § 20-107.3 which is attached hereto as "Option
1990]
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B," and which is an outright rejection of the unitary theory of
classification of property created by Smoot.
While recognizing the amendment as comprehensive, it is the Board's
belief that the legislation is clear, provides proper standards of proof,
is responsive to the needs addressed in this report to the degree
necessary, and is consistent with the original intent of the enactment
of § 20-107.3 to provide a fair marital partnership recognition to
property disputes in divorces.
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1990 SESSION
SPI06912S ENGROSSED
SENATE BILL NO. 90
Senate Amendments in [ I - January 29, 1990
A BILL to amend and reenact § 20-107.3 of the Code of Virginia, relating to equitable
distribution.
Patron-Michie
Referred to the Committee for Courts of Justice
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That § 20-107.3 of the Code of Virginia is amended and reenacted as follows:
§ 20-107.3. Court may decree as to property of the parties.-A. Upon decreeing the
dissolution of a marriage, and also upon decreeing a divorce from the bond of matrimony,
or upon the filing with the court as provided in subsection I of a certified copy of a final
divorce decree obtained without the Commonwealth, the court, upon request of either party,
shall determine the legal title as between the parties, and the ownership and value of all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, of the parties and shall consider which of
such property is separate property an4 . which is marital property .and which is part
separate and part marital property in accordance with subdivision A 3 . The court shall
determine the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the
evaluation issue. Upon motion of either party made no less than twenty-one days before the
evidentiary hearing the court may, for good cause shown, in order to attain the ends of
justice, order that a different valuation date be used. The court, on the motion of both
parties, may retain jurisdiction in the final decree of divorce to adjudicate the remedy
provided by this section when the court determines that such action is clearly necessary
because of the complexities of the parties' property interests, and all decrees heretofore
entered retaining such jurisdiction are validated.
1. Separate property is (i) all property, real and personal, acquired by either party
before the marriage: (ii) all property acquired during the marriage by bequest, devise,
descent, survivorship or gift from a source other than the other party; and (iii) all
property acquired during the marriage in exchange for or from the proceeds of sale of
separate property, provided that such property acquired during the marriage is maintained
as separate property ; and (iv) that [ porion part ] of any property classified as ( par I
separate pursuant to subdivision A 3 . Income received from I and the inerese in valu
eh eparate property during the nnriage is separte psepefty separate property during the
marriage is separate property if not attributable to the personal effort of either party. The
increase in value of separate property during the marriage is separate property, unless
marital property [ - inelidig or ] the personal efforts of either party, have contributed to
such increases and then only to the extent of [ the increases in value attributable to I
such contributions. The personal efforts of either party must be significant and result in
substantial appreciation of the separate property if any [ Ainote o increase in value
attributable thereto is to be considered marital property .
2. Marital property is (i) all property titled in the names of both parties, whether as
joint tenants, tenants by the entirety or otherwise, and (ii) that [ parmin part I of any
property classified as [ p-4 ] marital pursuant to subdivision A 3, or (ii) all other
property acquired by each party during the marriage which is not separate property as
defined above. All property including that portion of pensions, profit-sharing or deferred
compensation or retirement plans of whatever nature, acquired by either spouse during the
marriage, and before the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at
least one of the parties intends that the separation be permanent, is presumed to be
marital property in the absence of satisfactory evidence that it is separate property. For
purposes of this section marital property is presumed to be jointly owned unless there is a
deed, title or other clear indicia that it is not jointly owned.
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(1 property as follows
(2 a, In the case of income received from separate property during the marriage, such
C= =,?" .17 (3 income shall be marital property only to the extent it is attributable to the permonal
(4 efforts of either party [ and in . In I the case of the increase in value of separate
(5 property during the marriage, such increase in value shall be marital property only to the
OY-=-Ifl' 48 (6 extent that marital property [ - inedirg or ] the personal efforts of either party, have
(7 contributed to such increases, provided that any such personal efforts must be significant
(8 and result in substantial appreciation of the separate property,
tf'2"E-I? #9 (9 b. In the case of any pension, profit-sharing, or deferred compensation plan or
10 retirement benefit, the marital share as defined in subsection G shall be marital property.
11 c. In the case of any personal injury or workers' compensation recovery of either
--21121 10 12 party, the marital share as defined in subsection H of this section shall be marital
(13 property.
(14 d. When marital property and separate property are commingled by contributing one
(15 category of property to another, resulting in the loss of identity of the contributed
, (17 property, the classification of the contributed property shall be transmuted to the category
(17 of property receiving the contribution. However. to the extent the contributed property is
(i8 retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift, such contributed
(19 property shall retain its original classification.
(20 e. When marital property and separate property are commingled into newly acquired
(21 property resulting in the loss of identity of the contributing properties, the commingled
C t.2.. ?r112 (22 property shall be deemed transmuted to marital property. However, to the extent the
(23 contributed property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift,
(24 the contributed property shall retain its original classification.
25 1 Fo, P-roea of Otis secei~no peraoin effoil of a poi'iy diigthe galen'Mae 1hol be
(26 deeme a eot&-b.6o by the maitelAb. I "Personal effort" of a party shall be
C,*..tr #13(27 deemed to be labor, effort, inventiveness, physical or intellectual skill creativity or
(28 managerial activity, promotional or marketing activity, applied directly to the separate
(29 property of either party.
30 B. For the purposes of this section only, both parties shall be deemed to have rights
31 and interests in the marital property : hweve. . However such interests and rights shall
32 not attach to the legal title of such property and are only to be used as a consideration in
33 determining a monetary award, if any, as provided in this section.
34 C The court shall have no authority to order the division or transfer of separate
35 property or marital property which is not jointly owned. The court may, based upon the
36 factors listed in subsection _ order the division or transfer, or both, of jointly owned
37 marital property, or any part thereof.
38 As a means of dividing or transferring the jointly owned marital property, the court
39 may (i) order the transfer of real or personal property or any interest therein to one of
40 the parties, (ii) permit either party to purchase the interest of the other and direct the
41 allocation of the proceeds, provided the party purchasing the interest of the other agrees to
42 assume any indebtedness secured by the property, or (iii) order its sale by private sale by
43 the parties, through such agent as the court shall direct, or by public sale as the court
44 shall direct without the necessity for partition.
45 D. In addition, based upon (i) thd equities and the rights and interests of each party in
46 the marital property, and (ii) the factors listed in subsection E, the court has the power to
47 grant a monetary award, payable either in a lump sum or over a period of time in fixed
48 amounts, to either party. The party against whom a monetary award is made may satisfy
49 the award, in whole or in part, by conveyance of property, subject to the approval of the
50 court. An award entered pursuant to this subsection shall constitute a judgment within the
St meaning of § 8.01-426 and shall not be docketed by the clerk unles the decree so directs.
52 The provisions of § 8.01-382, relating to interest on judgments, shall apply unless the court
53 orders otherwise.
54 Any marital property, which has been considered or ordered transferred in granting the
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3 Senate Bill No. 90
monetary award under this section, shall not thereafter be the subject of a suit between
the same parties to transfer title or possession of such property.
E. The amount of any division or transfer of jointly owned marital property, and the
amount of any monetary award, and the method of payment shall be determined by the
court after consideration of the following factors:
1. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary of each party to the well-being of the
family:
2. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party in the acquisition and
care and maintenance of such marital property of the parties:
3. The duration of the marriage;
4. The ages and physical and mental condition of the parties:
5. The circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage,
specifically including any ground for divorce under the provisions of § 20-91 (1), (3) or (6)
or § 20-95;
6. How and when specific items of such marital property were acquired;
7. The debts and liabilities of each spouse, the basis for such debts and liabilities, and
the property which may serve as security for such debts and liabilities;
8. [Repealed.]
9. The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;
10. The tax consequences to each'party; and
11. Such other factors as the court deems necessary or appropriate to consider In order
to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.
F. The court shall determine the amount of any such monetary award without regard to
maintenance and support awarded for either party or support for the minor children of
both parties and shall, after or at the time of such determination and upon motion of
either party, consider whether an order for support and maintenance of a spouse or
children shall be entered or, if previously entered, whether such order shall be modified or
vacated.
G. In addition to the monetary award made pursuant to subsection D, and upon
consideration of the factors set forth in subsection E, the court may direct payment of a
percentage of the marital share of any pension, profit-sharing or-deferred compensation
plan or retirement benefits, whether vested or nonvested, which constitutes marital property
and whether payable in a lump sum or over a period of time. However, the court shall
only direct that payment be made as such benefits are payable. No such payment shall
exceed fifty percent of the marital share of the cash benefits actually received by the
party against whom such award is made. "Marital share" means that portion of the total
interest, the right to which was earned during the marriage and before the last separation
of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intended that the
separation be permanent.
H. In addition to the monetary award made pursuant to subsection D. and upon
consideration of the factors set forth in subsection A. the court may direct payment of a
percentage of the marital share of any personal injury or workers' compensation recovery
of either party, whether such recovery is payable in a lump sum or over a period of time.
However, the court s-hall only direct that payment be made as such recovery is payable.
whether by settlement, jury award, court award or otherwise. "Marital share" means that
part of the total personal injury or workers' compensation recovery attributable to lost
wages [ ; Ast eaig capeel I [v and mneds el ,'wse ht]accruing during the
marriage and before the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at
least one of the parties intended that the separation be permanent,
IT . Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification
and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties pursuant to §§ 20-109
and 20-109.1. Agreements, otherwise valid as contracts, entered into between spouses prior
to the marriage shall be recognized and enforceable.
I J. A court of proper jurisdiction under § 20-96 may exercise the powers conferred by
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this section after a court of a foreign jurisdiction has decreed a dissolution of a marriage
or a divorce from the bond of matrimony, if (i) one of the parties was domiciled in this
Commonwealth when the foreign proceedings were commenced, and (ii) the foreign court
did not have personal jurisdiction over the party domiciled in the Commonwealth, and (iii)
the proceeding is initiated within two years of receipt of notice of the foreign decree by
the party domiciled in the Commonwealth, and (iv) the court obtains personal jurisdiction
over the parties pursuant to § 8.01-328.1 A 9. or in any other manner permitted by law.
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COMMENT #1
P. 1, LL. 18-19: GENERAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY.
This provision legislatively reverses the "unitary theory" of property
classification established by the ruling in Smoot v. Smoot, 213 Va. 435, 357
S.E.2d 728 (1987). The problems created by this ruling, its impact on Virginia's
extreme law of transmutation, and the implications of post-Smoot cases such
as Lambert, Ellington, Westbrook, Pommerenke and Lassen are well-addressed
in the Report on the issue rendered by the Legislative Subcommittee of the
Board of Governors, Family Law Section, Virginia State Bar, dated September
29, 1989. The need for a legislative reversal of Smoot's "unitary theory" of
property classification is recognized by virtually all family law practitioners
and judges who have reviewed the issue.
The language of this provision clearly provides the trial court with the
authority to classify property as "part marital" or "part separate" in accor-
dance with the "marital partnership" set forth in the new subdivision A(3) of
§ 20-107.3. The necessity for such specific language arises from the holding
in Smoot that the existing statutory language "does not recognize a hybrid
species of property."
In virtually all other common law equitable distribution states, statutes
similar to the existing Virginia statutory language have been interpreted by
case law to permit hybrid classification in order to fairly recognize "source
of funds" credits or identifiable contributions by a spouse to the "marital
partnership" that justify the inclusion or exclusion of "part" of property in
the marital estate. Specific statutory language in many other states similarly
permits hybrid classification of property to fairly recognize such contributions.
However, it was the unexpected strict statutory interpretation by the Virginia
supreme Court in Smoot that has caused Virginia to be virtually alone in
preventing a "part" classification of property where fairness and well-recog-
nized "source of funds" rules would otherwise have justified such a hybrid
classification. Thus, the Virginia ruling in Smoot that "property must be
classified as either all marital or all separate, not both" is specifically reversed
by this legislative language, making Virginia's equitable distribution law as to
property classification consistent with the "marital partnership: theories well-
recognized by virtually all other common law states.
EXAMPLE 1
Husband owns a certificate of deposit in his sole name in the sum of $10,000.00
at the time of his marriage. Wife owns a CD in her sole name in the sum of
$20,000.00 at the time of the marriage. After the marriage, the parties combine
the funds into a single jointly owned CD in the face amount of $30,000.00,
which is in existence at the time of the separation of the parties. Assuming
that the contributions are retraceable in accordance with the evidentiary
standards set forth in subdivision A(3)(d) or (e), the trial court shall classify
the $30,000.00 CD as Husband's part separate property "to the extent" of
$10,000.00, and Wife's separate property to the extent of $20,000.00.
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EXAMPLE 2
Assume same facts as Example 1, except that Husband's $10,000.00 CD is
deposited into a joint savings account after marriage which contains $20,000.00
from the wage incomes of both parties during the marriage. Assuming the
Husband's contribution of his CD is retraceable in accordance with the
evidentiary standard set forth in subdivision A(3)(d) or (e), the trial court shall
classify the joint savings account as Husband's part separate property to the
extent of $10,000.00, and the $20,000.00 balance of the account would be.
classified as marital property. The ultimate division of the marital part of the
savings account, being the sum of $20,000.00, would be divided by the court
between the parties after its consideration of the § 20-107.3(E) factors.
ANAL YSIS OF EXAMPLES 1 AND 2:
Under present Virginia law as expressed in Smoot, the $30,000.00 CD in
Example 1, or the $30,000.00 joint savings account in Example 2 would be
classified as entirely marital property, with the separate CD contributions of
each party being transmuted by their commingling. The ultimate division of
the entire CD or savings account would be in the total discretion of the trial
court, which could consider, among other factors, the source of acquisition
of the funds pursuant to § 20-107.3(E)(6). However, post-Smoot cases have
made it clear that the statute does not mandate such a division, leaving trial
courts, practitioners and clients without any guidance or reasonable expecta-
tions as to the ultimate division of the property. The authority of the trial
court to make a hybrid classification is permitted by the legislation to address
this problem.
COMMENT #2
P. 1, LL. 33-34: DEFINITION OF SEPARATE PROPERTY.
This language clarifies that the definition of separate property includes
that hybrid "part" of property under subdivision A(3) which is classified as
"part separate" property.
COMMENT #3
P. 1, LL. 34-36: I"NCOME FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY.
The present statutory language defines all income received from separate
property as separate property. Similar seemingly unambiguous language relating
to the "increase in value" of separate property was held, however, in the
Lambert and Ellington cases to permit the transmutation of the entire value
of the formerly separate property to marital property where the increase or
appreciation in value was due to the active (but not passive) efforts of either
party.
This amendment and language is an attempt to address two problems
with the existing statutory language. First, it avoids the potential of a similar
harsh result of transmutation that occurred in the Lambert and Ellington
1990]
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cases. The Court of Appeals, based upon this present case law, could pre-
dictably hold that the active "efforts of either party in generating income from
separate property would similarly result in the transmutation of the entire
value of such property into marital property.
Second, the amendment reflects a fairer result to the marital estate by
including income as marital property, but only to the extent it is generated
from the active personal efforts of either party during the marriage. Passive
income would remain separate property. The inclusion of income generated
from active marital effort would be consistent with the marital partnership
theory.
The net result of the language is to preserve or keep intact the integrity
of the separate property itself as separate property, but to include in the
marital estate that income, but only the income itself, generated from the
active personal effort of either party. Passive income not resulting from marital
effort, and therefore not affecting the marital relationship or partnership of
the parties, would remain separate property.
EXAMPLE 3: INCOME-PASSIVE
Wife owns a rental home in her sole name at the time of her marriage to
Husband. Prior to and after the marriage, the rental income received from
the property is kept in a separate bank account is Wife's sole name, and all
expenses relating to the property, including taxes, insurance and mortgage
debt are paid directly from said account. The property is managed by a real
estate management company and neither party performs any activities such as
repairs, debt payments, or rent collection relating to the property. There is
$3,000.00 in said rental account at the time of the parties separation. Since
this income was not attributable to the personal efforts of either party, the
$3,000.00 account would be the separate property of Wife.
EXAMPLE 4: INCOME-PERSONAL EFFORTS
Assume the same facts as Example 3, except that the Wife, during the marriage
collects the rent, makes arrangements for the repairs to the real estate,
negotiates the lease agreements, and does the accounting work relating to
payments for said property. Under these circumstances, the real estate itself
would remain classified as the separate property of Wife (subject to the rules
on "increase in value" during the marriage contained in subdivision A(3)(a)),
and the income in the account at the time of the parties separation would be
classified as marital property. The $3,000.00 in the said account would
thereafter be divided by the court between the parties based upon the factors
set forth in § 20-107.3(E).
EXAMPLE 5: INCOME-PASSIVE
Husband owns a certificate of deposit in the sum of $20,000,00 at the time
of his marriage to Wife. All interest checks received from said certificates are
deposited in a checking account in Husband's sole name. At the time of the
separation of the parties, the account has $4,000.00, all representing the
interest income from said CD's. The funds in this checking account would be
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classified as Husband's separate property since they resulted from passive
income.
EXAMPLE 6: INCOME-COMMINGLING
Assume the same facts as in Example 5, except that the interest checks are
deposited in the joint checking account of both Husband and Wife, and are
commingled with the wage and other incomes of the parties. At the time of
the parties separation, the balance in the joint checking account is $10,000.00,
and the account had not been reduced below the $4,000.00 deposit balance
during the marriage. Under these circumstances, pursuant to subdivision
A(3)(d), the separate interest income, once commingled with the marital wages,
would be transmuted to marital property. However, to the extent the account
balance is retraceable to the interest deposits under the evidentiary standard
set forth in subdivision A(3)(d), the account balance would be classified as
part separate property, but only to the extent of such contributed property
using standard "source of fund" rules. Thus, assuming traceability, the balance
of the account would be classified as $4,000.00 as the separate property of
Husband, and $6,000.00 as marital property. The marital property balance of
$6,000.00 would be divided pursuant to the consideration by the court of §
20-107.3(E) factors.
ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLES 3, 4, 5 AND 6:
The examples above reflect the application of the marital partnership
theory to the issue of income generated from separate property during the
marriage. In Example 3, the income is generated solely from the effort of
others and not either party. In such a situation, no public policy justifies
including this income in the marital estate and, therefore, such income would
remain separate property. This assumes the income is maintained as separate
property and would be further subject to the commingling and tracing rules
set forth in subdivision A(3)(d) and (e) if such income is commingled with
other marital property.
However, where the income is generated through the effort of a party
during their marriage, which effort is made by a spouse, this affects the day-
to-day functions and relationships of the parties and, pursuant to the marital
partnership theory, should be included in the marital estate in order to reflect
such marital effort. However, the inclusion will only be to the extent of such
income generated from such effort, and the classification of the separate
property itself would remain separate, subject to the "increase in value" rules
set forth in subdivision A(3)(a). Such is the case in Example 4 applying the
rule to a rental income situation.
Examples 5 and 6 show the application of the amendment to more classic
passive income increases. Where stock dividends are generated, interest on
CD's, the interest from mutual funds, bonds and other intangibles result
merely from the investment return itself, no public policy justifies the inclusion
of such income into the marital estate. This income, provided it is maintained
separately, would remain separate property, as shown by Example 5. However,
if the same interest income was commingled into other accounts of the parties,
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which more commonly occurs in the real world relationship of married parties,
the identity of the commingled interest is addressed by the subdivision A(3)(d)
or (e) relating to commingled property. Subject to adequate tracing, and the
use of the proceeds of such joint accounts as shown in Example 6, which
rules are well-developed in other equitable distribution states, such interest
income could still be classified as separate property, but only to the extent of
such contributions. The commingling rules are more fully addressed in the
comments to subdivision (A)(3)(d) and (e), Comments #11 and #12.
COMMENT #4
P. 1, LL. 36-42: INCREASE IN VALUE OF SEPARATE PROPERTY.
This language is in specific response to the harsh transmutation rulings
of the Lambert and Ellington cases in which the Court of Appeals held that
where the appreciation in value of separate property (i.e., a solely titled stock
corporation owned by a spouse at the time of the marriage) is the result of
the "active" efforts of the parties during the marriage, the commingling of
this increase transmutes "the entire" property to marital property. The criticism
of such rulings is well-set forth in the Report issued by this Subcommittee,
dated September 9, 1989, and is a critical reason why virtually all family law
practitioners and judges believe a legislative response to the entire transmutation
area is needed in Virginia. The language also includes specific evidentiary
standards as to when the personal effort of either party will permit the
inclusion of the increase in value of an asset in the marital estate. The
proposed standard is taken from the Illinois legislative response to similar
transmutation problems experienced in their state, which standards have ap-
parently satisfactorily resolved the issue in more recent Illinois cases studied
by our Subcommittee. The intent and application of the legislative standard
is more specifically set forth in the attachments to the Report of this Subcom-
mittee, including the application of such standard in Illinois by the drafters
of said legislation.
The net result of this statutory language is, first, to prevent the total
transmutation of the entire asset into marital property based upon the active
appreciation thereof by either party during the marriage. By the amendment
permitting a hybrid classification of property, the integrity of the value of the
property at the time of the marriage or its later commingling would be
preserved, but the "increase in value" of such asset, during the marriage and
only to that extent, would be classified as marital property to the extent the
increase in value is attributable to such contributions.
Second, in the case of the personal efforts of either party, the specific
standard to justify the inclusion of the extent of such increase in value into
the marital estate requires the efforts to be "significant" and result in
"substantial appreciation of the separate property." This language specifically
responds to the lack of such standards in Virginia case law, and recognizes
that minimal efforts (i.e., the "painting of a fence," "planting of a bush" at
the business of the other spouse) would not justify the transmutation or
inclusion of the business or asset into the marital estate.
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Third, the language recognizes the significant personal effort or contri-
butions of either party. It is the Subcommittees belief that where the day-to-
day relationship of the parties affects their marital relationship and marital
estate, such as the classic case of a full-time working husband in his previously
separately owned business, and the non-working housewife, that the effort of
either party in increasing the value of an asset such as a business, should be
recognized in the marital estate. Thus, to the extent only of such increase in
value by either party, where the effort is "significant" (the Illinois legislative
standard), the marital partnership theory justifies the inclusion of that part of
the increase of value reflecting such effort, as part of the marital estate.
EXAMPLE 7: INCREASE IN VALUE-PASSIVE
Husband owns 100 stock certificates titled in his sole name in XYZ Corporation
valued at $40.00 per share, or $4,000.00, at the time of his marriage to Wife.
The certificates remain in his sole name during the marriage, and all dividend
income is automatically rolled over by the corporation to purchase additional
shares of stock. There is a stock split of said stock during the marriage. At
the time of the separation of the parties, Husband owns 450 shares of stock
of said corporation, each share being worth $52.00, or a total value of
$23,400.00. Since the increase in value is passive, and not the result of
significant personal effort, the entire value of stock would be Husband's
separate property.
EXAMPLE 8. INCREASE IN VALUE-ACTIVE
Same facts as Example 7, except Husband spends a minimum of 8 hours per
week in working on his stock investments, and as a result of his expertise in
the ability to buy and sell his stock, the value of the stock at the time of the
parties separation is $75,000.00. Wife has mailed envelopes containing stock
certificate exchanges for Husband, and has occasionally taken telephone
messages for Husband relating to investment information. The original $4,000.00
value of stock would be Husband's separate property. That increase in value
which would have resulted from passive increase would be Husband's separate
property, being an additional amount of $19,400.00 ($23,400.00 passive in-
crease-$4,000.00 value at the time of the marriage). The active increase due
to the personal effort of Husband would be marital property, being the sum
of $51,600.00 ($75,000.00 value-23,400.00 passive increase/original value).
This sum of $51,600.00 would be divided between the parties based upon a
consideration of the § 20-107.3(E) factors.
ANAL YSIS OF EXAMPLES 7 AND 8:
Based upon these facts, the personal effort of Wife would assumingly be
insignificant and not, by themselves, be a commingling or effort to justify
inclusion of the increase in value as part of the marital estate. Whether such
efforts would have justified such an inclusion under the present Virginia law
expressed in the Lambert and Ellington cases is uncertain, but because of the
possibility of such transmutation by these types of actions, the language
clarifies this standard. More significantly, however, subdivision (A)(3)(a) would
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include the increase in value of the property, to the extent of such increase
only, if resulting from the significant effort of either party. Thus, in this
Example, the active effort of Husband itself by his personal effort which
affects his marital relationship by his expending of 8 hours per week, would
justify the inclusion of the extent of such increase in value during the marriage.
This would assume such efforts themselves result in substantial appreciation,
in excess of that which would have resulted from mere passive appreciation
had no active personal effort been expended by either spouse. Assuming the
court found Husband's efforts to be significant, and the evidence further
showed that Husband's efforts resulted in a substantial increase in value above
and beyond that of what mere passive appreciation would have resulted, then
the "extent" of such increase would be in the marital estate. This results in
a fair apportionment of the increase of value of the asset reflecting the marital
partnership theory, but only to the extent such efforts result in an economic
affect of the marital relationship.
EXAMPLE 9: INCREASE IN VALUE-PERSONAL EFFORT
Husband owns 100% stock in his solely owned business, which business is
worth $200,000.00 at the time of his marriage to Wife. Wife is a homemaker,
not employed during the marriage, but rendering non-money contributions to
the family, while Husband works at this business during normal working
hours. The business is the main source of income to the family during the
marriage. After a 20 year marriage, the parties separate and the business is
then worth $450,000.00. Assuming the personal efforts of Husband (being
"either party") under the proposed definition of separate property and as
contained in subdivision A(3)(a), have been the main cause of the increase of
value of the business during the marriage, and that his efforts have been
significant, the trial court could classify the business as follows: The amount
of $200,000.00 of the business would be the Husband's separate property,
being property representing the value at the time of the marriage. The "extent"
of the increase in value during the marriage, attributable to such efforts of
"either party" being the Husband in this case, would enable the trial court
to classify the $250,000.00 increase in value as marital property. The ultimate
division of the $250,000.00 marital part of the business would, however, still
be in the discretion of the trial court pursuant to the actors set forth in § 20-
107.3(E), and would not necessarily be an equal of 50/50 division, in accor-
dance with the law expressed in the Papuchis and Pommerenke cases. Such
division, accordingly, of the marital share of the $250,000.00 would reflect
the court's evaluation of the contributions of each party in each case during
the marriage pursuant to the 107.3(E) factors.
ANAL YSIS OF EXAMPLE 9:
The rationale for recognizing the personal efforts of "either party" under
the analysis above is a recognition of the marital partnership theory. The
courts should recognize the increase in value of an asset, such as a business,
where it results from the day-to-day contributions of either spouse during the
marriage which affect their marital relationship. Where the Husband actively
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works at this business during his marriage, this affects the marital relationship
no less than the non-owning spouse's contributions to the family. Thus, where
those efforts are significant and result in substantial appreciation of the business
(I.e., active efforts as opposed to passive appreciation not reflecting significant
marital effort), the marital estate should be inclusive of such increase, but
only to the extent such increase occurred during the marriage. The value
owned by Husband at the time of the marriage, not being a reflection of any
marital contributions, should remain intact as the separate property of the
Husband. At present, the case law of Virginia expressed in Lambert and
Ellington would render the entire value of the business as marital property.
The net result of the statutory language is consistent with the most non-
Virginia case law on the subject by fairly apportioning the increase in value
of an asset to reflect that part of the value which results from the significant
marital effort of either party, but to similarly keep intact and to preserve the
separate part of the value of such asset which does not reflect such contri-
butions. More significantly, the language further protects the interest of a
non-working homemaker who does not perform personal effort directly to-
wards such business or asset, but whose day-to-day marital relationship with
her spouse is affected by the other spouse's significant time and ability to
work at such business to increase its value and provide income to the family
unit. Such increase in value, by reflecting the efforts of "either party," more
fairly compensates the marital estate. The language further clarifies, however,
that insignificant efforts of either party, such as the "planting of a shrub"
or "painting the fence" types of contributions does not render an asset as
part marital where neither spouse made significant efforts towards such asset.
Finally, the specific standard set forth in the language of "significant" efforts
resulting in "substantial appreciation" of property (which language was taken
from the Illinois legislation which similarly responded to their transmutation
problems), provides the guidance and standards for such transmutation that
are clearly lacking as a result of the Virginia case decisions such as Lambert
and Ellington.
EXAMPLE 10: INCREASE IN VALUE-DISCHARGE OF DEBT
Husband purchases a $50,000.00 home just prior to marriage with $10,000.00
of separate funds as a down payment and a $40,000.00 mortgage. All mortgage
payments are made with marital funds, being the wages of either or both
parties during the marriage. At the time of trial, the house is valued at
$80,000.00, and the principal mortgage balance is $20,000.00, creating an
equity of $60,000.00. The separate estate of Husband has contributed $10,000.00
to the equity in the home. The marital estate has contributed $20,000.00.
Thus, the separate and marital estates have a 1/3 and 2/3 interest in the
home, respectively. The increase in value reflecting the contributions of the
"marital" contributions under the proposed language would be 2/3 of the
equity, or the sum of $40,000.00 (2/3 of $60,000.00 equity). The court would
classify the Husband's 1/3 interest in the property as Husband's separate
property, or the sum of $20,000.00 (1/3 of $60,000.00 equity).
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ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLE 10:
The legislative language addresses other types of marital contributions,
other than personal efforts, that result in the increase in value of assets. The
use of marital assets to pay for the maintenance of separate property, to pay
for the discharge of mortgage indebtedness or to pay for improvements to
separate property are addressed by this language. It reflects the fair reimburse-
ment to the marital estate where actual money or other more tangible contri-
butions are made by either party, during the marriage, which affect their
marital economic relationship, and which affect the "increase in value" of an
asset.
Example 10 is an application of these fair rules to the classic example of
a pre-marital home owned by one party where marital contributions, such as
wages or other marital income, is used to pay the mortgage and thus increase
its value. The "proportionate approach" to the contributions of separate and
marital properties appears to be a fair method to permit a hybrid classification
by the court, recognizing the proportionate contributions of each type of
property, and a similar apportionment of the increase of equity of the home
over the years of marriage. This method and proposed rule has been adopted
in the case decisions of numerous other states, and is more specifically analyzed
by the authors of similar Ilinois legislation in the attachments to the Report
of this Subcommittee dated September 29, 1989.
EXAMPLE 11: INCREASE IN VALUE-IMPROVEMENTS
The parties use $10,000.00 of their joint bank account to add a room addition
to the separately owned residence owned by Husband at the time of the
marriage, and titled in his sole name. At the time of the trial, the home has
appreciated to a value of $100,000.00 without any liens, and 20%0 is attributable
to the room addition as established by expert testimony. Under the "value
added" rules for such improvements followed by most states, the court would
classify 80% of the home's value, or the sum of $60,000.00, as Husband's
separate property, while the 20% of the equity or $20,000.00 representing the
enhancement of value caused by the marital contribution, would be marital
property and divided between the parties in accordance with § 20-107.3(E).
ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLE 11:
Where the increase in value of a separate asset is due to the contribution
of marital assets, under existing Virginia law, it can be assumed such com-
mingling of marital funds into separate property would transmute the entire
separate asset to marital property. The statutory language, permitting hybrid
classification, more properly permits the court to classify part of the asset as
marital property to the extent it increases in value due to such marital
contributions. The general rule in most states in the case of improvements to
property is the "value added" or the "enhancement in value" rule. Such a
rule is consistent with the marital partnership theory by permitting the court
to classify as part marital property that part of the separate value of the
separate property that increased due to the contributions from marital property.
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The rule would further avoid the total transmutation rules that would result
from such commingling of properties under current Virginia case law.
COMMENT #5
P. 1, LL. 44-45: DEFINITION OF MARITAL PROPERTY.
This language clarifies that the definition of marital property includes that
hybrid "part" of property under subdivision A(3) which is classified as "part
marital" property.
COMMENT #6
P. 1, L. 54-P. 2, L. 1: DUTY OF COURT TO
MAKE HYBRID CLASSIFICATION.
Subdivision A(3) makes it mandatory for a trial court to classify property
in a hybrid manner in accordance with the rules set forth in subdivision
A(3)(a) through (e). The language's mandate that the court "shall classify"
attempts to respond to the need to avoid the total discretion on the classifi-
cation level which has resulted from the opinion in Smoot and post-Smoot
transmutation cases.
Subdivision A(3) is also an organized attempt to concisely place in one
section of the Code the various types of fact situations and rules applicable
to property classification which confront family law practitioners and courts,
and to articulate fair standards therefore which are consistent with the marital
partnership theory.
It should be made absolutely clear that the amended language is not an
attempt to dictate the division of the "marital share" of such property pursuant
to § 20-107.3(E), or to enact a 50POD/presumption for such division. Rather,
it is an attempt to provide articulated and uniform rules at the classification
level to reverse the harsh consequences of the Smoot decision.
COMMENT #7
P. 2, LL. 2-4: INCOME FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY.
This language requires the classification of that part of income generated
from separate property as marital property, but only to the extent it results
from the personal effort of either party. For a more detailed analysis, see
Comment #3 and Examples 3, 4, 5 and 6.
COMMENT #8
P. 2, LL. 4-8. INCREASE IN VALUE OF SEPARATE PROPERTY.
This language requires the classification of that part of the increase in
value of separate property to the extent marital property, such as wages,
marital income, and other tangible contributions, or the personal effort of
either party, contribute to such increase. In the case of the personal effort of
either party, the effort must be "significant" and result in "substantial
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appreciation" of property. For a more detailed analysis, see Comment #4,
and Examples 7, 8, 9 and 10.
COMMENT #9
P. 2, LL. 9-10: PENSIONS, ETC.
In 1989, § 20-107.3(G) was amended to provide for the awarding of a
percentage of the "marital share" of a pension, said share having accrued
from the date of marriage to the date of the parties last separation. In essence,
subsection 107.3(G) permits a "hybrid" classification in the case of pensions
or other deferred compensation plans by definition. This subdivision A(3)(b)
merely clarifies for consistency that said marital share as defined in subsection
107.3(G) shall be classified as marital property by the court. The portion of
such pension which arose prior to the marriage or after the last separation of
the parties shall be classified as the separate property of the owner of such
pension or plan. The division of the "marital share" portion of the pension
or retirement plan shall be in the discretion of the trial court in accordance
with § 20-107.3(E) factors and the extensive existing Virginia case law approving
numerous deviations from a 50/50 division of such pension between the
parties.
COMMENT #10
P. 2, LL. 11-13: PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS.
There have been no Virginia Court of Appeals cases on the issue of the
proper classification of personal injury or workman's compensation awards.
Circuit Court opinions have been in conflict as to whether such awards are
all marital property, separate property, or a hybrid of both. Other issues
resulting in much litigation in other states, and not presently addressed by
present Virginia case law, is the affect of the deferral of personal injury
settlement or liquidation of an award after the separation of the parties, or
the equitable distribution trial, where the actual injury occurred during the
marriage of the parties. See, e.g., In re marriage of Fields, 779 P.2d 1371
(Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (unliquidated personal injury claim arising during the
marriage is marital property). But see contra, Hurley v. Hurley, 342 Pa.
Super. 156, 492 A.2d 439 (1985).
The legislative subcommittee believes it is appropriate and necessary to
clarify the future uncertainty of this area in order to provide workable
guidelines for practitioners and trial courts which recognize the underlying
purposes of the marital partnership theory.
Subdivision A(3)(c) requires the classification of the "marital share" of a
personal injury or workman's compensation award in accordance with new
proposed subsection 20-107.3(H). An analysis of the proposed rules relating
to such awards is contained in Comment #14.
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COMMENT #11
P. 2, LL. 14-19: COMMINGLING OF PROPERTY, LOSS OF
IDENTITY OF CONTRIBUTED PROPERTY
One of the main criticisms of Virginia's present transmutation laws is the
extreme effect of commingling of marital and separate property, resulting at
the classification level of the entire asset being classified as marital, with the
total discretion of the trial court to divide such asset as it sees fit considering
the 107.3(E) factors. The failure to permit a hybrid classification, or a "source
of funds" type of consideration has resulted most recently in the Lassen v.
Lassen case in the total transmutation of an asset, without a real articulation
of standards for division on remand.
Subdivision (A)(3)(d) is adopted from similar language adopted by Illinois
in their statutory response to their similar harsh transmutation case law. The
implementation of this standard is more specifically set forth in the attachments
to the Report of this Subcommittee dated September 29, 1989.
Basically, subdivision (A)(3)(d) permits the transmutation of previously
owned separate property where it is commingled with other marital property,
resulting in the loss of identity of the contributed property. Such would be
the case where previously liquidated separate cash, stocks or assets are com-
mingled into a joint bank account of the parties, or the separate bank account
of one party containing marital property such as wages or income generated
from marital property. To this extent, it recognizes the effect of commingling
expressed by Virginia case law, as most recently expressed in the Lassen case.
However, consistent with the "source of funds" theory, if such contri-
butions are "retraceable" by a "preponderance of the evidence," and was
not a gift, then such contributed property shall retain their original classifi-
cation, such property shall be classified by the trial court as "part separate"
property and "part marital" based upon the "source of funds" rules well-
established by non-Virginia case law. See also Rexrode v. Rexrode, 1 Va. app.
385, 339 S.E.2d 544 (1986) implying the use of such retracing to determine
proper classification of credit union account. The ability to permit such a
hybrid classification resolves the classification level problems which, at the
present time, provide practitioners and courts with little guidance. For a basic
application of the commingling rules, see Examples 1, 2, 5 and 6 and the
examples contained in the article prepared by the authors of the Illinois statute
attached to the Report of this Subcommittee dated September 29, 1989.
EXAMPLE 12
Let's analyze the proposed subsection in reference to the facts contained in
the Lassen case. Husband received an inheritance prior to the marriage. Assume
the value of said accounts at the time of his marriage was $50,000.00, and
were certificates of deposit in his sole name. During the marriage, Husband
liquidates $40,000.00 of the CD's and placed them in a bank account which
was in his sole name, but which contained $1,500.00 which was from his
retirement payments. One week later after the deposit of said CD's in the
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bank account, Husband writes checks for $40,000.00 for the purchase of three
investment stock accounts which were in Husband's sole name. The accounts
are valued at $60,000.00 at the time of the equitable distribution trial. The
$10,000.00 CD remaining in Husband's name would be his separate property.
The $60,000.00 in the investment stock accounts would be Husband's separate
property. The proceeds in the marital bank account would be marital property.
ANAL YSIS OF EXAMPLE 12:
Pursuant to subdivision (A)(3)(d), the placing of the proceeds of the CD
into Husband's bank account results in the transmutation of said proceeds
into marital property since it would result in the loss of identity of the specific
cash represented by the CD's where the balance in the account at the time of
the deposit would be $41,500.00. The stock accounts would initially be
classified as marital property pursuant to § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d). However, unlike
Lassen and pursuant to the authority of the trial court to make a hybrid
classification, assuming the proceeds which led to the purchase of the invest-
ment stock accounts are retraceable by the preponderance standard of evidence,
to that extent, said accounts would be Husband's separate property. This is
a classic "source of funds" case that the statute attempts to address.
COMMENT #12
P. 2, LL. 20-24: COMMINGLING OF PROPERTY, LOSS OF
IDENTITY OF BOTH PROPERTIES.
This subdivision deals with the situation where two separate assets are
combined into a newly created asset during the marriage. This would be the
combination of tangible assets, such as the creation of a new ring from a pre-
marital engagement ring and a post-marital ring into a new ring, as occurred
in the Price v. Price decision. Under such circumstances, the new property
would be initially classified as marital property.
Subdivision (e) would also apply where marital and separate intangible
property is commingled, such as the commingling of separate cash accounts
and marital bank accounts into the purchase of a new account or asset. This
was the fact situation of the Lassen case. See Example 6 and 11 for the
application of this rule.
COMMENT #13
p. 2, LL. 26-29: DEFINITION OF "PERSONAL EFFORT".-
This language defines in more specific terms those types of efforts which
may constitute the "personal effort" of a party. It is basically an adoption
of the standard set forth in the Uniform Marital Property Act and variations
of same adopted by other common law equitable distribution states. Due to
extensive litigation in other states as to what types of personal efforts can be
considered in the context of the issue of the classification of the "increase in
value" of an asset, usually being a business, the legislative subcommittee is
of the opinion this definition comprehensively includes those types of efforts
that should be considered by the trial court.
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COMMENT #14
P. 3, LL. 40-49: PERSONAL INJURY/WORKMAN'S
COMPENSATION A WARDS.
Subsection 20.107.3(H) would provide needed standards for the classifi-
cation and division of personal injury or workman's compensation awards.
Parallel to the pension division subsection contained in § 20-107.3(G), the
legislation permits deferral of the payment of any monetary award arising out
of said asset, where the claim has not yet been tried, liquidated, settled or
paid pursuant to such an award. This avoids the extensive litigation on the
issue of the "speculative" nature of a personal injury claim where such a
claim has not yet been liquidated at the time of the equitable distribution
trial, which has occurred in other states.
Based upon the better reasoned case law and the recent trend of non-
Virginia case opinions, the legislation sets forth a "hybrid" classification of
such awards into two distinct parts. The first part is a reimbursement to the
marital estate of the financial loss to the parties resulting from such an injury
due to the loss of wages of the injured party. The second part of such an
award is the medical losses, and pain and suffering portion or other intangible
consequential damages, which would be the separate property of the injured
spouse.
The "marital share" of such an award, consistent with the marital
partnership theory and with § 20-107.3(G) relating to pensions, would include
only such wage losses to the parties that accrued during the marriage and
before the last separation of the parties. Thus, at the time of an equitable
distribution trial, the actual monetary loss to the economic partnership of the
parties during the marriage could be quantified and identified, even though a
settlement or award had not been completed.
Also consistent with the pension rules for the delay in payment of a
retirement award, the statute would further permit the deferral of the payment
of a personal injury award until settlement or trial of the injury case where
payment to the injured spouse has not occurred at the time of the equitable
distribution award. Such a mechanism makes common sense where the eco-
nomic loss to the marital partnership is known at the time of the equitable
distribution trial, but the award has not yet been received by the injured
spouse. Such a mechanism would clarify this issue in Virginia and would
avoid the extensive litigation that has occurred in other states on such issues.
EXAMPLE 13
During the marriage, Husband is injured in an automobile accident. His
specials include $5,000.00 loss of wages, and there is no evidence of permanent
injury affecting Husband's future earning capacity. During the marriage and
prior to the separation of the parties, Husband settled the case for $15,000.00,
netting $10,000.00 after his payment for attorney fees. The $10,000.00 is
deposited in a separate account in Husband's name. The wage loss portion
of the claim is $5,000.00, and $10,000.00 is the remaining portion of the
settlement, being 1/3 and 2/3 proportions. The net proceeds received after
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payment of attorneys fees is $10,000.00, which would be classified as 1/3
marital property, or the sum of $3,333.33, and 2/3 the Husband's separate
property, being the sum of $6,666.67. The marital portion of said proceeds
would be divided by the trial court pursuant to § 20-107.3(E) factors.
EXAMPLE 14
Same facts as Example 13, except that there has been no trial or settlement
of the claim at the time of the equitable distribution trial. The trial court
would classify as the "marital share" of the property the loss to the marital
estate due to wage loss based upon the percentage of the overall settlement,
and award a spouse a portion of such percentage at the time received by the
injured spouse. The following formula could be used by the trial court in
such circumstances:
Net Settlement$5,000.0 (marital share) t tlmnx (total settlement amount) x % x proceeds received by
injured spouse.
For example, using the $5,000.00 wage loss set forth above, if settlement was
made 1 year after the equitable distribution trial, for the amount of $25,000.00,
and Husband's settlement netted $16,666.67 after payment of attorneys fees,
and unpaid medical bills, and further assuming the trial court determined the
non-injured spouse should receive 30% of the "marital share," the net result
would be an award to the Wife (non-injured spouse) of the sum of $1,000.00
($5,000.00/$25,000.00 x .30 x $16,666.67) and the remaining net settlement
proceeds to the Husband (injured spouse).
COMMENT #15
p. 4, LL. 8-9: EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENTS.
This provision makes it absolutely clear that it is intended that this
legislation applies only to divorce suits filed after July 1, 1990. It was inserted
to clarify that these amendments, which are considered by the drafters of the
legislation to be substantive in nature, do not apply retroactively to pending
cases. Due to the significant substantive changes in the classification of property
itself, the intent is to leave no doubt that the legislation is substantive and
not procedural and therefore, applies prospectively only.
Such an approach is consistent with Virginia case law on the issue, and
a similar result and analysis relating to pension classification contained in an
opinion of the Attorney General to Delegate James F. Almand, dated August
23, 1988, relating to the 1988 legislative amendments to § 20-107.3.
